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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
This dissertation consists of three essays focusing on the role of agriculture and resource
misallocation in economic development.
Chapter 2 studies the “dual economy” in developing countries, namely the productivity
gap between the agricultural and the non-agricultural sector. I present a new explanation
for this phenomena which relies on the interaction between non-homothetic preferences and
costly domestic trade. In particular, food is a necessity which has an income elasticity less
than one. Food is produced in rural regions and shipped to cities incurring trade costs,
while non-agricultural good is produced in cities and shipped to rural regions. Combining
the preference and production structure, high ability workers sort into cities and work in
non-agriculture as they spend a larger fraction of expenditure on non-agricultural goods,
which are cheaper in cities. Low ability workers prefer to live in rural regions and work in
agriculture for easier access to food. The sorting mechanism has larger effects in developing
countries as these countries have higher trade costs and higher consumption shares of food.
I formalize the idea in a two-sector multi-region general equilibrium model. Quantitative
analysis of the model shows that the ability sorting mechanism can explain around 30% of
the rural-urban income gap in Malawi relative U.S. I also find empirical support of model
predictions using a detailed household survey from Malawi.
Chapter 3 explores the role of capital deepening on the productivity gap between agri-
culture and non-agriculture studied in Chapter 1, while also paying attention to two other
important development facts regarding agriculture: 1. the employment share of agricul-
ture declines in income levels; and 2. the international productivity gap is much larger in
agriculture than in non-agriculture. Empirical studies show that the elasticity of substi-
1
tution is larger in agriculture than in non-agriculture. This means the agricultural sector
responds more strongly to the reduction in the relative price of capital. In response to this,
labor will move out of agriculture, and labor productivity in agriculture rise relative to non-
agriculture. I explore this capital-labor substitution mechanism quantitatively by comparing
a model with CES production functions and a model with Cobb-Douglas production func-
tions. I find that the model with CES production functions is successful in explaining the
sectoral gaps in productivity while does not help in explaining the other two development
facts. The reason is because agriculture is also more capital intensive than non-agriculture,
which counteracts the effect coming from a higher elasticity of substitution, consistent with
the findings of Herrendorf et al. (2015) in U.S. data.
The sectoral gaps in labor productivity has been deemed as a sign of severe misalloca-
tion of labor in developing countries (Gollin et al., 2014). Both the previous two chapters
present arguments that this is not necessary true. Chapter 4 on the other hand discusses
the measurement of the cost of resource misallocation across micro production units in more
detail. The burgeoning literature on misallocation following Hsieh and Klenow (2009) has
mainly used value-added production functions, which potentially could understate the cost
of misallocation because these studies ignore the magnification of the effect of misallocation
through intersectoral linkages (Jones, 2011, 2013). This chapter compares the efficiency loss
coming for resource misallocation measured in two models conditional on observing the same
data. One model has output production functions and allow for sectoral linkages and the
other model uses value-added production functions. I find that when there are no distor-
tions in intermediate input use, measured efficiency loss in the two models is identical. Both
models are correct representations of the underlying data. When there are distortions in in-
termediate input use, the value-added model produces incorrect measures of efficiency loss.
Empirical analysis using Chinese data however shows that the bias is small as the distortions
in intermediate input use are substantially smaller than that in primary input use. Existing
studies using the value-added model might actually have overstated the cost of misallocation
due to mis-specified parameter values.
2
CHAPTER 2
Transportation Costs, Ability Sorting, and the Dual
Economy
2.1 Introduction
Many developing countries can be characterized as a “dual economy”, where the non-
agricultural sector is much more productive than the agricultural sector. Despite low agricul-
tural productivity, these countries have a large share of workers in agriculture (Gollin et al.
(2002); Caselli (2005), see Figure 2.1). A mirror image of the sectoral productivity gap is the
equally conspicuous rural-urban income gap (Young, 2013).1 The “dual economy” is such a
robust and salient feature of developing economies that reallocation of workers from agricul-
ture to non-agriculture (industrialization) or from rural to urban areas (urbanization) has
been viewed as synonymous to economic development. The traditional view of the sectoral
productivity gap is that there are barriers preventing workers from moving to urban areas.
Reallocation can bring the economy closer to the efficiency frontier. Given the large income
gaps and the large share of agricultural workers in developing countries, the efficiency gain
from reallocation can be huge.
This chapter proposes a new explanation for the “dual economy” which implies the gains
from reallocation are not warranted. I argue that high ability workers sort into cities due
to spatial price differences induced by transportation costs. As low ability (income) workers
spend a larger fraction of their income on food (Engel’s law), they prefer the rural areas
1To the extent that rural areas mostly engage in agricultural production while urban areas focus on
non-agricultural production. I use agriculture-non-agriculture and rural-urban interchangeably throughout
this chapter and only make clear the distinction when necessary. I do not distinguish between income and
productivity either.
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with cheaper food. On the other hand, high ability (income) workers prefer urban areas
because they value non-food consumption more and it is cheaper in cities. The ability
sorting mechanism is stronger in developing countries because 1) food consumption is more
important there, and 2) the spatial price differences are larger in developing countries due to
higher transportation costs. This explains why the income gap shrinks as a country develops.
I formalize the ability sorting mechanism in a two-sector multi-region general equilibrium
model. A non-agricultural sector locates in an urban center while all other regions are rural
and engage only in agricultural production. There is trade between the urban center and
the rural regions with varying iceberg trade costs, of which transportation costs are a main
component.2 The trade costs generate spatial price differences. Workers have Stone-Geary
utility with subsistence requirement in food. Each worker draws a pair of sector-specific
productivity and makes the location choice to maximize utility.
The introduction of sector-specific productivity draws follows Lagakos and Waugh (2013),
in which workers make the sector choice according to their comparative advantage in different
sectors, as in the classic Roy model. They find that agricultural labor productivity relative to
non-agriculture is lowered when unproductive agricultural workers select into the agricultural
sector as agricultural employment increases. My model reduces to that of Lagakos and
Waugh (2013) when trade costs are zero, which allows me to assess the importance of the
ability sorting mechanism on top of worker selection based on comparative advantage. On
the other hand, the multi-region setting follows Gollin and Rogerson (2014), which allows me
to zoom in on the rural regions as location choice across rural regions is only determined by
the ability sorting mechanism. I add worker heterogeneity to Gollin and Rogerson (2014) and
explore the role of ability sorting in explaining the spatial income differences in developing
countries.
The model predicts that income declines across rural regions in the trade costs with the
urban center. Using a detailed household survey from Malawi, I find that income declines
in the distance to the urban center, which is taken as a proxy for trade costs. This pat-
2I thus do not distinguish between trade costs and transportation costs in this chapter.
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Figure 2.1: The “Dual Economy”
(a) Agricultural Productivity Gap (b) Agriculture Employment
Note: The left panel plots the agricultural productivity gap, defined as the ra-
tio of agricultural labor productivity to non-agricultural labor productivity both
measured in nominal terms, against GDP per capita relative to U.S. The right
panel plots the employment share of agriculture against GDP per capita to U.S.
Data come from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO,Rao (1993)) and the Penn World Table 8.1 (Feenstra et al., 2015).
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tern lends support to the ability sorting mechanism as it is not readily explained by worker
selection. I further test the ability sorting mechanism using detailed information on agricul-
tural production in the data. I construct a measure of farmer’s productivity by estimating
a plot level production. Consistent with the ability sorting mechanism, my measure of agri-
cultural productivity also declines in the distance to city. This finding could just reflect
genuine benefits of locating near to the city, such as cheaper intermediate inputs or better
access to agricultural technologies. I show that my findings are robust to these alternative
explanations.
I calibrate a zero transportation cost benchmark of the model to U.S. data using data
moments provided in Lagakos and Waugh (2013). I allow countries to differ in three ex-
ogenous factors: an economy wide efficiency measure that affecting productivity in both
sectors, transportation costs, and land endowment. I evaluate the model by varying these
factors to match aggregate labor productivity in Malawi, the spatial price differences in
the micro data, and arable land per capita. The ability sorting mechanism, namely adding
transportation costs in the model, significantly increases the model’s explanatory power of
the rural-urban income gap in Malawi. The explained share of the rural-urban income gap in
Malawi relative to U.S. goes down from 41.7% to 11.7% when the ability sorting mechanism
is shut down while holding aggregate labor productivity constant. Both aggregate efficiency
and transportation costs affect ability sorting. To explore their quantitative importance, I
perform several counterfactual experiments by varying them separately. These experiments
produce very different results. In particular, raising aggregate productivity have significantly
larger effects on productivity and welfare than reducing transportation costs, but similar ef-
fects on the rural-urban income differences. Transportation costs are more important in
understanding regional income differences.
If the government can focus its infrastructure investment on raising aggregate efficiency
or reducing transportation costs in different regions, these experiments provide useful infor-
mation for evaluating different investment projects. Of particular interest is that welfare
gains under these policy experiments are not equally distributed among workers. The bot-
tom workers gain less than average workers when transportation costs are reduced. In some
6
cases, the very poor even experience welfare loss. On the other hand, improvement in ag-
gregate efficiency benefits the bottom workers more than others. Dollar and Kraay (2002);
Dollar et al. (2016) find that the bottom workers tend to have similar income growth as
the average workers in many developing countries. This analysis suggests that this might
be due to different drivers of economic growth counteract each other. Governments should
be careful in selecting growth-promoting policies when poverty reduction is also a target.
Empirical studies such as Jacoby (2000); Jacoby and Minten (2009) find that improvement
in rural transportation infrastructure benefits the poor, my findings suggest that it might
not be the case if the improvement is at a large scale with general equilibrium effects taken
into account.3
The final piece of empirical support for the ability sorting mechanism comes from inter-
national data. Lagakos and Waugh (2013) argue that as women have lower physical strength
than men, they must have comparative disadvantage in strength intensive agricultural pro-
duction. The selection mechanism can thus explain why the share of women in agricultural
workers is increasing in agricultural employment. The same argument also implies women
should always be less likely to choose agriculture than men. Using data from International
Labor Organization (ILO) I find plenty of cases where women are more likely to choose
agriculture than men, and the probability of observing that is increasing in agricultural
employment. This can be explained by the ability sorting mechanism if women also have
absolute disadvantage to men. Women’s disadvantage can be explained by the model of Pitt
et al. (2012) where sector-specific worker productivity takes both physical strength and hu-
man capital as inputs. If women and men have similar human capital, women will have lower
productivity than men in both sectors due to their lower physical strength. The mechanism
should be stronger in developing countries as strength intensive technologies may be adopted
due to their lack of human capital (Caselli and Coleman, 2006), or because those countries
have a smaller services sector where women have comparative advantage (Ngai and Petron-
3The fact that perfectly mobile workers have unequal welfare gains from reductions in transportation
costs echos a recent trade literature studying the distributional effects of reduction in trade costs in the
presence of non-homothetic preferences and worker heterogeneity (Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal, 2016; Nigai,
2015).
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golo, 2017). The sorting mechanism is at work even when there is no difference between men
and women but women receive lower wages in both sectors due to discrimination.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section presents a literature
review. Section 2.3 motivates the model in Section 2.4 using Malawi data. Section 2.5
studies the model quantitatively. Section 2.6 presents empirical support in the Malawi data
for model predictions, while Section 2.7 supports the model using ILO data. Section 2.8
concludes, which is followed by an appendix containing additional results and a detailed
description of data construction.
2.2 Related Literature
This chapter belongs to a recent literature on agriculture and development.4 Caselli (2005)
and Restuccia et al. (2008) single out agriculture as key to understand the huge international
income differences because 1) agricultural productivity in developing countries is extremely
low relative to non-agriculture, and 2) the low agricultural productivity induces large agri-
cultural employment in developing countries due to subsistence food requirement. Many
studies have since tried to explain why agricultural productivity is extremely low in poor
countries.5 This chapter relates to two sets of explanations and derives new implications
from them.6
4The idea that agriculture is important for understanding development is not new. It has long been at
the center stage of understanding economic development, see, e.g. Lewis (1954); Harris and Todaro (1970).
The new literature builds on the old literature and brings in better data and new perspectives.
5Related to that,Gollin et al. (2002, 2007) emphasize the pivotal role of agricultural productivity growth
in jump-starting modern economic growth.
6Another branch of the literature focus on the use of intermediate inputs in agriculture. Agricultural
production in poor countries use very little modern intermediate inputs than developed countries. This
could be due to distortions in the intermediate input markets (Restuccia et al., 2008), low productivity
in producing intermediate inputs (Yang and Zhu, 2013), or farmers not willing to use intermediate inputs
because of the associated risk when an insurance market is missing (Donovan, 2014). Land market misal-
location represents another reason for low agricultural productivity in developing countries (Adamopoulos
and Restuccia, 2014; Adamopoulos et al., 2015; Restuccia and Stantaeula`lia-Llopis, 2017). In particular,
Restuccia and Stantaeula`lia-Llopis (2017) use the same Malawi data that I use to find more severe misal-
location in agriculture than what Hsieh and Klenow (2009) have found in manufacturing. Other researches
have studied specific factors behind land misallocation, such as untitled land (Chen, 2016), the communal
land tenure arrangement in Sub-Sahara Africa (Gottlieb and Grobovsˇek, 2015), and a land reform in the
8
First, this chapter is related to a literature that emphasizes the role of worker selection
in explaining productivity differences. Adopting a Roy model, Lagakos and Waugh (2013)
find that an increase in agricultural employment reduces average worker productivity in
agriculture but raises it in non-agriculture. This narrows the international productivity
differences in non-agriculture and widens that in agriculture. Young (2013) provides the
best empirical support to the self-selection argument. Using micro data from 65 countries,
he shows that workers born in the urban areas have a similar probability of moving to rural
areas as workers born in rural areas move to urban areas, despite a sizable rural-urban
income gap observed in data. Alvarez (2017) provides further evidence using Brazil panel
data, which allows him to track workers who actually move between sectors. He finds that
there is no significant wage growth for workers moving from agriculture to non-agriculture
when they don’t change their occupation.7 I contribute to this literature by proposing an
ability sorting mechanism based on absolute advantage of workers and the differences in
the consumption value of different regions. This literature relies on unobserved ability to
explain the productivity gap, which is not susceptible to econometric testing. The multi-
region setting in my model provides a way of testing the ability sorting mechanism.
The second literature traces the failure of agriculture in developing countries to high
transportation costs (Adamopoulos, 2011; Herrendorf et al., 2012; Gollin and Rogerson,
2014).8 High transportation costs distorts the spatial allocation of workers, which is particu-
larly detrimental to agriculture. This is because 1) more workers are allocated to agriculture,
a sector with decreasing returns due fixed land supply, and 2) agricultural production also
uses less intermediate inputs because transportation costs raise the price. While these studies
mainly assume homogeneous workers, I show that allowing for heterogeneous worker pro-
ductivity introduces a new channel for transportation costs to generate a “dual economy” in
Philippines (Adamopoulos and Restuccia, 2015).
7Other studies such as Adamopoulos et al. (2015) have combined the worker selection mechanism with
other distortions in the economy.
8It should be noted that trade literature has long been examining the effects of trade costs. Most of
them do not try to explain low agricultural productivity in developing countries. An exception is Tombe
(2015) who studies a multi-sector trade model with explicit reference to the problems of developing countries’
agricultural sector.
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developing countries.
The international comparison of sectoral productivity mirrors another finding previously
emphasized in Gollin et al. (2004), that is, agricultural labor productivity is significant lower
than non-agricultural labor productivity within a country when measured in nominal prices.
The gap in sectoral productivity is larger in developing countries. One explanation of the
productivity gap is measurement issues in the data. For example, Gollin et al. (2004) argue
that agricultural workers engage in more home production than non-agricultural workers.
Wingender (2015) interprets the gap as coming from sectoral differences in skill composition.
By carefully correcting measurement errors in the data, Gollin et al. (2014) find the gap is
still substantial after the adjustment.9 Another explanation is that regions differ in cost-of-
living or amenities such that welfare is equalized across regions. However, price differences
across regions are small relative to the income differences (Ravallion and van de Walle, 1991;
Brandt and Holz, 2006). Gollin et al. (2017) find that urban areas have better amenities
that rural areas in almost all the amenity measures they consider. These findings indicate
labor might be severely misallocated in developing countries (Gollin et al., 2014). Early
studies by Lewis (1954) and Harris and Todaro (1970) trace the source of misallocation to
institutional settings preventing the equalization of marginal product between the sectors.10
Caselli and Coleman (2001) argue that reduction in migration barriers lowered the sectoral
productivity gap in the U.S. The fact that many urban workers migrate to rural areas
(Young, 2013) suggests worker selection might be the reason behind the sectoral productivity
gap. Lagakos and Waugh (2013) though find self-selection cannot quantitatively explain the
sectoral productivity gap in developing countries very well. The ability sorting mechanism
on the other hand finds its biggest success in explaining the gap.
My multi-region model has features of the von Thu¨nen model of ”dual economy” (Nerlove
9Herrendorf and Schoellman (2015) show that the agricultural productivity gap in U.S. can be explained
away by measurement errors in the data.
10Similar in that vein, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016) show the gap can be explained by the rural insurance
networks which raises the benefits of locating in rural areas. Young (2013) however shows that the urban
workers migrating to rural areas fail to experience a reduction in the variance of consumption. Assuming
the income gaps reflecting labor misallocation, Vollrath (2009, 2014) estimates the efficiency loss from that.
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and Sadka, 1991). The original von Thu¨nen model emphasizes the differential use of land in
rural areas according their distance to the urban center. Fafchamps and Shilpi (2003, 2005)
have examined those predictions of the von Thu¨nen model using data from Nepal. They
find that the spatial specialization of economic activities and organization of labor do vary
systematically to the distance to the urban center. By adding worker heterogeneity to the
original model, my model generates spatial income differences across rural areas which I find
support in the Malawi data. My findings suggest that it might be fruitful to go beyond the
rural-urban dichotomy and study spatial inequality within each sector, in particular that
across the rural areas.
The sorting mechanism has been used to explain the spatial income gaps between cities
in the urban literature (Lee, 2010; Black et al., 2009; Handbury, 2013), which often model
spatial differences in housing prices as the source of ability sorting. I adopt the idea in a
rural-urban setting. In developing countries, the rural-urban income gap is a more salient
feature of spatial income inequality and food is a much more important consumption item
for the poor which has an income elasticity less than 1.
2.3 The Spatial Profile of Income and Prices in Malawi
This section presents some motivating evidence. I examine how income (consumption) and
prices vary geographically with respect to a region’s distance to an urban center using data
from Malawi. Malawi is a landlocked country in the Southern-Eastern part of Africa. It is
one of the least developed countries in the world. In 2005 it has a GDP per capita of only 580
dollars valued at PPP prices. Over 80% of its labor force work in agriculture. Transporta-
tion infrastructure is very poorly developed in Malawi. Due to the poor conditions of its
road, Malawi’s domestic transport costs are much higher than neighboring countries such as
Zimbabwe, which has similar income level to Malawi. Transport costs are the single largest
expenditure for Malawian farmers. In sugar production, which is one of Malawi’s major ex-
ports, regional and international transport costs add nearly 50 per cent to production costs
11
for Malawian sugar.11
The data I use is the Malawi 2010-2011 Integrated Survey on Agriculture (the Third
Integrated Household Survey, IHS3). It is part of the Living Standards Measurement Study
- Integrated Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS-ISA) project implemented by the LSMS team
of the World Bank. The ISA improves on previous LSMS surveys with a strong focus on
agriculture, which allows me to study the production and consumption decisions of farmers
in detail.
IHS3 has a sample size of 12,271 households and 56,397 individuals. The primary sam-
pling unit is the census enumeration areas (EAs). There are 768 EAs in total. The EAs differ
in the distance to urban markets, which is recorded in the community survey of IHS3.12 I use
two measures of distance: the physical distance to the nearest urban center and the cost of
total fare by regular motola to the nearest urban center.13 As the cost of fare doesn’t include
all the transportation costs to the urban center, I will focus on the physical distance.14 The
results using the cost of fare is similar but I do not report them in the text. IHS3 also asks
what the nearest urban center is. There are four urban centers to choose from: Mzuzu,
Lilongwe, Zomba, and Blantyre. These urban centers account for 11.9% of total population,
while the fraction of urban population is only 15.3% in total. The fact that the majority of
urban population live in the four urban centers allows me to treat all EAs except for those
in the urban centers as the rural area without worrying too much about the small cities.15
Figure 2.2 presents the geographic distribution of EAs according to the distance and cost
11The description above is based on OECD’s African Economic Outlook 2005-2006.
12A community identified in the community survey doesn’t corresponds to an EA exactly. It is represen-
tative of the EA as a whole.
13A motola is a pick-up truck that serves as an informal public transit.
14The question in the survey is: What is the cost of the total fare to go by regular matola from here or
the nearest matola stage to the nearest major urban centre, even if one has to change matola en route? It
thus might miss costs to the matola stage for some EAs. Changing matola might also incur additional time
cost that is not included in the total fare.
15Ideally, I would like to consider the distance to all cities, but the data is insufficient for that task.
Fafchamps and Shilpi (2003, 2005) use more detailed data on the geographic characteristics of regions in
Nepal. They focus on the examining the spatial specialization pattern instead of income.
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Figure 2.2: Geographic Distribution of EAs
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of fare to the nearest urban center. The distribution of EAs is relatively concentrated around
the urban centers. Most EAs locate within a 150km radius of one of the urban centers. Most
EAs have a cost of fare less than 1000 Malawian Kwacha.16 The two measures are highly
correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.82. Given the scarcity of data for the remote
areas, it is not surprising that the spatial profile presented below has much larger confidence
interval for the farthest areas.
I construct measures of income and consumption at the household level from the data.
These measures are aggregates of income from different sources and consumption of different
categories. The procedure mainly follows De Magalha˜es and Stantaeula`lia-Llopis (2015)
who also use the data to document the cross-sectional facts of consumption, income and
wealth in Malawi. Section 2.9.2 gives a brief description of how I construct the income and
consumption measures.
16As of September 26, 2017, the exchange rate between Malawian Kwacha and U.S. dollar is 723.6
Kwacha/dollar.
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2.3.1 Income and Consumption
This subsection studies spatial inequality in Malawi. The fact that the urban-rural income
gap can be very large in developing countries is well known in the literature (Gollin et al.,
2014). Malawi is a good example of that. According to Malawi’s national statistics, agricul-
ture’s share of GDP in 2010 is 29.6% while its share of employment is 86.4%, which implies
an sectoral productivity gap over 15!17 This gap might be explained by measurement errors
in employment and GDP, and the gap might also reflect differences in observable character-
istics of agricultural and non-agricultural workers. Gollin et al. (2014) estimate that a half
of the raw agricultural productivity gap can be explained by these factors.18 Even with the
adjustment, the sectoral differences is still staggering, implying large potential gains from
labor reallocation. Looking at the rural-urban income differences, my calculation using the
Malawi data shows a gap of 3.01, which is a lot lower than the agricultural productivity gap
but still respectable.19
The rural-urban dichotomy obviously is an over-simplified description of regional inequal-
ity in developing countries. All people certainly do not have equal income within rural or
urban areas. Economists often consider economic isolation thus lack of trade as a source
of low income. In line of that, we might expect income to vary substantially across rural
regions, as the vast rural hinterland in developing countries hides large differences in the
access to the urban markets. I next examine how income varies with the distance to the
nearest urban center.20 For all the results presented below, I net out the differences across
17The data comes from Malawi’s Statistical Year Book 2012, which can be downloaded at http://www.
nsomalawi.mw/images/stories/data_on_line/general/yearbook/.
18Gollin et al. (2014) use data for 2005. The raw and adjusted productivity gap between agriculture and
non-agriculture for Malawi are respectively 12.54 and 6.23.
19The difference between agricultural productivity gap and rural-urban income gap indicates that even
within the same area there is an income gap between agriculture and non-agriculture. This could be due to
labor market frictions such as a rationed non-agricultural labor market, or ability sorting between the two
sectors, or some insurance role provided by agriculture (Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2016). It could also be due
to ability sorting caused by transaction costs within an area, such as the cost of going to the market. I am
not examining this aspect of the data. The model studied below have agriculture and non-agriculture take
place in different areas.
20As mentioned above, I also use the cost of fare to the nearest urban center as a measure of access to
urban market. The results are similar but I do not report them in the text.
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urban centers by regressing the variables of interest on a set of city dummies. Through out
this chapter, I examine the relationship between a variable of interest and the distance to
the nearest urban center using the non-parametric kernel-weighted local linear smoothing
method. Unless otherwise noted, I choose an Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 50
for the local regressions.
Figure 2.3: Spatial Income Profile
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Note: Income comes from author’s calculation based on IHS3 data. Log income per
capita is smoothed using the kernel-weighted local linear regressions with Epanech-
nikov kernel and bandwidth equal to 50.
Figure 2.3 plots log income per capita against the distance to the nearest urban cen-
ter.21 Income initially declines in the distance to the city, then slightly increases and finally
decreases in the end. This suggests that geographic isolation reduces income near the city
but its effect tappers off as we go further away from the city. As discussed above, most
EAs locate within 150 kilometers from a urban center, this suggests that the results for the
far away areas should carry less weight given the paucity of data for those areas. This is
21I also use income per worker instead of income per capita, where a worker is defined as someone aged
between 15 and 64. The results are similar.
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reflected in the much larger confidence interval for the distant areas. Another reason to
put less weight on the results for the far away areas is that these areas are less likely to be
economically influenced by the urban center than some other nearby small cities. Taking
these into consideration, the spatial income profile in Figure 2.3 suggests that there is not
only a large income gap between urban and rural areas, but income also tends to decline in
the distance to the city within rural areas.
Since I only have a cross-section of data. The income measures I calculated contains a
permanent income component and a random shock. We are interested in the permanent
income component, which is better captured by consumption instead of income (Battistin
et al., 2009). In the data, consumption shows much less variation than income. Consumption
might also be more reliable if survey respondents are more reluctant to report income than
consumption or if income is hard to measured, which is particularly the case when most
people produce agricultural products not sold in the markets. In line of these considerations,
Figure 2.4 presents the spatial profile of consumption per capita.22 The rise in the middle
range is much less significant. Overall, there is a declining trend extended to the farthest
areas. This confirms that income might be systematically related to the location of a place.
The spatial variation is also economically significant: both the income and consumption gaps
between the poorest and richest regions can be as large as one log point.
The spatial income profile might not only reflect the productivity differences between
agriculture and non-agriculture. Fafchamps and Shilpi (2003) find that regions closer to the
city also engage more in non-agricultural production, which should lead to higher income
in those regions if non-agriculture has higher productivity. If these differences in regional
production structure can fully explain the spatial income profile, we should try to understand
why the production structure differs across regions. To examine whether it is the case in
data, I include the share of income coming from agriculture as a determinant of household
income.23 Even though the agricultural share of income is an economically and statistically
22The results are similar if I use consumption per adult equivalent. Following Meyer and Sullivan (2009),
I use the equivalence scale (A+PK)F , where A is the number of adults in the family, and K is the number
of children, with the child proportion of an adult P = 0.7 and economies of scale factor F = 0.7.
23Income shares are easily available as I construct total income from different income sources. It is hard
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Figure 2.4: Spatial Consumption Profile
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Note: Consumption comes from author’s calculation based on IHS3 data. Log con-
sumption per capita is smoothed using the kernel-weighted local linear regressions
with Epanechnikov kernel and bandwidth equal to 50.
significant determinant of household income, the spatial income profile documented above is
robust to the inclusion of the share.24
Regional differences in nominal income don’t translate into real income differences if
higher nominal income is offset by higher prices or worse amenities. If real income is equalized
across regions for these reasons, the rural-urban difference in nominal income might not be
a sign of resource misallocation. A recent study by Gollin et al. (2017) however shows that
a spatial equilibrium due to differences in amenities is very unlikely in a developing country
like Malawi. Using detailed data from 20 African countries including Malawi, they find that
amenities are constant or increasing in population density for almost all aspects of amenities
to construct employment shares because there is no detailed data on labor supply for all activities.
24A one percent increase of the share leads to a decline of log consumption per capita by 0.07, with a
p-value less than 0.001.
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they consider, such as housing quality and health, pollution and crime.25
If not amenities, can the differences in cost-of-living equalize real income across regions?26
Many casual observations suggest that there is a big difference in cost of living between rural
and urban areas in developing countries. Quantitative measures of that however are lacking,
to some extent due to the lack of good price data. Most studies constructing spatial cost-
of-living indexes do find that urban areas have larger cost-of-living, but the differences are
far from explaining all the differences in nominal income (eg., Ravallion and van de Walle
(1991); Brandt and Holz (2006)). I next turn to the evidence on prices from the Malawi
data.
2.3.2 Food Prices
The rest of the section analyses the spatial profile of prices. The analysis of prices is to
show that 1) spatial differences in nominal income can not be offset by differences in cost-
of-living, and 2) rural areas have lower relative price of food. I first look at food prices in
this subsection. Like many expenditure surveys, IHS3 asks both the value and quantity of
purchases for over 100 food items. This allows me to calculate unit values as proxy of prices.
To reduce the noise in unit value reported by individual households, I take the medium
unit value in a region to be the the price prevailing in that region. Combined with average
consumption shares of food items in each region, the prices are then used to construct a
spatial food price index. I classify the rural EAs into four regions according their distance
to the urban center and the urban EAs form a separate region. For each of the four urban
centers, a separate Paassche price index is constructed for the city and the surrounding rural
areas. Prices are normalized to 1 in the city. I report the average over the four cities in
Table 2.1. The differences in food prices between rural and areas are broadly consistent with
the findings of Deaton and Dupriez (2011) for Brazil and India. Within rural regions, there
25Housing quality and health are not amenity per se, but they use them as proxies for public good
provision in the household’s location.
26Gollin et al. (2017) look at real amenities. That is, they measure quantities which already take into
account the effect of price differences. Since they don’t consider all consumption goods, prices for other
goods might still differ across regions to equalize welfare.
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is also a decline in prices farther away from the city. Between the city and farthest rural
area, there is an economically significant 17% price gap. Keeping nominal income constant,
this means moving from the farthest area to the city could reduce real income by 8.5% given
food’s expenditure share of 0.5 in Malawi.27
Table 2.1: Spatial Price Differences
Regions 0 1 2 3 4
Distance to city city < 50 [50, 100] [100, 150] > 150
Price 1 0.91 0.87 0.86 0.83
Own-production 10.4 44.9 46.4 46.3 46.3
Note: Region 0 is the city, the rest are rural regions arranged in increasing distance
from the city. The first row shows the distance to the city measured in kilometers.
The second row is the Paasche price index for food. The third row is the percentage
of food not purchased.
Two caveats regarding the use of unit value are worth mentioning. First, I use unit value
to evaluate own-produced food. Table 2.1 reports that close to a half of food consumption in
rural areas come from own production while that number is only 10% in cities. This could
lead to an underestimation of the regional price differences if own-produced food is valued
at lower prices by the family than purchased food. For example, Deaton and Dupriez (2011)
find that the rural food price is substantially overestimated in Brazil and India when only
using unit values from cash purchases. Second, unit values are known to be contaminated
by quality differencesDeaton (1988). If high price goods also have high quality goods, this
however leads to an over-estimation the regional price gap.
To construct the price index, I need to balance the number of item prices available
and the number of regions, as smaller regions are more likely to recording zero purchase.
Having a few regions probably misses the price differences within an aggregated region. I
next look at the spatial profile of prices for individual food items. I make use of all unit
values reported by regressing prices at household-item level on distance to the nearest urban
27Of course, this rough calculation doesn’t consider the changes in other prices and the possibility of
substitution.
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center with a set of controls. The set of controls include the city dummies and the month
when the household were visited by survey teams, which is supposed to capture the effect of
seasonality. I experiment with two specifications, one includes the log of total expenditure
and one does not. The inclusion of total expenditure is to correct for the quality differences
in unit values.
Figure 2.5 plots the distance estimates against average expenditure shares. Most food
prices decline with distance from the city. It is especially so for those items with large ex-
penditure shares. Adding total expenditure increases the estimates, indicating the existence
of quality bias. However, the qualitative conclusion still holds. Looking at the individual
items closely, items less likely to be locally produced such as “Tinned meat or fish”, “Pow-
ered milk”, “butter”, “Sugar”, “Cooking oil” all have positive estimates. Interestingly, while
“Sugar” has a significant negative estimate, “Sugarcane” which is used to produce sugar has
a significant positive estimate. This says rural areas tends to have lower prices for locally
produced goods but higher prices for goods more likely to be exported from outside. As
descried in the introduction, I emphasize the effect of regional price differences coming from
the combination of regional specialization in production and costly trade. These findings
support my presumption.
My focus is on the aggregate cost-of-living and the relative price of food. While the
discussion of food prices is interesting, it is still only part of the story. As price is not
recorded for non-food items in IHS3, I next turn to a more structural estimation of both the
aggregate price index and relative price of food using information from Engel curves.
2.3.3 Price Estimates from Engel Curves
A recent literature pioneered by Hamilton (2001) and Costa (2001) uses information on
shifts in Engel curves to estimate differences in cost-of-living over time or across space. The
method relies on Engel’s law, which states that food’s budget share is inversely related to
household real income, conditional on relative prices and other household characteristics.
Movements in food’s budget share then provides an estimate of real income, ceteris paribus.
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Figure 2.5: Distance Slope of Prices and Expenditure Share
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Note: I regress log of item prices on the distance to city with a set of controls.
What’s plotted is the estimated coefficient against the item’s expenditure share.
Both the results with total expenditure as a control and without are reported.
My method of estimating the aggregate price index and relative price of food builds on this
literature.
I estimate two demand systems, one for food and one for individual food items. The
demand system for food is assumed to be the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS): food’s
budget share is given by
ωij = φ+ β(lnYij − lnPj) + γ(lnP Fj − lnPNj ) +X ′ijθ + uij,
where i and j indicates household and EA respectively, ω is food’s budget share, Y is
nominal income, P is the price index and subscripts F and N refer to food and non-food
respectively, X is a set of household characteristics controlling for differences in preference
between households, and u is a random error. Without information on prices, the model can
21
be estimated as,
ωij = φ+ β lnYij +X
′
ijθ +
∑
j
δjDj + uij, (2.1)
where Dj is an EA dummy and δj = −β lnPj + γ(lnP Fj − lnPNj ) contains information on
both the cost of living and the relative price of food. Given the estimates for β and γ, I
should be able to decompose δj into the two components if I have either the cost of living
or the relative price.
The second demand system I estimate provides an estimate for lnPj. Following Nakamura
et al. (2016), the item-level Engel curve is specified as,
ωkij = φ
k + βk(lnYij − lnPj) + γk(lnP kj − lnPj) +X ′ijθk + ukij,
where k indexes item. For each item k, I construct at the EA level item price P kj as the
medium unit value reported by households in that EA. Without variation in item prices
within the EAs, this precludes the estimation of Pj from a single item. Nakamura et al.
(2016) estimate the model non-linearly, pooling all items together. Since there are 768
EAs and many items, a non-linear estimation like theirs is computationally not feasible.28
Another concern is the large amount of zero expenditures for each item in the data.29 Not
considering the zeros will lead to biased estimates. In line of these considerations, I propose
the following three-step procedure to estimate Pj. The first two steps adopts the censored
regression approach of Heien and Wesseils (1990) to correct for the zero expenditures. The
demand system to be estimated is
ωkij = φ
k + βk lnYij +X
′
ijθ
k +
∑
j
δkjDj + u
k
ij, (2.2)
where δkj = γ
k lnP kj − (βk + γk) lnPj. In the first step, a probit model of whether or not
zero expenditure is observed is estimated on the regressors of the demand equation for each
28Their study of Chinese inflation rate only considers 30 provinces.
29This could be due to household not consuming the good or misreporting. As the households only report
food consumption during the last week, this could be also due to irregular purchasing.
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item. The estimates are used to calculate the inverse Mills ratios.30. In the second stage,
the item level demand equation 2.2 is estimated with the inverse Mills ratio as an additional
control. In the last stage, the estimated δkj are regressed on lnP
k
j without a constant term.
The residuals can be viewed as estimates of lnPj. I average the residuals over item to form
my estimates of aggregate price lnPj.
31 Finally, the relative price lnP Fj − lnPNj up to a
constant γ is retrieved as δj + β lnPj, where δj and β come from the Engel curve estimation
for food.
Figure 2.6: Spatial Profile of Log of Cost-of-Living Index
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Note: The price index comes from the Engel curve estimation described in the
text. Log price is smoothed using the kernel-weighted local linear regressions with
Epanechnikov kernel and bandwidth equal to 50.
I select ten food items according to their expenditure share and prices available.32 The
30The inverse Mills ratio is φ(·)Φ(·) if expenditure is positive, and
φ(·)
1−Φ(·) if otherwise. φ(·) and Φ(·) are the
predicted probability density and accumulative density for each observation
31This procedure leads to biased estimates of γ as lnPj and lnP
k
j might be correlated. I note that my
estimates of γ reported in the appendix are similar in magnitude compared to those of Nakamura et al.
(2016). I am working on improve the estimation procedure.
32They are maize ufa mgaiwa (normal flour), maize ufa refined (fine flour), dried fish, Sugar, tomato, rice,
nkhwani, brown bean, goat, and salt.
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controls used in the estimation are household size and composition, and household head’s
characteristics.33 Figure 2.6 plots the non-parametric fit of lnPj against distance to the city.
Surprisingly, price increases in distance. Cost-of-living do not offset the rural-urban income
differences but makes the gap in real income wider. In view of the food price differences
presented above, This could be the case if remote areas face really high prices for non-food
goods. For example, most services are not traded across regions. As most studies find urban
areas have slightly higher cost of living, this also points to the importance of accounting
for quality differences in measuring prices, especially for the non-food items.34,35 Another
possibility is urban areas provide more varieties which lowers aggregate price. The rural-
urban price difference is 0.11 log points, which is also economically significant. I freely admit
that the magnitude should not be taken too seriously given the complexity in the estimation
and measurement errors in data. The evidence does cast doubt on the role of cost of living
in explaining the spatial income differences found above.
Figure 2.7 shows that γ(lnP Fj −lnPNj ) declines in distance except the inaccurate estimates
in the farthest areas. As most studies estimate γ to be positive (e.g., Hamilton (2001); Costa
(2001)), this also implies relative price declines in distance as expected. For individual items,
my estimates are also positive as shown in Section 2.9.1. If we take γ to be 0.05, which is
roughly the middle point of the values found in the literature, this implies the biggest gap
in relative price is around 1 log point. The measure of relative price is mechanically related
to that of aggregate price with my estimation procedure. However, given the spatial profile
of food price, aggregate price must be much higher in urban areas to reverse the pattern
of relative price, which contradicts most estimates of rural-rural price differences in the
literature.
33Household composition is described as the ratio of children less than 15 years of age in the household.
Household head’s characteristics include sex, education, age, religion, marital status, language spoken, and
a dummy indicating whether the household head is a farmer.
34Deaton and Dupriez (2011) find that quality differences explain some of the rural-urban food price
differences in Brazil and India.
35A theoretical possibility is that rural areas export high quality goods to urban areas while import low
quality goods given the income differences and quality is a luxury. Since transportation costs don’t depends
on quality, transportation costs can have a larger share in traded non-agricultural goods due to the differences
in the value of goods.
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Figure 2.7: Spatial Profile of Relative Price
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Note: The relative price comes from the Engel curve estimation described in the
text. Log relative price is smoothed using the kernel-weighted local linear regres-
sions with Epanechnikov kernel and bandwidth equal to 50.
2.3.4 Taking Stock
Taking all the evidence together, there are two main points to take away. First, rural areas
have much lower income per capita than urban areas, which also declines in the distance
to the city. Spatial differences in cost of living is less likely to offset the differences in
nominal income. Since the majority of Malawi’s population lives in the rural areas, this
spatial variation within rural areas is not a trivial issue. This is a new though not surprising
finding. It might be explained by increasing migration costs for workers farther away from
the city. Worker selection as in Lagakos and Waugh (2013) and Young (2013) however
cannot easily explain the differences within rural areas. In the next section I show that
workers might sort within rural areas due to the spatial differences in relative price, which
is the second main point from this section.
My finding of higher relative price of food in urban areas echos a recent literature em-
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phasizing the role of transportation costs in distorting the spatial allocation of workers in
developing countries (Adamopoulos, 2011; Herrendorf et al., 2012; Gollin and Rogerson,
2014). For example, Adamopoulos (2011) find that transportation costs in the 5% poorest
countires are 2.74 times higher than those of the 5% richest countries. From this point of
view, my price estimates from Engel curve estimation might not seem so surprising. In re-
ality, price determination depends much more than an aggregate measure of transportation
costs. The measured price differences probably are more relevant in determining the spatial
allocation of workers than rough measures of transportation costs.
2.4 A Model of Transportation Costs and Ability Sorting
This section presents a model to explain the spatial distribution of income discussed above.
The income inequality within rural areas motivates a multi-region model, which also helps
me to test the model implications using the Malawi Data in Section 2.6. The main idea
of the model is that spatial prices differences due to transport costs can lead to sorting
of workers across regions when food consumption is a necessity. Remote rural regions will
have relatively cheaper foods, which makes them more attractive to low ability/low income
workers with large expenditure share of food. Higher ability workers choose regions closer
to the city because they focus more on the consumption of non-food good. The model has
a similar geographic structure to Gollin and Rogerson (2014) who study the allocation of
workers between an urban center and several rural regions in presence of transportation costs.
It also follows a long tradition of von Thu¨nen’s model of agricultural land use (e.g., Nerlove
and Sadka (1991)). In the model workers have sector-specific productivities as Lagakos and
Waugh (2013), such that comparative advantage is also a determinant of the sectoral choice
of workers.36
The economy features an urban center surrounded by a group of rural regions. I index
36Sector-specific productivity is not essential in inducing ability sorting due to spatial price differences.
However, if individual productivity is homogeneous across ectors, there will be perfect sorting across all
regions, as long as transport costs are not zero. With heterogeneous productivity, transportation costs play
a role in determining the sectoral choice of workers.
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the regions by j = 0, 1, 2...J , such that region 0 is the urban center, and the rest are rural
regions. The urban center produces a non-agricultural good. All rural regions produce a
homogeneous agricultural good. There will be trade between the urban center and the rural
regions, but not among the rural regions. Trade is costly. For a unit of agricultural good
transported from rural region j, only τ ja units reach the urban center. Similarly, for a unit
of non-agricultural good transported to region j, τ jn units arrive. Goods prices in region j
thus are given as
P ja = τ
j
aP
0
a , and τ
j
nP
j
n = P
0
n . (2.3)
The rural regions are arranged such that trade costs are increase in j. That is, τ ja and τ
j
n are
decreasing in j. The relative price of agricultural good P
j
a
P jn
= τ jaτ
j
n
P 0a
P 0n
is hence decreasing in
j. Remote regions provide cheaper food. Finally, each rural region is endowed with Tj units
of land which is used in agricultural production.
There is a continuum of workers. Each is endowed with a pair of individual productivity
{za, zn}, representing the efficiency of the worker in agriculture and non-agriculture. The
pair of productivity is draw from a joint distribution G(za, zn) with za > 0 and zn > 0. The
production of the non-agricultural good uses only labor according to,
Y 0n = AL
0
n, (2.4)
where A is productivity, L0n =
∫
i∈Ω0 z
i
ndG(i) is the labor input measured in efficiency units.
Profit maximization leads to
w0 = P 0nA. (2.5)
Agricultural production uses both labor and land. All regions have access to the same
technology, such that production in region j > 0 is given by
Y ja = A(L
j
a)
α(Tj)
1−α, (2.6)
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where Lja =
∫
i∈Ωj z
i
adG(i) is the labor input in region j. Profit maximization leads to,
wj = αP jaA
(
Tj
Lja
)1−α
, (2.7)
qj = (1− α)P jaA
(
Lja
Tj
)α
, (2.8)
where qj is the rental rate of land in region j.
Worker’s preference over the agricultural goods Ca and non-agricultural good Cn is de-
fined as follows,
U =
(
Ca − a¯
µ
)µ(
Cn
1− µ
)1−µ
, (2.9)
where a¯ > 0 is the subsistence requirement, and µ is the weight on agricultural consump-
tion. While the Stone-Geary preference or its extension (Herrendorf et al., 2013) have been
wildly used in the structural transformation literature, it has the unsatisfying property of
being homothetic asymptotically.37 My analysis however is not driven by the Stone-Geary
assumption. In Section 2.9.3 I show that ability sorting holds under any non-homothetic
preference that treat agricultural good as a necessity.38 I choose the Stone-Geary preference
for its analytical tractability.
A worker chooses a region to maximize utility, based on her productivity and local wage
and prices. Given the location choice, the budget constraint reads,
P jaCa + P
j
nCn = I
j, (2.10)
where Ij is the worker’s income in region j. In the urban center, workers only receive wage
income. In rural regions, workers receive wage income and a share of land rents. The land
rents are distributed across workers within a rural region. Each worker receives a share
proportional to her wage income. This amounts to workers receive all agricultural output
37The income effect is important in understanding structural transformation even in rich countries (Bop-
part, 2014), which is not possible with the Stone-Geary preference.
38The proof assumes homogeneous ability, so it corresponds to the within rural area ability sorting. Sector
choice under general preference is much harder to analyze when workers have sector-specific productivity.
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they produce. This assumption in essence mimics that of the classical dual economy model
of Lewis (1954): workers receive their average product. It is not so unrealistic. In developing
countries, rental markets for land are often missing, and most of the land is owned by the
family but without land titles (Chen, 2016).39 In this model, it results in worker income
proportional to their productivity, which simplifies the analysis below. But it does not drive
the results.40 Income in region j hence is summarized as,
Ij =

wjzn, if j = 0,
1
α
wjza = P
j
ay
j
aza, otherwise,
(2.11)
where yja =
Y ja
Lja
is the agricultural output per efficiency unit in region j.
Given the location choice and assuming Ij > P ja a¯,
41 optimal consumption decision is
simply given as,
P jaCa = µIj + (1− µ)P ja a¯ (2.12)
P jnCn = (1− µ)(Ij − P ja a¯) (2.13)
39In the Malawi data, only 7% of land plots are rented. Most land plots are either inherited (73.6%) or
granted by local leaders (11.6%).
40We can otherwise assume land rents are accrued to land owners who consume locally. Ability sorting
among workers still holds. If all workers receive an equal share of land rents irrespective of their location, a
sufficient condition for the results to hold is R < P ja a¯ where R is the total land rents. This condition is likely
to hold given I calibrate land rents to be only 18% of agricultural output while subsistence consumption
is 79% of agricultural output in the United States. The ability sorting results will be reversed if only the
distribution of land rents favors the near regions over remote regions and land rents are large relative to food
consumption. This is because lower ability farmers will value the fixed rental income more than high ability
farmers. This however is highly unrealistic.
41Otherwise only the agricultural good is consumed, we have P jaC
j
a = I
j and Cjn = 0. How the utility is
defined under this case doesn’t affect the equilibrium outcome. It only matters for welfare analysis. I will
come back to this point below.
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which leads to the indirect utility function,
V (j, za, zn) =

wjzn
(P ja)
µ
(P jn)
1−µ − a¯
(
P ja
P jn
)1−µ
, if j = 0,
wjza
α(P ja)
µ
(P jn)
1−µ − a¯
(
P ja
P jn
)1−µ
, otherwise.
(2.14)
The indirect utility for a worker residing in region j is a linear function of her productivity
with the intercept being determined by the relative price and the slope being a real wage
measure. The simple form of the indirect utility function makes the worker’s location choice
easy to analyze. The problem can be broken down into two sub-problems: the location
choice among rural regions and the sector choice between rural regions and the urban center.
I analyze them in turn.
Location Choice between Rural Regions The linear indirect utility implies that remote
regions have an advantage in attracting workers due to lower relative price of the agricultural
good. It must be counteracted by a lower real wage (income) if all regions are populated.42
We thus have real wage w
j
(P ja)
µ
(P jn)
1−µ decreasing in j for the rural regions.43 It is easy to
see that under this scenario, if worker i chooses a near region over a remote region, any
agent with a higher za will also prefer the near region. This means the choice between
rural regions can be described by a set of cutoffs {z˜ja}j=1,...J−1, where the worker with z˜ja is
indifferent between region j and j + 1.
wj z˜ja
α
(
P ja
)µ (
P jn
)1−µ − a¯(P jaP jn
)1−µ
=
wj+1z˜ja
α
(
P j+1a
)µ (
P j+1n
)1−µ − a¯(P j+1aP j+1n
)1−µ
,∀j > 0. (2.15)
The presence of non-homothetic preference and regional price differences leads to perfect
worker sorting: higher productivity workers sort into higher wage regions and pay higher
price for the agricultural good. Figure 2.8 illustrates this for three rural regions, where the
allocation of workers between rural regions is fully described by two cut-offs. I summarize
42All regions must be occupied due to the presence of a fixed factor.
43Technically, w
j
(P ja)
µ
(P jn)
1−µ is not a satisfying real wage measure, as different workers have different price
indexes when preferences are non-homothetic. I call it real wage nevertheless for convenience.
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these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Among rural regions, regions with lower relative price of the agricultural
good: 1) pay lower real wages, measured as nominal wage deflated by a price index with fixed
weights; 2) attract agricultural workers with lower productivity.
Figure 2.8: Location Choice Between Rural Areas
In
di
re
ct
 U
tili
ty
Cutoff 1 Cutoff 2
3
2
1
Choose 3
Choose 2
Choose 1
Lee (2010) show that ability sorting can rise between cities when big cities provide more
product varieties but also have higher rents. Since the housing demand is fixed, big cities
attract more high ability (income) worker because they value the consumption variety more
than low ability (income) workers. Sorting is not perfect because high ability and low ability
workers complement each other in production in all cities. This results in lower return for
high ability workers in big cities as low ability workers must be compensated for the high
housing price. For similar logic, Black et al. (2009) also show that cities with higher housing
prices should have lower return to education, which they find support in U.S. data. They
however assume both types of workers live in all cities, without considering the location
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choice problem. In my model, the disadvantage of near regions in food price is compensated
by higher real income. In developing countries, food consumption is more important than
housing consumption, while housing consumption might still play a role. The Malawi data
shows that food accounts for over 50% of total expenditure while housing rent is negligible.
Engel’s law stating that the expenditure share of food is declining in income is also a robust
feature of data, see eg. Houthakker (1957). Spatial price differences induced by transport
costs then imply workers are sorted across regions, which should help explain the spatial
income profile document in Section 2.3.
From the profit maximization conditions of agricultural firms, the wage rate in rural
regions is closely related to average product, wj = αP jay
j
a. Plugging it back into the indirect
utility function, we have
V (j, za, zn) =
(
P ja
P jn
)1−µ (
yjaza − a¯
)
, ∀j > 0.
Since the relative price of food is decreasing in j, we must have yja increasing in j, otherwise no
worker will choose the remote areas. As the production technology is the same everywhere,
it must be the case that remote areas have more land per unit of efficiency labor. Since
agricultural workers are sellers of the agricultural goods, they naturally prefer higher relative
price of food. For them to accept a lower relative price of food in remote areas, they must be
compensated by higher land intensity. The rental rate of land must be lower in remote areas
as land intensity is high while food price is low. I summarize these results in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 More remote rural areas have higher land-labor (in efficiency units) ratios
and lower land rental rates.
The model however doesn’t have an unambiguous prediction regarding how nominal
wages vary between regions. In a von Thu¨nen model with Cobb-Douglas preferences and
homogeneous workers, Nerlove and Sadka (1991) show that nominal wages can be declining
in the distance from the urban center, only if remote regions in general have a lower price
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index. My model also has a similar property. As w
j
(P ja)
µ
(P jn)
1−µ is decreasing in j, nominal
wage can be declining in j, if the increase in the price of the non-agricultural good is small
enough compared to the reduction in the price of the agricultural good.44 If the condition
is not satisfied, the model allows nominal wage to be increasing in j or behave randomly as
long as real wage is declining in j. This indicates that for workers around the boundary z˜ja,
workers in nearer regions might have lower nominal income. Perfect ability sorting doesn’t
necessarily mean there is perfect separation in nominal income between regions, a prediction
which is counterfactual.
Another way to look at nominal wage is to use the fact that wj = αP jay
j
a. As P
j
a is
decreasing in j and yja is increasing in j, nominal wage is also decreasing in j if output per
efficiency unit doesn’t increase fast enough. This again requires the price of non-agricultural
good doesn’t increase too fast as a small increase in output is enough to make the marginal
worker indifferent. The model doesn’t have an unambiguous prediction for output per worker
either. As we go farther away from the urban center, yja is increasing while worker’s pro-
ductivity is decreasing, output per worker in a region might decrease or increase. The same
result applies to land per worker. Income per worker also changes in an ambiguous way as
it is a product of P ja , y
j
a, and average worker efficiency. It is more likely to be decreasing
in j than nominal wage and output per worker, which explains the spatial income profile
documented in Section 2.3.
The expenditure share of food doesn’t have a clear spatial pattern. It is given by
food share = µ+ (1− µ) a¯
yjaza
(2.16)
It is lower for higher ability agricultural workers. But these workers choose nearer areas
where average agricultural output per efficiency unit is lower, which raises the expenditure
share. The fact that it is increasing in the distance to city again requires the difference in
ability to play a dominant role.
Sector Choice I next consider the choice between rural and urban regions. Let the optimal
44Notice that the Engel curve evidence in Section 3 points to the opposite.
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choice between rural regions be j∗, had the worker chosen agriculture. The non-agricultural
sector will be chosen if,
w0zn
(P 0a )
µ (P 0n)
1−µ − a¯
(
P 0a
P 0n
)1−µ
>
wj
∗
za
α
(
P j
∗
a
)µ (
P j
∗
n
)1−µ − a¯(P j∗aP j∗n
)1−µ
The location choice can be rewritten as,
w¯0
w¯j∗
zn
za
>
1
α
+
a¯
[
1− (τ j∗a τ j∗n )µ−1
] (P 0a
P 0n
)1−µ
w¯j∗za
, (2.17)
where τ j
∗
a and τ
j∗
n are trade costs of region j
∗ as defined above, and w¯j = w
j
(P ja)
µ
(P jn)
1−µ is the
real wage rate. This condition is different from the standard Roy model where sector choice
is made to maximize nominal wages (Lagakos and Waugh, 2013) for three reasons. First,
when prices differ between sectors, what matters is real wages instead of nominal wages.
This is reflected in the LHS of 2.17. Second, workers receive average product instead of
marginal product in agriculture, as seen in the first term on the RHS of 2.17. This raises the
bar for the workers to choose non-agriculture.45 Third, the second term on the RHS of Eq.
2.17 captures the interaction between subsistence consumption and spatial price differences.
This interaction induces the sorting of better agricultural workers to non-agriculture. For
each za, the sector choice 2.17 can be perfectly described by a cutoff of zn, denoted as z˜n(za).
The higher za is, the lower the ratio of z˜n(za) to za. It is thus harder to induce low ability
agricultural workers to choose non-agriculture. This is due to two effects. First, there is
a direct effect as low ability workers with low income value low price of agricultural good
more. Second, there is the indirect effect as low ability workers choose remote regions with
even lower prices of agricultural good. This is depicted in Figure 2.9 where there are three
rural regions. I summarize this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The ratio zn(za)
za
which describes the rural-urban choice for a worker with
agricultural productivity za is decreasing in za.
45It can also be viewed as a source of labor market frictions that lowers agricultural wages relative to
non-agricultural wages.
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Figure 2.9: Rural-Urban Choice
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Given the description of the location choice, labor supply in the urban center is given as
follows.
L0n =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
z˜n(za)
zndG(za, zn). (2.18)
In rural region j, labor supply is given as
Lja =
∫ z˜ja
z˜j−1a
∫ z˜n(za)
0
zadG(za, zn), (2.19)
where I assume z˜0a = 0 and z˜
J
a = ∞ to save on notation. The number of workers in each
regions are given as
N j =

∫∞
0
∫∞
z˜n(za)
dG(za, zn), if j = 0,∫ z˜ja
z˜j−1a
∫ z˜n(za)
0
dG(za, zn), otherwise.
(2.20)
We are now ready to define a competitive equilibrium for this economy.
Definition 1 The competitive equilibrium is defined as as a set of good prices {P ja , P jn}j=0...J ,
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wages {wj}j=0...J , and land rental rates {qj}j=1...J that: 1) clear all the markets given worker’s
and firm’s optimal decision take the prices as given, and 2) satisfy the relationship between
prices described by 2.3.
Factor market clearing is given by equating the factor demand 2.5, 2.7, and 2.8 to labor
supply 2.18 and 2.19, and land supply Tj. Given Walras’s law, I normalize P
0
n = 1 and
consider only the market clearing condition for agricultural good,
µ
P 0n
P 0a
Y 0n + (1− µ)N0a¯ =
J∑
j=1
(1− µ)(Y ja −N j a¯)
τ ja
, (2.21)
where I have made use of the aggregation property of the linear demand system implied by
the Stone-Geary preference.
2.5 The Quantitative Analysis
2.5.1 Calibration and Model Performance
This section quantifies the model and evaluates the importance of ability sorting. The
purpose is to understand how adding spatial price differences reinforces the selection effect
of Lagakos and Waugh (2013). The preference and technology parameters are calibrated to
U.S. data. For the U.S., it is assumed that transport costs are zero such that all workers
face identical prices. The model reduces to the baseline model of Lagakos and Waugh (2013)
except that agricultural production uses land. Following them, the joint distribution of
individual productivity draw is assumed to be
G(za, zn) = C[F (za), H(zn)],
where F (za) = exp
(za)−θa and H(zn) = exp
(zn)−θn ,
and C[u, v] = −1
ρ
log
[
1 +
(exp−ρu−1)(exp−ρv−1)
exp−ρ−1
]
.
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The parameters θa and θn controls the dispersion of the productivity draws and ρ determines
the correlation of the productivity draw. Using U.S. data, Lagakos and Waugh (2013)
find θa = 5.3, θn = 2.7, and ρ = 3.5. These numbers are also used here. Compared to
Lagakos and Waugh (2013), I have land in my model. The land share 1 − α is set to be
0.18, according to the estimate of Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008) for U.S. agriculture.
Land endowment is set to be 3.39 to match a land per agricultural worker of 169.3 acre
(Adamopoulos and Restuccia, 2014). The preference parameters are set to target a long-run
agricultural employment share of 0.5 percent and a current agricultural employment share
of 2 percent, which leads to µ = 0.0037 and a¯ = 5.54. Productivity A is normalized to 100.
The transportation costs are calibrated to the Malawi economy. Similar to Gollin and
Rogerson (2014) who also focus on the spatial misallocation induced by transportation costs,
I assume there are only two rural regions. Total land is set to match the gap in arable land
per worker between Malawi and U.S. in Restuccia et al. (2008), TMWI/TUS = 0.73/1.62.
In line with previous discussion on spatial price differences, I assume the first rural region
corresponds to the area within 50 kilometers from an urban center and the second rural
region includes all the rest rural areas. Transportation costs are assumed to be the same
for both goods. I set τ 1a = τ
2
n = 1.1 and τ
2
a = τ
2
n = 1.5, which are broadly consistent with
the Engel curve evidence in Section 2.3 and in line with the numbers used by Gollin and
Rogerson (2014). In the data, total land cultivated by farmers in the remote region is slightly
larger, which leads to T1 = 0.45T
MWI and T2 = 0.55T
MWI . Aggregate productivity A is
then calibrated to match the aggregate income difference between Malawi and U.S., which
requires AMWI = 6.37.
Table 2.2 presents the simulation results for the aggregate economy. To emphasize the
role of ability sorting, the model is contrasted to the model of Lagakos and Waugh (2013).
Since the Lagakos and Waugh (2013) model doesn’t have land, I first introduce land to
their model then add transportation costs. Both sets of results are reported. Compared
to Lagakos and Waugh (2013), adding land differences significantly increase the explaining
power for sectoral productivity and the employment share of agriculture. However, it helps
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Table 2.2: Model Performance: Aggregates
Data
L&W
(2013)
+land +sorting
U.S./Malawi ratio
Aggregate productivity 28.8 28.8 28.8 28.8
Ag productivity 88.2 39.5 54.0 53.3
Non-ag productivity 7.9 17.2 8.8 8.0
Malawi
Ag employment 85.4% 58.6% 78.8% 80.8%
Rural-urban income gap 3.01 1.56 1.60 1.95
Note: The productivity data come from Restuccia et al. (2008). Rural-urban in-
come gap comes from my calculation using the Malawi data.
little in terms of explaining the rural-urban income gap.46 Adding land to Lagakos and
Waugh (2013) increases the explained percentage of APG relative to U.S. from 11.7% to
15.1%.47 Ability sorting increases that percentage to 42.7%, a significant improvement.
Ability sorting explains the productivity gap relative to U.S. in non-agriculture slightly
better, but becomes slightly worse in explaining that in agriculture. This is because I hold the
aggregate productivity gap constant. With the new model, aggregate efficiency A is higher
than without ability sorting. This raises productivity in both sectors. Average worker ability
decreases in agriculture and increases in non-agriculture due to ability sorting. Figure 2.10
plots the probability of choosing non-agriculture for workers. Low ability agricultural workers
are less likely to choose non-agriculture in my model compared to Lagakos and Waugh
(2013), while the opposite is true for high ability agricultural workers. Overall, workers
46The agricultural productivity gap (APG) is probably a more suitable measure for my model. Malawi
has an unusually high APG. According to raw national accounts data, the gap is 12.5 in 2005, which reduces
to 6.2 after adjusting for measurement errors and human capital (Gollin et al., 2014). This is high even
compared to countries of similar income levels. For example, according to Restuccia et al. (2008), Malawi’s
GDP per capita is 1171 in 2005 international dollars. Uganda’s GDP per capita is 1224 while its APG is
only 2.49 after adjustment. In the Gollin et al. (2014) sample, only one country (Lesotho) has an APG
higher than Malawi. In line of this, I believe the rural-urban income gap calculated in data probably gives
a better description of the actual rural-urban differences.
47The model is calibrated to explained the U.S. APG which is 1.43. The explained percentage is calculated
as log(predicted APG)−log(U.S. APG)log(actual APG)−log(U.S. APG) .
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Figure 2.10: Sector Choice in the Model
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Note: The probability is estimated from regressing actual sector choice on agricul-
tural ability using robust locally weighted scatter plot smoothing.
choose agricultural more, which leads to a 2 percentage points increase in the agriculture
employment share.
I next contrast the within rural area model predictions to data. This could be a test of the
model because my calibration doesn’t target these data moments. As seen in Table 2.3, the
model overestimates the employment share in the near rural region but underestimates the
employment share in the remote rural region. This is reasonable since the one city assumption
will overestimate the attractiveness of the near region when remote regions actually have
access to other cities as well. Even though the model overestimates the attractiveness of
the near region, it correctly predicts that the employment to land ratio in the near region is
smaller than in the remote region. This is in direct contrast to Gollin and Rogerson (2014)
who study a similar model without heterogeneous ability. If workers are homogeneous, the
near region will have a larger employment to land ratio to counteract the benefit of being
closer to the urban center. Otherwise, all workers will flow to the near region. In my model,
what matters is the efficiency labor unit instead of number of workers. Ability sorting allows
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Table 2.3: Model Performance: Within Rural Area
Data Model
Employment share
Urban region 14.8% 19.2%
Rural region 1 27.9% 39.2%
Rural region 2 57.3% 41.7%
Urban/Rural income ratio
Region 1 2.67 1.45
Region 2 3.24 2.74
the near region to have a lower employment to land ratio but higher labor (in efficient units)
to land ratio. The model correctly predicts a lower income gap in the near region, which is a
motivation for the model. The predicted within-rural area income gap is larger than that in
data, again reflecting the over-estimation of the attractiveness of the near region. Overall,
the model is more successful in explaining the income gap between the urban center and
the remote region than explaining that between the urban center and the near region. This
somehow suggests that transportation costs between the near region and the urban center
might be underestimated.
2.5.2 Counterfactual Experiments
I next run a set of counterfactual experiments with the model. I focus on how changes
in productivity and transportation costs affect the equilibrium and the associated welfare
effects. Since the ability sorting mechanism depends both on aggregate productivity and
transportation costs, the experiments also evaluates the relative importance of them. I
consider the following sets of changes: 1) reduce transportation costs in the near region by
10%; 2) reduce transportation costs in the near regions by 10%; 3) increase the land share
in the near region to 0.5, and 4) raise A by 10%. The first three can be considered as
infrastructure development targeted at different regions, while the last can be viewed as an
improvement in production efficiency coming from other sources.
40
Since utility is not defined when food consumption is below subsistence, I adopt the
following transformation of the Stone-Geary preference used above,
U =

Ca, if Ca < a¯
a¯+
[
(Ca−a¯µ )
µ
( Cn1−µ)
1−µ]σ−1
σ
, if Ca ≥ a¯
(2.22)
where 0 < σ < 1 ensures that utility is strictly concave when Ca ≥ a¯ and that it increases
when the consumption of the non-agricultural good goes from zero to positive. Following
Gollin et al. (2007), I choose σ = 0.0001 to approximate a log utility. Under the transfor-
mation, the positive results still hold as consumption behavior and location choice is not
affected. My welfare measure is the equivalent variation defined as the percentage change in
welfare that satisfies
V (I ′, P
′
a, P
′
n) = V ((1 + x)I, Pa, Pn), (2.23)
where prime indicates variables after the change. Given the non-homothetic preference,
welfare gains differ across workers even they are perfectly mobile. I document the average
welfare change for all workers and for workers in the bottom 20% and 40%. Focusing on
workers in the bottom is motivated by Dollar and Kraay (2002); Dollar et al. (2016) who
study whether growth is shared among the poor.
Table 2.4 presents the simulation results. For the first experiment, reducing transporta-
tion costs in the near region raises agricultural productivity but lowers non-agricultural
productivity. This is because workers migrate in response to their comparative advantage
due to lowering spatial price differences such that the non-agricultural sector on average has
worse workers. Consistent with that, rural-urban income gap has a 5.8% drop. The size of
the drop in non-agricultural productivity is larger than the increase in agricultural produc-
tivity, implying the reduction in transportation costs actually make the misallocation within
rural areas worse. Overall, this leads to an increase in aggregate productivity less than 2%.
The urban center and the near rural region both experience increase in employment at the
expense of the remote region. Welfare gains benefit the bottom workers less than others.
Since most bottom workers locate in the remote region, this reflects that the reduction in
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Table 2.4: Counterfactual Experiments
Baseline Ex 1 Ex 2 Ex 3 Ex 4
U.S./Malawi ratio
Aggregate productiv-
ity
28.8 28.3 28.5 28.7 23.6
Ag productivity 53.3 53.2 54.0 53.1 48.0
Non-ag productivity 8.0 8.3 8.8 8.1 8.2
Malawi
Urban Employment 19.2% 20.7% 19.7% 19.4% 25.7%
Rural 1 Employment 39.2% 40.8% 36.0% 42.2% 40.2%
Rural 2 Employment 41.7% 38.6% 44.3% 38.3% 34.1%
Rural-urban income
gap
1.95 1.84 1.88 1.93 1.86
Welfare gain
Overall 2.5% 0.6% 0.3% 11.4%
Bottom 20% 1.3% -0.1% 0.0% 13.5%
Bottom 40% 1.2% 0.6% 0.0% 13.4%
the relative price of the agricultural good hurts net suppliers in the remote region, they are
partly compensated by an increase in the land-labor (in efficiency unit) ratio. The bottom
20% workers fare slightly better than the bottom 40% workers as some of them are not
selling their output and are not affected by the price change.
Reducing transportation costs in the remote region reduces both agricultural and non-
agricultural productivity, though aggregate productivity only increases by around 1%. This
again is due to the reallocation of workers from the near region to the urban center and
the remote region. It reduces the average worker ability in the urban center as in the
first experiment. It also increases the share of employment in the low productivity remote
region. Aggregate productivity increases because the non-agricultural sector has a larger
share of employment. Rural-urban income gap is reduced by a little over 2%. The welfare
gains are much smaller than that in the first experiment. Bottom workers still benefit less
than the average workers. The bottom 20% workers even suffer a welfare loss due to the
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reduction. This reflects the reduction in land-labor ratio in the remote region, which hurts
the agricultural workers in subsistence. Net suppliers in the remote region are compensated
by a higher relative price of the agricultural good even though relative price has decreased
in the urban center.
The third experiment, raising the land share of the near region, has similar effects on
productivity as the first experiment, though with much smaller magnitude. Employment
in the urban center increases a little, while there is a large shift of employment from the
remote region to the near region. This is largely mechanical due to the increase in size of
the near region. Employment density actually decreases in the near region relative to the
remote region.48 Due to the increase in the price of the agricultural good, the remote region
becomes more attractive to low ability workers. The welfare gains are small, with the bottom
workers experience almost zero gains on average. This again is caused by the decrease in
land-labor ratio associated with the increase in employment density in the remote region.
The fourth experiment has the largest effects on the equilibrium outcome and welfare,
because it is an economy wide change affecting all regions. Productivity growth reduces
the importance of food consumption, which weakens the ability sorting channel. This again
leads to a slight decrease in non-agricultural productivity despite the increase in produc-
tion efficiency. Agricultural productivity increases by a little over 10% due the increase
in production efficiency and the increase in worker efficiency, while aggregate productivity
increases by almost 20%. The near region shows a small reduction in employment, while
employment in the urban center increases by 5.5 percentage points at the loss of the remote
region. Welfare gains are also large, with the average change being 11.4%. Different from
the first three experiments, the bottom workers benefit more from the increase in production
efficiency. Even though the price of the agricultural good decreases, they benefit from the
increase in the land-labor ratio. Due to the increase in production efficiency and the increase
in land-labor ratio, over 90% workers under subsistence are able to move out of subsistence.
The experiments I carry out do not consider the cost side at all. The results from these
48In the table, the employment share of the remote region has declined. But note that the land share has
also decline.
43
experiments are thus not sufficient to guide infrastructure investment. Nevertheless, the
three experiments regarding transportation costs show very different effects on productivity
and welfare from the other experiment. Reductions in transportation costs are more effective
in reducing the regional income gap than raising sectoral productivity. They also benefit the
bottom workers less than the rest, contrary to the a universal productivity growth. These
findings echo the study of Gollin and Rogerson (2014) who also emphasize the geographic
factors within rural area. It shows that studying how limited resources for infrastructure
development should be allocated can be as important as simply promoting infrastructure
development.
Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Dollar et al. (2016) argue that the poor benefit equally from
economic growth as others by showing that income growth of the bottom workers are similar
to that of all workers in data. My welfare analysis shows that there is more subtlety to the
story. I find that infrastructure investment aiming at reducing transportation costs benefits
the poor less or even hurt the poor, while that aiming at increasing aggregate production
efficiency benefits the poor more than the others. The results of Dollar and Kraay (2002)
and Dollar et al. (2016) then should be viewed as a combination of effects coming from
improvements in different aspects of the economy. It is however not very meaningful to just
asking whether growth is good or bad for the poor. Instead we need to ask what kind of
growth-promoting policies are good for the poor.
2.6 Empirical Support for the Sorting Mechanism
I test the model predictions in this section using the third Integrated Household Survey
(IHS3) of Malawi introduced in Section 2.3. Previous studies have provided evidence for
worker selection between rural and urban areas. Young (2013) show that despite an aver-
age rural-urban consumption gap of 1.52 in 65 developing countries, around a quarter of
individuals who lived in urban areas prior to the age of 12 migrate to rural areas as adults.
Using Brazilian panel data, Alvarez (2017) find that workers switching from agriculture to
non-agriculture don’t experience a wage increase if they don’t change their occupations,
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confirming the presence of sector-specific skills.
The Malawi data shows that 11% of workers originated from urban areas migrate to rural
areas. The number is smaller than what Young (2013) has found but the rural-urban income
gap of 3.01 in Malawi is also larger than that in the countries studied by him. Although
providing some support, this is not a test of the selection mechanism. Since individual
productivity is unobserved, such a test is challenging. Good panel data such as that used
by Alvarez (2017) is required. The Malawi data doesn’t qualify for this task. Given the
multi-region setting of my model, the data does provide a way to get around this problem.
Detailed data on agricultural production allows me to directly measure agricultural worker’s
ability by estimating agricultural production functions controlling for other inputs (Jacoby
and Minten, 2009; Shenoy, 2017). With the ability measures the model prediction of within
rural region ability sorting can be readily examined. This is the main objective of this
section. I also provide evidence for the spatial profile of land rental rate predict by the
model in next subsection. It however cannot be viewed as an piece of evidence of the ability
sorting mechanism as it is also implied in Gollin and Rogerson (2014) where the sorting
mechanism is missing.
2.6.1 Ability Sorting between Rural Areas
Ability sorting within rural regions can be tested if we have a measure of agricultural ability.
I construct such a measure from estimating a plot-level production function. I start with
decomposing total output on a plot into the contribution of inputs and a residual as follows,49
yij = β0 + βssij + βkkij + βllij + βmmij + aij,
49Output and inputs except for capital are constructed by aggregating over different items using a com-
mon set of market prices, following Restuccia and Stantaeula`lia-Llopis (2017). So the production function
is measured in physical units, devoid of the effect of local prices. Capital is measured using self-evaluation
of different agricultural instruments and structures owned by the household. The use of self-reported values
helps capture the quality differences in capital. See Section 2.9.2 for a detailed description of data construc-
tion. I also only study the rainy season as agricultural production in Malawi mainly happens during the
rainy season.
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where i and j indicate farmer and plot respectively, the four inputs are land (s), capital (k),
labor (l), intermediate input (m) all in logs, output(y) is also in logs, and a is the residual.
The residual combines all factors affecting the output on a plot besides the inputs, including
the quality of land, the weather shocks, measurement errors, and the managerial ability of
the farmer that is a very important determinant in agricultural production (Welch, 1970).
The purpose is to separate the managerial ability from other factors included in the residual
and take it as my measure of agricultural productivity.
The residual productivity of a plot can be decomposed into a farmer-plot-specific com-
ponent and a farmer-specific component,
aij = Φi + Ψij.
The farmer-specific component Φi affects all plots managed by the same farmer. It in-
cludes the farmer’s productivity, measurement errors at the farmer level, and local weather
conditions.50 The farmer-plot-specific component Ψij includes the quality of the land, mea-
surement errors at the farmer level, and other random shocks. The data provides detailed
information on land quality through a set of plot characteristics: the type of soil and soil
quality, the extent of erosion, and the type of irrigation system.51 Weather conditions are
also well documented, including information on the amount of rain during the last completed
rainy season and the timing of rain.52 Let Xij be the set of land quality and weather controls,
the production function can then be estimated as,
yij = β0 + βssij + βkkij + βllij + βmmij +Xijγ + ui + ij, (2.24)
50Local weather might affect different plots differently. The effect of the local weather conditions included
in the farmer-specific component then is the average effect over all plots, and the deviation from the average
enters the farmer-plot-specific component.
51All these measures are categorical such that I can control for the differences in land quality in a flexible
way.
52The survey asks whether the amount of rain is too much, the right amount, or too little. It also asks
whether the rain began (ended) too early, at the right time, or too late.
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where ui is a farmer-specific unobserved effect including the farmer’s productivity and mea-
surement errors at the farmer level, and ij includes all other random errors. Data quality
of IHS3 is very high. One example for that is the measurement of plot size. In surveys on
agricultural production, plot size is often self-reported which can deviate from true plot size
(Carletto et al., 2013). This problem is overcome by using GPS measured plot size provided
for almost 98% of all land plots.53 For this reason, I assume the effect of measurement errors
are small and take ui to be my measure of agricultural productivity.
Given the above discussion, land quality is well measured while weather conditions at
the plot level are not. ij then mainly include unmeasured weather effects. If input decisions
are mainly made before the realization of weather shocks, we have the exogeneity condition
E(ij|sij, kij, lij,mij, Xij) = 0. The inputs however are affected by ui as farmers make input
decisions knowing their own managerial talent. The fixed effects estimation then should
lead to consistent estimates of the parameters. However, a few variables are invariant at the
farmer level, including capital stock and weather conditions. Under fixed effects estimation,
the coefficients for these variables are not identified and ui will also contain the effects of
capital stock and weather conditions. In view of this, I use the correlated random effects
estimation proposed by Mundlak (1978). The Mundlak approach projects the unobserved
effects on the observed controls,
ui = Z¯iθ + ηi,
where Z¯i is the average of all controls at the farmer level, and ηi is the true random effect.
Plugging this into equation 2.24, the estimation equation now reads
yij = β0 + βssij + βkkij + βllij + βmmij +Xijγ + Z¯iθ + ηi + ij. (2.25)
The model is then estimated using random effects estimation. The parameters β and γ are
the same as those from the fixed effects estimation. θ equal to the difference between the
fixed effects and random effects estimators.
53For the rest, I use self-reported plot size.
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From the regression, my measure of agricultural ability is constructed as
aˆi = θssi + θlli + θmmi + ηi. (2.26)
The agricultural ability has two components. The first component is the projection of ui
on the inputs, which reflects how the input responds to agricultural productivity at the
farmer level. Since the true output elasticities are the fixed effects estimates, these should
be conceived as part of farmer’s agricultural productivity correlated with the average input
level. I don’t include capital because the output elasticity of capital is not identified under
fixed effects estimation, as capital is invariant at farmer level. To the extent that capital
declines in the distance to city and higher farmer managerial talent leads to higher capital
usage, I will underestimate the decline of farmer productivity in distance to the city. The
second component is the random effect ηi, which is the part of productivity orthogonal to
inputs. This could be due to distorted factor markets, which is prevalent in Malawi given
the allocation of land is mostly made by local chiefs and intermediate inputs are heavily
subsidized Restuccia and Stantaeula`lia-Llopis (2017).
Table 2.5: Production Function Estimates
Estimates Standard
error
Land 0.23 0.025
Intermediate 0.17 0.010
Labor 0.43 0.029
Mean land 0.10 0.040
Mean intermediate 0.070 0.016
Mean labor -0.35 0.033
Mean capital 0.14 0.014
No. of Obs 8791
No. of Groups 3651
Overall R-squard 0.33
Remark: Standard errors are clustered at EA level.
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I include in the regression only farmers managing at least 2 plots. I end up with 3651
farmers managing 8791 plots. Most farmers only manage 2 plots. Average number of plots
per farmer is 2.4. Table 2.5 presents the estimation results. All estimates are highly signifi-
cant. The output elasticities show that agricultural production in Malawi is relatively land-
and labor-intensive. The estimates for the average of land size and intermediate input are
positive, showing better farmers use more land and intermediate inputs. The estimates for
average labor however is negative, indicating better farmers also save on labor. If we take
the estimates on capital as the true output elasticity, we can not reject the hypothesis that
the production function exhibits constant returns to scale.54 If we believe the estimate for
capital is larger than the true output elasticity, the production function should have minor
decreasing returns to scale. This is in contrast with Shenoy (2017) who find significant de-
creasing returns in Thailand data. However, his estimation is at the farm level while my
estimation is at the plot level. The constraint due to farmer’s span of control should not
matter that much given the limited size of most plots in the data.
To check the validity of the estimated agricultural productivity, I examine whether two
proxies for human capital, age and years of schooling, are good predictors of the estimated
agricultural productivity. Regression shown that both are highly significant predictors. The
estimates for years of schooling is 0.01 and that with age is -0.002.55 This shows education
increases farming ability, while increase in age is associated with lower farming ability. This
makes sense if physical strength matters for farming or young people are better at adapting
to new technology. These results are also consistent with Shenoy (2017).
Figure 2.11 plots my measure of farmer’s ability against the distance to nearest urban
center. Farmer’s ability quickly decreases initially then the effect of distance levels off in the
more remote areas. It shows a declining trend in the farthest areas though the confidence
interval is very large. The spatial profile is consistent with the model prediction and the
spatial profile of income. The spatial gap of ability is much lower than that of income. The
large gap in income reflects the fact that more able farmers also employ more inputs. Given
54A Wald test of constant returns to scale has a p-value of 0.29.
55The standard errors are 0.002 and 0.0004 respectively.
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that I find relatively large returns to scale, we should expect the induced effect on inputs to
be large.56
Figure 2.11: Distance to City and Farmer Productivity
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Note: Farmer’s productivity comes from the production function estimation de-
scribed in the text. It is further smoothed using the kernel-weighted local linear
regressions with Epanechnikov kernel and bandwidth equal to 50.
The spatial profile of farmer’s ability might also reflect genuine benefits of being near
the cities. One of the benefits might be lower intermediate prices in the near region. The
production function estimation however already controls for input usage such that the effect
of input prices should not enter the measure of farmer productivity. I also include in the
production function estimation an intermediate input price index as control. To construct
the index, I regress household level input prices (in logs) on dummies for the type of the
input and dummies for EAs. The estimates for the EA dummies are then taken to be the
price index. Another benefit of being near the cities is that it allows farmers to learn better
farming practices that is not reflected in the use of intermediate inputs. To control for that,
56An estimation of the effects however is not possible because these farmers also face different prices.
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I also add the access to agricultural extension services in an EA to the regression.57 The
findings are similar without or without these controls.
Since I use a common set of prices to value physical output of different crops, this could
distort my finding as I also emphasize the spatial price differences. If the farmers in the
remote areas grow more crops that are undervalued with the common prices, it will also
generate a spatial profile as found above.58 To exclude the effect of prices, I estimate the
production function using plots growing only “local maize” or “hybrid maize”, two of the
most common crops in Malawi. The spatial profile of measured farmer’s ability is particularly
strong for hybrid maize, which is consistent with Schultz (1964) who argues that human
capital is particularly important when new technology is adopted. The labor measure I use
weighs the input of men, women, and children using their wages. In the baseline estimation
I include farmers who actually reside in urban centers. The spatial pattern is robust to the
use of a non-weighted labor measure or use observations only from the rural area. I also
estimate the model using only plots with GPS-measured land size. The results still hold.
I interpret my findings as providing support to the ability sorting mechanism. Alterna-
tively, farmer’s productivity can be higher in regions closer to the urban center along the
lines of Lagakos and Waugh (2013) if they are more selected as those regions might also
have a higher share of non-agricultural production (Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2003). To rule
out this possibility, I control for the share of income coming from agriculture in each EA
in my estimation. My findings again are robust to the additional control, lending further
support to the ability sorting mechanism.
57The survey asks about the distance to the office/residence of the nearest Assistant Agricultural Exten-
sion Development Officer.
58The problem is similar to that in constructing real GDP: using prices of the rich countries tend to
underestimate the international income gap while using prices of the poor countries tend to overestimate the
gap because consumers spend more on cheaper goods. Since the data applies to the suppliers, the opposite is
true because they produce more of the expensive goods given the trading opportunity. Since medium prices
are used as the common prices, they tend to be closer to prices in regions near the cities due to the goods
are more likely to be available in the cities. This leads to lower prices for crops grown in remote regions.
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2.6.2 Testing the Model Prediction for Land Rental Rate
The model predicts that land rental rate should be lower in remote prices. I examine whether
the pattern exists in data in this subsection. For each plot, IHS3 asks the respondents to
estimate the selling price and the one-year rent of the plot if they were to sell or rent out
the land. Given that less than 10% of all plots are purchased or rented, it is not possible
to use actual rents.59 I use the self-estimated land price or rent divided by land size to be
my measure of land value. I net out the effect of land quality by regressing the log of the
value measures on the set of land quality measures discussed above. The regression residuals
are then plotted against the distance to the city in Figure 2.12. Both price and rent show a
clear declining trend in the distance to the city except a small bump for prices in the middle
range. This is consistent with the model. Jacoby (2000) also provides similar evidence for
Nepal. This pattern however is not unique to my model. It is also predicted by Gollin and
Rogerson (2014).
2.7 Other Supporting Evidence: Women in Agriculture
I provide the last piece of evidence regarding the employment of women in agriculture.
Lagakos and Waugh (2013) find ample evidence to show that women tend to have lower
agricultural productivity due to their lower physical strength and agricultural production
is strength intensive. The comparative disadvantage of women in agricultural production
makes them less likely to work in agriculture when the agricultural sector shrinks along
economic development. The share of women in agriculture will increase as the employment
share of agriculture increases. They show that this is borne out in data, supporting that
workers select into different sectors according to their comparative advantage.
Another implication of women’s comparative advantage in non-agriculture is that women
should always be more likely to choose non-agriculture than men. To see whether that is
also borne out in data, I use the International Labor Organization (ILO) database of labor
59Actual purchase price is not provided.
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Figure 2.12: Distance to City and Land Value
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Note: The one-year rental and selling price are self-estimated by survey respondents.
I divide them by land size after netting out the differences in land quality. The
unit measures are then smoothed using the kernel-weighted local linear regressions
with Epanechnikov kernel and bandwidth equal to 50.
statistics, which provides information on employment by sex and industry for 205 countries
or regions running from 1948 or 2008. In any given year the number of countries with data
available is very small, especially during the early years.60 The data also come from different
sources, including household survey, labor force survey, official estimates, and population
census. I pool all available data together to maximize the use of available information, but
the findings are robust to the use of data for a single year or data coming from a particular
source.
Figure 2.13 plots the log odds ratio of choosing agriculture for women versus men against
the employment share of agriculture. The odds ratio is defined as ratio of the probability of
choosing agriculture relative to non-agriculture for women to that for men. It depicts how
women have different tendencies to choose agriculture over non-agriculture than men. When
60In 1945, only one country (New Zealand) has data.
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Figure 2.13: Log Odds Ratio of Choosing Agriculture: Women VS. Men
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Note: Data come from International Labor Organization. The scatter plot pools
available data from different years.
plotted in logs, a dot above zero indicates a violation of the prediction that women are less
likely to choose agriculture. It can be seen that many countries have odds ratio above 1
and the chance of observing that is increasing in the employment share of agriculture. I run
a logit regression of the odds ratio above 1 on the employment share of agriculture. The
estimated coefficient is 0.045 and the p-value is less than 0.001. Predicted probability of the
odds ratio above 1 is 0.21 when agriculture accounts for 10% of total employment, it jumps
to 0.86 when the share increases to 80%.
It is hard to explain these findings if only comparative advantage is at work. My model
of spatial ability sorting provides an explanation for that. Instead of relying on comparative
advantage, the mechanism I emphasize relies on absolute advantage. When it is at work,
women are more likely to choose agriculture than men if they are less productive than men
in both sectors. What we see in data combines both the effects of comparative advantage
and absolute advantage. The impact of absolute advantage is stronger in countries with
large agricultural employment as 1) food consumption is more important in poor countries
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and 2) poor countries tend to have larger spatial differences in prices. This explains why the
probability of observing an odds ratio larger than 1 is increasing in the employment share
of agriculture.
For the comparative advantage mechanism to work, female workers need to be less pro-
ductive than men in agriculture. Lagakos and Waugh (2013) argue that this is true as women
has less physical strength than men and agricultural work is strength intensive. For the ab-
solute advantage mechanism to work, it suffices that women are also less effective workers
than men in non-agricultural work. This could be true if physical strength is also an input
in non-agricultural work, albeit less important an input than in agriculture. Consider the
framework of Pitt et al. (2012) where workers have two traits, skills (H) and brawn (B), the
sectoral productivity which is taken as primitives in my model is a function of the two traits,
zi = viH
αiB1−αi , i = a, n (2.27)
where αa < αn indicates agricultural production is more brawn intensive, and vi changes the
scale of the productivity measure. If women have similar skills but less brawn than men,
it would imply they have comparative advantage in non-agriculture. It also implies that
women are less productive than men in non-agriculture, although to a less extent than in
agriculture. This conclusion could hold even if women have more skills than men, as long as
the advantage is not large enough. Women are also more likely to have absolute disadvantage
in developing countries if the technology used in these countries are more brawn intensive.
This happens if developing countries choose brawn intensive technologies in response to the
lack of skills of their workers, as forcefully argued by Caselli and Coleman (2006). Since
the non-agriculture sector is a combination of manufacturing and service, if women have
comparative advantage in services as argued by Ngai and Petrongolo (2017), they will also
tend to have a disadvantage in the non-agricultural sector in developing countries where the
services sector is relatively small.
Absolute advantage of men is a sufficient but not necessary condition for the ability
sorting mechanism to work. If women are paid less in both agriculture and non-agriculture
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due to discrimination, the ability sorting mechanism is still at work. Given data on wages
only, we can not separate the gender wage gap due to ability differences or discrimination.
Both will induce ability sorting nevertheless. Using data from International Labor Organi-
zation, Oostendorp (2009) find that the average within occupation gender wage gap is 0.11
log points across 63 countries. Surprisingly, Oostendorp (2009) also find that the gender
wage gap tend to be lower in developing countries. Given that the data available are more
likely for non-agricultural occupations, this could be readily explained by the ability sorting
mechanism if women in non-agriculture is more selected in developing countries.
2.8 Summary
Why do the large rural-urban income gaps persist in developing countries? Young (2013)
find that around a quarter of urban workers migrate to rural areas despite the large rural-
urban income gaps in a sample of 65 countries.61 The voluntary urban-rural migration
suggests that the rural-urban income gaps might not be explained by labor market barriers
preventing rural workers from moving to urban areas. An alternative explanation proposed in
Lagakos and Waugh (2013) and Young (2013) is that workers self-select into different sectors
according to their comparative advantage. More productive workers prefer urban areas more
because the urban sector uses skilled labor more intensively. This chapter proposes a new
explanation complementing that of Lagakos and Waugh (2013) and Young (2013). Urban
areas are attractive to better workers due to their consumption value: high income workers
spend a large fraction of income on non-food items which are cheaper in urban areas. The
rural-urban income gaps do not reflect distortions in the allocation of workers, but come
from frictions in the good markets. Quantitatively, the new mechanism plays a larger role
in explaining the income gap than worker selection based on comparative advantage.
To distinguish my explanation from that of Lagakos and Waugh (2013) and Young (2013),
I look beyond the rural-urban dichotomy and examines the spatial income inequality within
61Going from urban to rural areas, there is no drop in the variance of consumption, so the urban-rural
migration can not be explained by risk factors.
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rural areas. Using Malawi data, I find that income declines as we go further away from the
urban center. While the rural-urban distinction is in the center stage of the study of economic
development, this finding suggests that examining spatial income inequality beyond that
simple dichotomy could be rewarding. A successful theory of the “dual economy” should
explain both the rural-urban income gaps and the income differences between near and
remote rural regions. While we can use labor market barriers to explain these spatial income
gaps, they are not easily explained by worker selection. This paper provides an explanation
of both the rural-urban income gap and the income profile within rural areas without relying
on labor market barriers.
My analysis provides further support for investment in transportation infrastructure in
developing countries (World Bank, 1994). I extend the analysis of Gollin and Rogerson (2014)
to a heterogeneous worker framework which allows me to discuss the distributional effects of
infrastructure development. Previous studies (Jacoby, 2000; Renkow et al., 2004; Jacoby and
Minten, 2009) find that improving market access of the remote rural areas generally benefit
the poor more. My general equilibrium analysis however shows that these investments might
benefit the poor less than average workers when endogenous price changes are taken into
account. The governments should have this in mind if poverty reduction is also a policy
target.
2.9 Appendix
This section provides additional results not reported in the main text. The first subsection
presents the results for the Engel curve estimation. The second subsection discusses the
construction of data. The last subsection provides a proof for ability sorting under general
non-homothetic preferences.
2.9.1 Engel Curve Estimates
Table 2.6 presents the results from the Engel curve estimation. For each food item, the first
column gives the average share of that item in total expenditure, the second item the income
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coefficient and the third column the price coefficient. Estimates for other control variables
are omitted.
Table 2.6: Engel Curve Estimates
Average
Share
Income(β) Price(γ)
Food 0.483 -0.115
(0.0028)
Maize ufa mgaiwa 0.070 -0.043 0.158
(Normal flour) (0.0015) (0.0009)
Maize ufa refined 0.052 -0.026 0.086
(Fine flour) (0.0014) (0.0007)
Dried fish 0.024 -0.009 0.024
(0.0005) (0.0001)
Sugar 0.020 -0.003 0.009
(0.0004) (0.0001)
Tomato 0.017 -0.009 0.031
(0.0004) (0.0001)
Rice 0.013 -0.002 0.004
(0.0005) (0.0001)
Nkhwani 0.014 -0.008 0.030
(0.0004) (0.0002)
Bean, brown 0.013 -0.006 0.011
(0.0004) (0.0001)
Goat 0.012 -0.011 0.018
(0.0006) (0.00004)
Salt 0.011 -0.008 0.023
(0.0002) (0.0001)
Remark: Standard errors in the parentheses. Reported standard er-
rors for β and γ come from the second and third stage of my estima-
tion approach, without considering the effect of generated variables
used in that stage.
2.9.2 Data Construction
The construction of data follows De Magalha˜es and Stantaeula`lia-Llopis (2015) who use the
Integrated Survey on Agriculture (ISA) to document the cross-sectional facts on income and
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consumption for several Sub-Sahara African countries including Malawi,62 and Restuccia
and Stantaeula`lia-Llopis (2017) who use the same Malawi data to study the misallocation
of land and capital in agriculture.
2.9.2.1 Consumption
Total consumption is the sum of durable and non-durable consumption. Non-durable con-
sumption includes food, clothing, services, utility, school, and medical expenditures. Durable
consumption includes housing services and furniture. The expenditures on different items
are for different time length. All of them are annualized to construct the total consumption.
Food consumption includes 135 items, which can be purchased, home produced, or received
as gifts. I evaluate the non-purchased food items at the medium reported price prevailed
within a region (defined as enumeration areas within a certain distance range from a cer-
tain urban center). The food items are reported in different units. I convert them all into
kilograms in two steps: 1. estimate the quantity of purchased items in modal unit using the
medium price in modal unit for a region; 2. construct household conversion rate using the
constructed quantity in modal unit and reported quantity in other units, use the medium
household conversion rate as the conversion rate for a region. House services includes the
self-reported renting value when the dwellings are owned by the households.
2.9.2.2 Income
Income consists of labor market income, agricultural net production, fishery net production,
business income, capital income, and net transfers.
The most important category in agricultural net production is non-permanent crops. As
not all output are sold, I evaluate the output not sold using the medium reported sales
prices prevailed in a region in a similar fashion as in the construction of total consumption.
Agricultural production is reported for two seasons: the rainy season and the dimba (dry)
season. Most agricultural production happens in the rainy season, which makes the con-
62The Malawi data I use is part of the ISA project, see Section 2.3.
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struction of prices for the dimba season hard due to data scarcity. I thus use the prices
from the rainy to evaluate output in the dimba season. The costs for agricultural production
include land rents, hired labor, transportation costs associated with sales, expenditures on
fertilizers, seed, and pesticides/herbicides. Subsidies on intermediate inputs are excluded
from the costs. Other agricultural production include tree/permanent crops, livestock sales,
and livestock products. For all types of agricultural net production, costs associated with
renting-in agricultural equipment and structure capital is subtracted from output.
Labor market income is summed over all household members report working. Workers
can have multiple occupations. Wage payment can be made in cash or in kind. Household
members report the last payment they receive for a reference period and how much time they
work during a year, which can be used to construct total wage income in a year. Business in-
come is aggregate over different types of non-agricultural business, such as processing/selling
agricultural by-products, street or market trading business, etc. For each business, the data
distinguishes months with zero, low, medium, or high volume of sales and how many months
each situation spans in a year. Cost is reported only for the last month. It is re-scaled using
information on revenue to estimate costs in other months.63 Total net income from a business
is then calculated by adding up profit (revenue-cost) over different sales situations, weighted
by number of months of those situations. Fishery net production is similarly calculated by
subtracting costs from total output. The output is valued at reported prices or imputed
median price, if the households do not report any sales. Costs include rented equipment,
fuel, oil, and maintenance, hired labor, and other costs. There are two seasons, high and
low. Total net production is aggregate over the two seasons and over different types of fish.
2.9.2.3 Production Function Estimation
Output is constructed by aggregating output from different crops using the medium prices
constructed in similar fashion as described above. Plot size is GPS measured with mini-
mal measurement error. Physical capital is aggregated over different types of agricultural
63That is, given the revenue in last month, we can calculate a cost share of revenue. I assume the same
share applies to all months.
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machinery and structures measured by self-evaluated prices. The use of self-evaluation of
asset values takes into account the differences in the quality of the machinery and structures.
Intermediate input is also aggregated over different items using medium prices. Given that
intermediate inputs in Malawi are heavily subsided, I only use prices constructed from input
purchases without using coupons. Labor is aggregated over different sources and uses: family
labor, hired labor, and exchange labor used for non-harvest work and harvest work. Labor
can be supplied by men, women, and children under 15 years old. To adjust for the differ-
ences in human capital of different workers, I use wage ratios constructed from information
on hired labor as weights in summing over different types of workers. Capital income mainly
comes from saving and investment, rents of house and equipment, and asset sales. It also
includes rental income from agricultural land and fishery equipment. Finally, net transfers
is calculated as income transfers and gifts received from rural areas/urban areas/other coun-
tries minus income transfers and gifts given out to rural areas/urban areas/other countries.
It might be associated government programs, social safety nets, or private transfers.
2.9.3 Ability Sorting Under Non-homothetic Preferences
This section proves that the ability sorting result holds under general non-homothetic prefer-
ences. Consider a non-homothetic preference of the general form U(Ca, Cn). The agricultural
good is the necessity with its income elasticity of demand less than 1. Workers choose be-
tween two regions j and j′. Regions differ in prices: P ja > P
j′
a and P
j
n < P
j′
n . Regions might
also differ in wages, denoted wj and wj
′
. Consider the location choice of two workers i and i′
with zi > zi′ . To prove ability sorting, it suffices to show that: 1) if worker i
′ chooses region
j, worker i also chooses region j; 2) if worker i chooses region j′, worker i′ also chooses region
j′. I will only prove the first part below, the second part follows the same logic.
Let uj
′
i′ be the utility worker i
′ derive in region j′. That worker i′ prefers region j over
region j′ implies
e(P ja , P
j
n, u
j′
i′ ) < w
jzi′ , (2.28)
where e(·) is the expenditure function. For small changes in prices, the change in expenditure
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is given by
de(Pa, Pn, u) = CadPa + CndPn
which can be further written as
d ln e(Pa, Pn, u) =
PaCa
e
d lnPa +
PnCn
e
d lnPn = sa(Pa, Pn, u)d lnPa + sn(Pa, Pn, u)d lnPn,
where sa and sn are the expenditure share of the two goods.
For worker i′, the change in expenditure going from region j′ to j, holding utility constant,
is given by
ln e(P ja , P
j
n, u
j′
i′ )− ln e(P j
′
a , P
j′
n , u
j′
i′ ) =
∫ lnP ja
lnP j
′
a
∫ lnP jn
lnP j
′
n
d ln e(Pa, Pn, u
j′
i′ )
Similarly, the change in expenditure for worker i is given by
ln e(P ja , P
j
n, u
j′
i )− ln e(P j
′
a , P
j′
n , u
j′
i ) =
∫ lnP ja
lnP j
′
a
∫ lnP jn
lnP j
′
n
d ln e(Pa, Pn, u
j′
i )
Since worker i has higher income than worker i′, we must have
sa(Pa, Pn, u
j′
i ) < sa(Pa, Pn, u
j′
i′ ), and sn(Pa, Pn, u
j′
i ) > sn(Pa, Pn, u
j′
i′ )
Given that Pa is increasing and Pn is decreasing from j
′ to j, this implies that,
ln e(P ja , P
j
n, u
j′
i )− ln e(P j
′
a , P
j′
n , u
j′
i ) < ln e(P
j
a , P
j
n, u
j′
i′ )− ln e(P j
′
a , P
j′
n , u
j′
i′ )
Combining this with the fact e(P j
′
a , P
j′
n , u
j′
i ) = w
j′zi and e(P
j′
a , P
j′
n , u
j′
i′ ) = w
j′zi′ , we have
e(P ja , P
j
n, u
j′
i )
wjzi
wj
wj′
<
e(P ja , P
j
n, u
j′
i )
wjzi′
wj
wj′
⇒ e(P
j
a , P
j
n, u
j′
i )
wjzi
<
e(P ja , P
j
n, u
j′
i )
wjzi′
< 1
where the last inequality comes from 2.28. We thus prove worker i will also be better off in
j because the change in wage is more than compensating the changes in prices.
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CHAPTER 3
Capital-Labor Substitution, Agriculture, and
Development
3.1 Introduction
This chapter continues the discussion on agriculture. While Chapter 2 mainly focuses on
the productivity gap between agriculture and non-agriculture within a country. The impor-
tance of agriculture is also reflected in the fact that agriculture accounts for a large part of
the international income differences: poor countries are much more unproductive in agri-
culture relative to non-agriculture while allocating a large share of workers to agriculture
(Caselli, 2005; Restuccia et al., 2008). Understanding the differences in sectoral allocation
and agricultural productivity across countries thus can provide key insights to understanding
economic development. In this chapter, I study the role of capital deepening in explaining
these development facts. I allow for sectoral differences in the process of capital deepening by
adopting CES production functions instead of the commonly used Cobb-Douglas production
functions.
Figure 2.1 already shows that both the employment share of agriculture and the produc-
tivity gap between agriculture and non-agriculture decline with GDP per capita.1,2 These
two patterns are linked to each other through the cross-country pattern in the nominal
1The productivity gap is related to but different from the wage gap between sectors as studied in many
micro studies. The wage gap might be a driving force behind the productivity gap. But productivity gap
might still exists if there were no wage gap such as in this model. For recent studies on the wage gap, see
Vollrath (2014) and Alvarez (2017).
2While the productivity gap can be a statistical figment due to errors in measuring output and inputs,
Gollin et al. (2014) show that the pattern persists after carefully dealing with the measurement issues. See
the discussion in Chapter 2.
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Figure 3.1: Nominal Value-added Share in Agriculture
value-added share of agriculture presented in Figure 3.1.3,4 While the value-added share
also declines in the level of development, it is much smaller than the employment share in
most countries and the gap is larger in poor countries. This explains why the agricultural
productivity gap in current prices (APG hereafter) exists and why it negatively correlates
with economic development. The same pattern can also be seen for the sectoral produc-
tivity gap measured in international prices which is presented in Figure 3.2. This directly
translates into a larger dispersion in agricultural labor productivity across countries.
The model used in this chapter is a static version of an otherwise standard model of
structural transformation as reviewed in Herrendorf et al. (2014). The model incorporates
3Remember labor productivity is defined as the ratio of value-added to employment.
4The data is for 1985 and comes from several sources, which is discussed in the data appendix in Section
3.8.
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Figure 3.2: Agricultural Productivity Gap in International Prices
both driving forces of structural transformation discussed in the literature: non-homothetic
utility (Kongsamut et al., 2001) which leads to the demand side explanation, and differen-
tial sectoral TFP (Ngai and Pissarides, 2007) which leads to the supply side explanation.
The deviation is to go from Cobb-Douglas to CES production technology, that is, allowing
for sectoral differences in the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. In two
recent studies, Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2013, 2014) show that this could be a neglected
source of structural transformation: the process of capital deepening is faster in sectors with
larger elasticity of substitution such that labor moves out those sectors. Their studies are
motivated by ample evidence on changes in sectoral capital intensity and factor shares in
many countries (Zuleta and Young, 2007; Herrendorf et al., 2015). Similar evidence has been
found in agriculture. For example, Schultz (1964) argues that the modernization of tradi-
tional agriculture is mainly accomplished through the massive substitution of machines for
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labor.5 Herrendorf et al. (2015) recently show that the U.S. sectoral technology is far from
Cobb-Douglas: the elasticity is much larger in agriculture than in non-agriculture. I argue
that this difference might have more bearing on the development facts regarding agriculture
besides structural transformation and evaluate the mechanism quantitatively.
The role of capital deepening with sectoral difference in elasticity of substitution can be
seen clearly from the following optimization condition,
θ
1− θ
(
K
N
) 1
σ
=
w
r
, (3.1)
where capital intensity (K
N
) is related to the relative factor price (w
r
). Capital deepening in
an economy increases the wage-rental rate ratio. The factor that the agricultural sector has
a larger elasticity implies that capital intensity increases faster in agriculture, which can lead
to larger changes in agricultural labor productivity in real prices and shift of employment
out of agriculture.6 In terms of APG, notice that the relative productivity ratio between the
two sectors ( yn
pya
)7 equals to the ratio of sectoral labor shares of income,8
yn
pya
=
Labor Sharea
Labor Sharen
. (3.2)
Changes in factor intensity will lead to changes in this ratio, which is decreasing in wage-
rental ratio if capital-labor substitution is easier in agriculture.9
Quantitative study of the model shows that compared to Cobb-Douglas, CES technology
provides little help in explaining sectoral allocation and real labor productivity. Large TFP
differences across sectors and countries are needed to explain why agriculture performs so
5An important example of this process is the use of tractors (Manuelli and Seshadri, 2014).
6The effect on productivity holds true if capital intensity in agriculture is not substantially lower than
that in non-agriculture, see Proposition 4.
7I add the relative price of the agricultural good p to indicate that it is measured in current prices.
8This identity only requires a competitive labor market equating wages between the two sectors and
holds irrespective of other distortions in the economy. See Gollin et al. (2014) for a discussion.
9Notice the labor share can be expressed as a function of wage-rental ratio: Labor Share =
1
( 1−θθ )
σ(wr )
σ−1+1
.
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badly in poor countries. This is similar to the findings of Herrendorf et al. (2015) who use
U.S. time series data. The reason for the finding is that agriculture also has a large capital
share other than a large elasticity of substitution. When the model is specified with Cobb-
Douglas technology, sectoral differences in capital shares also help explaining the sectoral
allocation, as emphasized in Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008). Capital-labor substitution
however helps explaining the agricultural productivity gap. In fact, it over-predicts the
cross-country difference in APG if we use the measurement error adjusted numbers from
Gollin et al. (2014). I find that APG can differ by a factor of 3 between the poorest and
richest countries, while in the data the gap in APG is in the range of 2 after adjusting for
measurement errors.
The model predicts incredibly high labor shares in agriculture for poor countries, sug-
gesting the explaining power of the model for APG might be overstated. I discuss possible
remedies to the model specification, in particular allowing for changes in factor-augmenting
productivity which can not be identified due to the paucity of data. Since reliable data on
sectoral labor shares is not available, I cannot directly test the model predictions. I how-
ever emphasize that differences in sectoral labor shares have the potential to explain the
agricultural productivity gap in poor countries, contrary to the conclusion drawn in Gollin
et al. (2014). The large differences in sectoral labor shares can still be consistent with a
relatively stable aggregate labor share as documented in Gollin (2002). Poor countries have
large employment share in agriculture which tends to lower aggregate labor share.10 It is
however counteracted by larger labor share of income in agriculture in poor countries. The
two forces work together to keep aggregate labor share relatively stable.
Related literature on agriculture and development has already been extensively reviewed
in Section 2.2. In particular, the literature on the role agriculture in comparative devel-
opment has mainly focused on finding sources of low total factor productivity (TFP) in
agriculture. Capital deepening is often thought of playing a limited role in explaining these
development facts (see, for example Lagakos and Waugh (2013) and Liao and Wang (2014)).
10Note that labor share is larger in non-agriculture than in agriculture in rich countries.
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However, the literature has mainly assumed Cobb-Douglas production functions. This chap-
ter on the other hand provides a comparison between CES technology and Cobb-Douglas
technology, in the same fashion as Herrendorf et al. (2015) who explore how structural trans-
formation is affected by the property of technology. Wingender (2015) also focuses on tech-
nology. He emphasizes sectoral differences in the elasticity of substitution between high skill
and low-skilled labor and finds that APG can be explained by the differences in skill compo-
sition between sectors. This chapter finds that CES technology mainly helps explaining the
pattern of APG, contrary to what is argued by Gollin et al. (2014). Though capital-labor
substitution still can not explain APG in rich countries, Herrendorf and Schoellman (2015)
find that the gap in the US can be fully explained by measurement errors in agricultural
value-added and in differences in worker’s human capital.
The model studied in this chapter also follows a long tradition in the structural transfor-
mation literature emphasizing the role of demand and supply factors in shaping the economic
structure (Kongsamut et al., 2001; Ngai and Pissarides, 2007; Acemoglu and Guerrieri, 2008).
In particular, my emphasis on capital-labor substitution echoes recent studies of Alvarez-
Cuadrado et al. (2013, 2014), who point out that differences in elasticity of substitution
between sectors can be a source behind structural transformation. I apply this idea to
a two-sector model to study its effect on both structural transformation and agricultural
productivity.
The next section presents the model and derives some theoretical results. Section 3.3
calibrates the model to U.S. economy and Section 3.4 presents the quantitative results.
Section 3.5 presents some supporting evidence for the capital deepening mechanism. Section
3.6 further discusses some extensions of the model. Section 3.7 concludes and Section 3.8 is
a data appendix.
3.2 The Model
Technology There are two sectors in the economy: an agriculture sector (a) and a non-
agriculture sector (n). Both sectors have a representative firm employ capital (K) and
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labor(N) to produce a single good used for final consumption. The production function has
a CES form. In non-agriculture, it is given as
Yn = A
[
θnK
σn−1
σn
n + (1− θn)N
σn−1
σn
n
] σn
σn−1
, (3.3)
where σn is the elasticity of substitution and 0 < θn < 1 is a share parameter equals to
the share of capital in output when capital-labor ratio is 1. A is a Hicks-neutral produc-
tivity parameter which can be viewed as the economy-wise total factor productivity (TFP).
Similarly, the agriculture sector has the following technology
Ya = Aκ
[
θaK
σa−1
σa
a + (1− θa)N
σa−1
σa
a
] σa
σa−1
, (3.4)
where the new parameter κ gives the relative TFP of the agricultural sector. Note that
I don’t introduce factor-augmenting productivity. This simplification is a result of data
constraint. In the quantitative analysis, I calibrate the share parameters to target factor
shares and the productivity parameters to labor productivity in data. I however don’t have
data on capital productivity, which can be used to discipline factor-augmenting productivity.
I further discuss this in Section 3.5.
Preference A representative consumer maximizes utility given income from capital and
labor. The preference is assumed to have a direct addilog form (Houthakker, 1960) over the
two goods
U(ca, cn) = ω
c1−αaa − 1
1− αa + (1− ω)
c1−αnn − 1
1− αn , (3.5)
where 0 < ω < 1, and I require αa > 0 and αn > 0 to guarantee diminishing marginal utility.
The utility function nests the usual CES utility function when αa = αn, and it becomes the
Cobb-Douglas utility function when we further require αa = αn = 1.
For my purpose, the addilog preference has the following advantages over the Stone-Geary
preference widely used in the literature. First, it avoids the problem that utility might not
be well-defined when the subsistence consumption is not met, which is indeed the case for
the poorest countries in my data sample. Related to that, it also guarantees a positive
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non-agricultural employment in even the poorest countries, as is observed in data. Second,
the preference is not just asymptotically non-homothetic. The income elasticity of the two
goods is given by
ea,E =
αn
αnsa + αasn
, and en,E =
αa
αnsa + αasn
,
where si =
pici
E
is the expenditure share of good i ∈ {a, n}. If αa > αn, the income
elasticity of the agricultural good is smaller than 1 and approaches from above to αn
αa
as the
expenditure share of the agricultural goods decreases to 0, while the income elasticity of the
non-agricultural good approaches 1 from above. This is consistent with empirical evidence
as the income elasticity of food is shown to be higher in poor countries and lower in rich
countries, and does not approach 1 as the Stone-Geary preference would predict (Seale Jr.
et al., 2003; Muhammad et al., 2011).11 Lastly, even though the Stone-Geary preference
admits an elasticity of substitution less than 1, which is key to the supply side explanation
of structural transformation (Baumol, 1967; Ngai and Pissarides, 2007). The elasticity also
approaches 1 in the limit. This is not the case for the addilog preference, whose elasticity of
substitution is given by
ean,p =
1
αa
+
(
1− αn
αa
)
(1− αa)sa(αasn + sa)
(αnsa + αasn)[2sa(1− αa) + αa] .
The elasticity of substitution depends on the expenditure shares. One set of sufficient con-
ditions for the elasticity to be less than 1 is αa > 1 and sa <
αa
2(αa−1) , which is satisfied in the
data. As the economy grows, the expenditure share of the agricultural good becomes small,
which gurantees [2sa(1 − αa) + αa] > 0. In this case, αa > 1 is sufficient for the two goods
to be gross complements.
11The structural transformation literature has pointed out the importance of income effect in explaining
sectoral reallocation, even in developed countries (Boppart, 2014; Comin et al., 2015). Some other proposed
preferences that allow for long-run income effects are the constant differences of elasticity of substitution
preference (S´wie¸cki, 2014) which belongs to the class of indirect addilog preferences of Houthakker (1960),
the price independent generalized linear preference (Boppart, 2014), and the non-constant CES preference
(Comin et al., 2015).
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Finally, the budget constraint of the representative agent is given by
pca + cn = rK + wN, (3.6)
where the non-agricultural good is taken to be the numeraire, p is the relative price of the
agricultural good, and r and w are the rental rate of capital and the wage rate respectively.
Equilibrium All markets are competitive. The equilibrium is defined in the usual way: 1)
firms maximize profits taking technology and prices as given; 2) the representative consumer
maximizes utility given the budget constraint; and 3) markets clear.
The optimality condition for utility maximization is given by
ω
1− ω
Y −αaa
Y −αnn
= p, (3.7)
where I have plugged in the market clearing conditions for the two goods. For the represen-
tative firm in agriculture, profit maximization gives
pθa (Aκ)
σa−1
σa
(
Ya
Ka
) 1
σa
= r, p(1− θa) (Aκ)
σa−1
σa
(
Ya
Na
) 1
σa
= w, (3.8)
Similarly, the profit maximization conditions in non-agriculture are given by
θnA
σn−1
σn
(
Yn
Kn
) 1
σn
= r, (1− θn)A
σn−1
σn
(
Yn
Nn
) 1
σn
= w, (3.9)
The equilibrium is fully described by the system of equations (3.3), (3.4), (3.7), (3.8), (3.9),
and the two market clearing conditions for the capital and labor,
Ka +Kn = K, Na +Nn = N. (3.10)
Discussion The model allows all the driving forces of structural transformation empha-
sized in the literature.12 The new source introduced is capital-labor substitution (Alvarez-
12Since the model economy is closed, the effect of international trade is not considered (Uy et al., 2013).
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Cuadrado et al., 2013, 2014). I next discuss how it might help explain the three development
facts regarding agriculture. Before that, the following lemma is going to be useful.
Lemma 1 The elasticity of substitution for the aggregate economy σagg = −d logK/N
d log r/w
is given
by
σagg =
ηa(1− ηa)
η(1− η) saσa +
ηn(1− ηn)
η(1− η) snσn +
(
1−
∑
i
ηi(1− ηi)
η(1− η) si
)
ε,
where ηi =
rKi
rKi+wNi
is the capital share of output in sector i, η = rK
rK+wN
is the aggregate
capital share, and ε is the elasticity of substitution between the two goods.
The proof follows Oberfield and Raval (2014). We can write the sectoral and aggregate
elasticity of substitution as follows.
σi − 1 = −d log rKi/wNi
d log r/w
= −d log ηi/(1− ηi)
d log r/w
= − 1
ηi(1− ηi)
dηi
d log r/w
,
σagg − 1 = −d log rK/wN
d log r/w
= −d log η/(1− η)
d log r/w
= − 1
η(1− η)
dη
d log r/w
.
Notice that η =
∑
i ηisi, we have
dη
d log r/w
=
∑
i
dηi
d log r/w
si +
∑
i
dsi
d log r/w
ηi
while changes in expenditure share is given by
dsi
d log r/w
= (ε− 1)(ηi − η)
Combining all these equations together gives Lemma 1.
It is easy to show that the aggregate elasticity of substitution given in Lemma 1 is larger
than 0,13 such that an increase in aggregate capital intensity lowers the relative price of
capital. I next proceed to study the effect of an decrease in the relative factor price (r/w)
Section 3.6.4 discusses how opening to trade might change the results of the baseline model.
13We only have to show 1−∑i ηi(1−ηi)η(1−η) si > 0, which follows from the definition of η.
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caused by capital deepening. I will consider the empirically relevant case described in the
following assumption.14
Assumption 1 σa > 1 > σn, and αa > 1 > αn.
Under Assumption 1, a decrease in the relative price of capital lowers labor share in agricul-
ture but raises that in non-agriculture. Since we have
Yn/Nn
pYa/Na
=
1− ηa
1− ηn ,
from the first order condition for labor. This just says that non-agricultural labor productiv-
ity relative to agricultural labor productivity in nominal prices increases due to the increase
in capital intensity. This explains why APG is lower in developed countries.
It can also be shown that the employment share of agriculture also decreases in aggregate
capital intensity. To see this, notice we can write the price of agricultural good as
p =
(
Ya
Na
)− 1
σa
(
Yn
Nn
) 1
σn
.
Optimal consumption allocation can be rewritten as
ω
(
Yn
Nn
Nn
)αn
= (1− ω)p
(
Ya
Na
Na
)αa
.
From these two equations we can express the employment share of agriculture as an implicit
function of labor productivity in the two sectors. Since labor productivity is determined
by the sectoral capital-labor ratio, which itself is determined by the relative price of capital
from firm’s optimal decision. Given the relative price, we can then solve for the employment
14The estimates presented in the next section are consistent with the assumption.
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share of agriculture from the following equation
Φ
[
θn
(
1−θn
θn
r
w
)1−σn
+ (1− θn)
]αnσn−1
σn−1
[
θa
(
1−θa
θa
r
w
)1−σa
+ (1− θa)
]αaσa−1
σa−1
=
Nαaa
(N −Na)αn ,
where Φ is a constant. Since the left hand side decreases due to the decrease in relative
factor price, Na also decreases. An increase in capital intensity thus lowers the share of
labor in the agricultural sector. This establishes capital deepening as a source of structural
transformation when the elasticity of substitution differs across sectors.
Finally, I examine the effect of capital deepening on relative productivity measured in
real prices. Agains, since labor productivity is determined by capital-labor ratios which itself
is determined by the relative price, we have
∂ log Yn/Nn
∂ log r/w
=
∂ log Yn/Nn
∂ logKn/Nn
∂ logKn/Nn
∂ log r/w
= −rKn
Yn
σn,
∂ log Ya/Na
∂ log r/w
=
∂ log Ya/Na
∂ logKa/Na
∂ logKa/Na
∂ log r/w
= −rKa
Ya
σa
Changes in relative labor productivity thus depend on the size of the elasticity and capital
share of income in each sector. Agricultural labor productivity increases relative to non-
agricultural labor productivity as long as ηaσa > ηnσn. Given that σa > σn, agricultural
labor productivity increases relative to non-agriculture in response to an increase in aggregate
capital intensity as long as capital share of income in agriculture is not substantially smaller
than that in non-agriculture. This condition will hold in rich countries as agriculture is more
capital intensive than non-agriculture in those countries. We are however not sure whether
it is also the case in poor countries due lack of information on sectoral factor shares. The
effects of capital deepening in this economy are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Given Assumption 1, capital deepening induces labor to reallocate to non-
agriculture, lowers the agricultural productivity gap, and raises labor productivity more in
agriculture if ηaσa > ηnσn.
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3.3 Calibration
I calibrate the model parameters to U.S. data in this section. I estimate the elasticity of
substitution between capital and labor following Herrendorf et al. (2015). The two param-
eters that determine the curvature of the utility function are estimated from the associated
demand system using a GMM approach. The rest of the parameters are then calibrated to
key data moments of the U.S. economy.
3.3.1 Elasticity of Substitution in Production
The elasticity of substitution is estimated using the procedures in Herrendorf et al. (2015).
They estimate a system of equations including the production function and the two first
order conditions as follows.
log
(
Yit
Y¯i
)
=
σi
σi − 1 log
[
θ¯i
(
exp(γik(t− t¯))Kit
K¯i
)σi−1
σi
+ (1− θi)
(
exp(γin(t− t¯))Nit
N¯i
)σi−1
σi
]
+ yit
log(rit) = log
(
θ¯iY¯i
K¯i
)
+
σi − 1
σi
[γik(t− t¯)] + 1
σi
log
(
Yit/Kit
Y¯i/K¯i
)
+ rit
log(wit) = log
(
1− θiY¯i
N¯i
)
+
σi − 1
σi
[γin(t− t¯)] + 1
σi
log
(
Yit/Nit
Y¯i/N¯i
)
+ wit
where i indexes sector and t indexes time, {yit, rit, wit} is a set of random errors, the
variables with a hat are the geometric average over the sample period except for t¯, which is
an arithmetic average of the time index, γik and γin are the growth rates of factor-augmenting
productivity. The functions are normalized such that the share parameters are calibrated:
θ¯i denotes the geometric average of observed capital shares over the period. The system
is estimated using the non-linear, feasible, generalized three-stage least squares estimation
procedure implemented in Eviews. The estimation uses the one-period lags of all endogenous
variables and a time trend as instruments and allows a AR(1) structure in the error term.
Herrendorf et al. (2015) estimate the system for 3 broad sectors: agriculture, manufac-
turing, and services. They use U.S. data over the period 1947-2010. I use their data and
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Table 3.1: Production Function Estimates
Agriculture Non-agriculture
σ
1.60
(0.069)
0.88
(0.039)
γk
0.022
(0.0029)
-0.021
(0.010)
γn
0.050
(0.0043)
0.025
(0.0054)
θ¯ 0.61 0.32
Note: standard errors in parentheses.
combine manufacturing and services into one single non-agricultural sector.15 The estima-
tion results are provided in Table 3.1. Capital and labor are substitutes in agriculture with
an elasticity of 1.6. The elasticity for non-agriculture is only 0.88. These estimates are
consistent with that in Herrendorf et al. (2015) (Table 1). The estimates for agriculture are
close to their estimates for agriculture, while the estimates for non-agriculture is close to
their estimates for total economy.16 Given the small share of agriculture during most of the
period, this is hardly a surprise.
The estimates of the elasticity of substitution also find supports in other studies. Studies
of U.S. agriculture looking at the changes in factor cost shares, capital-labor ratio, and
relative prices over time also find an elasticity of substitution around 1.5 (Lianos, 1971;
Kislev and Peterson, 1981, 1982). This fits the description of a wave of mechanization after
the second world war in Schultz (1964). The ease of capital-labor substitution, however,
is not confined to the U.S. Thirsk (1974) finds that it is also the case in Colombia. He
also summarizes studies on U.S., Europe, India, and Brazil to conclude that “the elasticity
of capital-labor substitution in agriculture exceeds unity and is probably close to one and
a half” (pp. 80). More recently, Xu (1999) studies China’s rapid growth in agricultural
productivity and finds an elasticity of substitution of 1.4.
On the other hand, an estimate of elasticity of substitution for non-agriculture is rare
in the literature. There is, however, ample evidence showing it is smaller than 1 for the
15Data is downloaded at https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mac.20130041.
16Their estimate for agriculture is 1.58, and that for the total economy is 0.84.
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aggregate economy (Chirinko, 2008). Remember the aggregate elasticity of substitution from
Lemma 1. Aggregate elasticity is a weighted sum of the sectoral elasticity and the elasticity
of substitution in consumption. Given that that in data factor shares varies between 0.3
and 0.7, the weight for the elasticity in consumption is close to 0.17 Aggregate elasticity of
substitution is then close to a weighted average of the elasticity of substitution in the two
sectors. The fact it is less than 1 combined with an estimate larger than 1 for the agricultural
sector implies inelastic substitution in the non-agricultural sector.
3.3.2 Preference Parameters
I estimate the two preference parameters αa and αn using a GMM approach.
18 Given the
preference parameters and data on the budget constraint, we can solve for the optimal
consumption decisions numerically. The predicted expenditure shares (sˆit) are not going to
exactly match the true expenditure shares (sit). I treat the gap between data and model
prediction as a result of measurement errors and non-optimizing consumer behavior. These
errors should be uncorrelated with the production side of the economy. We thus can use
supply side variables as instruments. Given the instrument, the moment condition is given
as follows
E [xitit] = 0,
where it = sit − sˆit is the prediction error in expenditure share for sector i in period t, xit
is any instrument used. The sample analog to the moment condition is
m(Ω;xit) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
xit(sit − sˆit),
17The maximum of η(1− η) is 0.25 when η = 0.5, while the minimum is 0.21 when η = 0.3, or 0.7. This
says ηi(1−ηi)η(1−η) will be close to 1.
18I also recover the parameters by estimating the associated demand system, following the approach in
Deaton (1974). The estimates are similar to that reported below. The parameters can also be estimated by
using the cointegration structure implied in the optimality condition (Ogaki, 1992; Clarida, 1994). I however
fail to detect a cointegration relationsip in the data.
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where T is the total number of periods in data, Ω is the set of parameters to be estimated.
The GMM estimator then minimizes the following object
Ωˆ = argmin
Ω
T ·
∑
k
m(Ω;xkat)
2,
where k indexes the instruments used. Also notice that the estimation is confined to the agri-
cultural sector. The other sector does not provide additional information as the expenditure
shares sum up to 1 both in data and in the model (Deaton, 1974).
I use Herrendorf et al. (2013)’s 3-sector consumption value-added data, which covers the
period 1947-2010. Manufacturing and services are again combined into one non-agricultural
sector. The instruments used include a constant term, and labor productivity in both sectors,
which comes from Herrendorf et al. (2015) as described above. The Herrendorf et al. (2013)
dataset only considers value-added used for consumption while neglecting investment. This
could be a problem for the model to match data as the size and structure of investment
might change from country to country. Section 3.6.1 gives a discussion on how to adjust for
investment.
The estimation results are presented in Table 3.2. I also report the implied income elas-
ticity of the agricultural good for two expenditure shares 0.1 and 0.5, which respectively are
reasonable numbers for U.S. around 1950 and a poor country like Malawi today. The income
elasticity is reported to make sure the estimates are within reasonable bounds. The litera-
ture only provides income elasticity estimates for final consumption, but not consumption
value added. I thus compare these estimates to income elasticity of food. Notice that the
income elasticity of food tends to be much larger than that for agricultural value added, as
food includes not only agricultural value-added but also services associated with processing,
packaging, and distributing food (Bunkers and Cochrane, 1957). Column 1 of Table 3.2
shows that the estimate for αn approaches 0, indicating that a quasi-linear utility function
fits the data. Income elasticity of the agricultural good takes two extreme values. When
income is low, it is 1 while it jumps to 0 when income is high enough. These estimates
provides support for the preference used in Gollin et al. (2004, 2007).
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Table 3.2: Estimates of Preference Parameters
1
(No constraint)
2
(αn > 0.1)
αa 1.74 1.87
αn ∼ 0 0.102
RMS sa 0.0516 0.0521
Implied income elasticity
sa = 0.1 0 0.06
sa = 0.5 0 0.1
Note: the estimates for ω is not reported.
The implied income elasticity in Column 1 however is far below Bunkers and Cochrane
(1957)’s estimates for farm product, which casts doubt on the extreme estimates for αn.
Similar to the Stone-Geary preference, it is still possible under the quasi-linear preference
that a poor country has all employment in agriculture, which is not observed in data. In
view of this, I provide another set of estimates by imposing an additional constraint on the
estimation. In Column 2 I require αn > 0.1. Judging by the mean squared error of the
estimated equation for expenditure shares, the model fit does not change much. The implied
income elasticity now are 0.06 and 0.1 respectively, which are more reasonable. I hence use
these estimates in the baseline numerical experiment.19
3.3.3 Other Parameters
Given the production and preference parameters, the other parameters are calibrated to
match data moments of the U.S. economy. The two productivity parameters are normalized
to be 1. This only changes the unit of output. The two share parameters in the production
function are calibrated to match a capital share of 0.61 in agriculture and 0.32 in non-
agriculture (see Table 3.1). The weight in preference ω is calibrated to match a current
employment share of 2.85% in agriculture. Labor endowment is normalized to be 1 such
that the results are on a per capita basis. K is set to deliver a capital-output ratio of 2.5.
Even in the U.S., the agricultural productivity gap is still larger than 1, which is incon-
19Note smaller income elasticity of food helps explain a large agricultural sector in poor countries. The
additional constraint hence might lower the explaining power of the model.
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Table 3.3: Baseline Calibration
Parameter Value Target
Production
A,k,N 1 Normalization
K 3.95 Capital-output ratio (2.5)
θa 0.46 Capital share in agriculture (0.61)
σa 1.60 Table 3.1
θn 0.36 Capital share in non-agriculture (0.32)
σn 0.88 Table 3.1
Preference
αa 1.87 Table 3.2
αn 0.102 Table 3.2
ω 0.003 Employment share in agriculture (2.85%)
Barrier
ξ 0.59 Agricultural productivity gap (1.4)
sistent with observed factor shares. To match this gap, I add a wedge to the non-agricultural
labor market following Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014). In particular, I assume a gap of
1
1−ξ between non-agricultural and agricultural wages. Now let w denote the wage prevalent
in the agricultural sector, the only change to the equilibrium is that the labor demand in
non-agriculture now reads,20
(1− θn)A
σn−1
σn
(
Yn
Nn
) 1
σn
=
w
1− ξ , (3.11)
with ξ chosen to match a agricultural productivity gap of 1.4 as observed in data. The
calibrated parameters are summarized in Table 3.3.
3.4 Quantitative Results
I am now ready to examine the model’s quantitative performance. The data I use are
compiled from Penn World Table, Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations,
United Nations National Accounts, and International Labor Organization. It covers 80
20Another interpretation is this procedure corrects the measurement errors in the data. Herrendorf and
Schoellman (2015) show that after accounting for the measurement errors and differences in human capital
agricultural wage and non-agricultural wage are not so different from each other.
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Figure 3.3: Sectoral Allocation, Model VS. Data
Note: left panel is for employment shares, and the right panel is for value-added
shares.
countries in 1985, including information on sectoral productivity, employment and value-
added shares, and aggregate capital and labor endowment.21 For each country, I calibrate
the two productivity measures to match observed labor productivity in the two sectors, and
the aggregate capital intensity is calibrated to directly match that in data. A comparison
between model prediction and data are presented in Figure 3.3 and 3.4. Figure 3.3 shows that
the model outcome tracks well the employment and value-added share in data. Figure 3.4
shows that the model predicts a negative relationship between the agricultural productivity
gap and income level, which can only be driven by difference in capital-labor substitution
between sectors.
To examine the model fit quantitatively, I regress data on model prediction for each
of the measures shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4. The regression results are shown in Table
3.4. I look at the regression coefficient and R-squared respectively. The model predicts
the employment share quite well, with the regression coefficient close to 1 and a R-squared
of 0.87. The model prediction for value-added share is worse than that for employment.
In particular, a regression coefficient less than 1 indicates that the model over-predicts the
value-added share for most countries. This directly translates to an underestimation of the
21Section 3.8 provides a more detailed description.
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Figure 3.4: Agriculture Productivity Gap, Model VS. Data
agricultural productivity gap. R-squared for APG is also very low, confirming the impression
from Figure 3.4. Also presented in Table 3.4 is a comparison with Cobb-Douglas technology
allowing for sectoral differences in the capital share.22 It shows that allowing for capital-labor
substitution helps explaining the sectoral allocation pattern, though not by a large margin.
The model with CES technologies helps getting the employment shares right but performs
worse for the value-added shares. As I emphasize above, Cobb-Douglas technology cannot
explain APG at all.
The model underestimates the agricultural productivity gap and the data is also much
22To save space, I don’t present the figures for Cobb-Douglas technology.
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Table 3.4: Model Fit
CES C-D
Coefficient R-squared Coefficient R-squared
Employment 1.01
(0.043)
0.88 1.41
(0.069)
0.84
Value-added 0.63
(0.043)
0.74 0.77
(0.043)
0.80
APG 2.42
(0.31)
0.08
Note: This table compares the model fit with CES and CD production functions.
The numbers reported come from regressing actual data on predicted value without
an intercept.
more volatile than the model predicts. This is partly driven by measurement errors in APG.
Gollin et al. (2014) show that after adjusting for measurement errors in both input and
output, the agricultural productivity gap shrinks a lot, which is particularly the case in
developing countries. Figure 3.5 contrasts the model prediction to the adjusted APG in
Gollin et al. (2014). What is presented is the model prediction against a linear relationship
between APG and GDP per capita using the adjusted numbers from Gollin et al. (2014), so
we are not targeting the extreme values for particular countries but an average over countries.
Surprisingly, the model actually over-predicts APG in the poorest countries. While Gollin
et al. (2014) show that the gap in APG between the poorest and richest countries is on
average around 2, the model predicts a gap close to 3.
As shown above, APG is tightly linked to sectoral labor share of income under com-
petitive markets. Figure 3.6 plots the model prediction of labor shares for the two sectors
and the aggregate economy. This over-prediction of APG in poor countries is echoed by
the implausible predictions for labor shares, with agricultural labor share in poor countries
between 0.8 and 0.9. Even though we don’t have good data on sectoral labor shares covering
countries of different income levels, these numbers are not credible. Fractional evidence in
Fuglie (2010) shows that labor share in agriculture tends to be around 0.6 in developing
countries and it doesn’t fall as country develops. Using the labor share of 0.6, APG in poor
countries will be reduced by a third, closer to the adjusted numbers reported in Gollin et al.
(2014). I argue that the over-prediction of APG and agricultural labor share are more likely
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Figure 3.5: Agriculture Productivity Gap, Model VS. GLW
Note: The blue dots are fitted APG for each country using adjusted numbers
from Gollin et al. (2014).
due to model mis-specification, and should not be seen as a rejection of the capital-labor
substitution mechanism. In particular, land as an important input in agricultural production
is not separated from physical capital in the model. Also, factor-augmenting productivity
change is not modeled due to data constraints. Section 3.6 discusses some extensions that
take these into consideration. For countries above a certain income level, the model predicts
that the aggregate labor share does not change much across countries. This is consistent
with the findings of Gollin (2002). In the model, both sectoral labor share of income and
sectoral composition change along economic development. Poor countries have both a larger
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Figure 3.6: Model Prediction of Labor Share of Income
agricultural sector and larger labor share of income in agriculture, which helps to keep the
aggregate labor share relatively stable across countries.
Lastly, I examine whether capital-labor substitution helps explain low agricultural pro-
ductivity in poor countries. Figure 3.7 compares the relative TFP in agriculture (κ) for
different model specification. Two points are worth mentioning. First, large TFP differ-
ences are needed to get the agricultural productivity right, which is why recent studies
tries to model TFP differences (e.g., Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014)). Second, the
Cobb-Douglas technology actually performs better than CES, as the inferred relative TFP is
larger under the former. This is because capital intensity is also much larger in agriculture.
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Figure 3.7: Relative TFP in agriculture, CES VS. C-D
The same difference in capital intensity leads to larger productivity difference in agriculture.
To summarize, besides APG, CES does not help explain other development facts regarding
agriculture. This is consistent with the findings of Herrendorf et al. (2015) using U.S. time
series data.
3.5 Labor Share of Income and Sectoral Capital Intensity
This section presents further evidence for the capital-labor substitution mechanism. I first
examine whether APG is tightly linked to the the ratio of sectoral labor shares as predicted
by the model. Data on sectoral labor share is not available for a large number of countries,
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Figure 3.8: APG VS. Ratio of Labor Share, EU-KLEMS data
in particular the poor countries. I hence use the EU KLEMS database (O’Mahony and
Timmer, 2009), which covers the OECD countries for the period 1970-2005. The OECD
countries are mostly rich countries but the data does show some variation in APG across
countries and over time. Figure 3.8 plots APG against the ratio of non-agricultural labor
share to agricultural labor share.23 The ratio of labor share does track APG closely.24 APG
however is in general larger than the ratio of labor shares, indicating possible measurement
errors or distorted labor market.
Labor shares are closely tied to capital-labor ratios. In particular, the model predicts
that capital intensity in non-agriculture relative to that in agriculture decreases with aggre-
gate capital intensity. I next examine this using the dataset of Butzer et al. (2010), who
23Labor share is defined as labor compensation (LAB) divided by gross value added(VA). Labor produc-
tivity is calculated as value added divided by total hours worked by persons engaged (H EMP). Agriculture
corresponds to the industry agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing (AtB), and non-agriculture is defined
as the difference between total industries (TOT) and agriculture.
24The correlation coefficient between the two is 0.67, and it’s statistically significant at 1%.
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Table 3.5: Relative Capital Intensity VS. Income Levels
(1) (2) (3)
Log of GDP per
capita
-7.03
(3.29)
-24.12
(5.32)
-2.99
(0.41)
Time Dummies No Yes -
R-squared 0.23 0.24 0.68
# of Obs. 520 520 80
Data Source Butzer et al. (2010) Butzer et al. (2010) Model
Note: the estimate for the constant term is omitted here, standard errors in parentheses.
provide internationally comparable measures of fixed capital in agriculture for a set of 30
countries from 1967-2003. These countries include not only rich countries but also some poor
countries. I complement this data with total capital stock from PWT and employment share
of agriculture from WDI to reach a measure of relative capital intensity. Non-agricultural
capital stock is defined as the difference between total and agricultural capital stock.25 Since
employment share of agriculture is often missing for poor countries and for early periods, I
end up with an unbalanced panel with 520 observations, covering 28 countries from 1980-
2003. Even the sample covers mainly rich countries, it does include observations for poor
countries such as Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan, where agriculture takes up around half
of total employment. I regress the relative capital intensity on the log of GDP per worker,
which is derived from PWT. The results are shown in Table 3.5. Column 1 shows that the
relative capital intensity decreases along economic development as the model predicts. The
estimate is statistically significant at 1% level.26 Column 2 adds time dummies to control
for measurement errors in each year, as the two capital stock might still not be comparable
after our adjustment.27 Adding time dummies increases both the level and statistical signif-
icance of the estimate. To make a comparison, I also run the same regression using model
simulated data in Column 3. Curiously, the decline in relative capital intensity is larger in
25 To make the two capital stocks as comparable as possible, I convert PWT’s capital stock evaluated at
current price PPPs (ck) into 1990 prices using the capital price for US (pl k).
26The significant effect mostly comes from cross-section variation, as the between group estimator produces
much larger and more significant estimates then the within group estimator.
27See footnote 25. In particular, total aggregate stock is comparable across countries but not so much
over time. We should expect the time dummies to catch this effect.
88
data, despite the model produces a larger effect on APG. I don’t want to overemphasize this
contradiction as the data is not of highest quality. Also, the model abstracts some features
that can alter the relationship between capital intensity and labor shares. The next section
discusses some of these features. I conclude this section by emphasizing that the evidence
presented here does lend support to the model prediction at least qualitatively.
3.6 Discussion
The baseline model is surely oversimplified. I now discuss some possible extensions. In
particular I will focus on how the results on APG will be altered.
3.6.1 Land in Agriculture Production
I have only considered reproducible capital which can be freely allocated between sectors.
In reality land plays an important role in agricultural production. For instance, Valentinyi
and Herrendorf (2008) show that the high capital share in agriculture is mainly explained
by land rents. Adding land to production probably helps bring the predicted APG for poor
countries down because land is going to take up a share of output, which can come from
labor. I make the extension here by assuming agricultural production employs capital, labor,
and land under a nested CES production function. There are 3 possible nesting structure. I
consider 2 of them as follows,
Ya = Ak
[
θa
(
γK
η−1
η
a + (1− γ)L
η−1
η
) η
η−1
σa−1
σa
+ (1− θa)N
σa−1
σa
a
] σa
σa−1
, (3.12)
Ya = Aκ
[
γL
η−1
η + (1− γ)
(
θaK
σa−1
σa
a + (1− θa)N
σa−1
σa
a
) σa
σa−1
η−1
η
] η
η−1
. (3.13)
The first technology combines land and physical first as in Adamopoulos and Restuccia
(2014). This makes sense as land is often treated as a form of capital, and both land and
physical capital are operated by labor. The second technology nests physical capital and
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Table 3.6: Estimates for 3-factor Agricultural Production
Eq 3.12 Eq 3.13
σa
1.85
(0.049)
0.93
(0.041)
η
0.44
(0.046)
1.08
(0.029)
γk
0.012
(0.0016)
0.031
(0.021)
γn
0.023
(0.0035)
0.096
(0.020)
γl
0.034
(0.0025)
-0.041
(0.022)
Note: standard errors in parentheses.
labor together. It recognizes the fact that capital and labor might provide services together,
which is then applied to land (Kislev and Peterson, 1982).
I still use the data and the estimation procedure of Herrendorf et al. (2015) to estimate the
production functions except now I break down capital income into those from reproducible
capital and land rents. The normalization is altered following Leo´n-Ledesma et al. (2011) who
also estimate a two-level nested CES production function using a normalized system. The
system is estimated combining the two sectors together, though I only report the results for
agriculture. The estimates for the non-agricultural sector change only a little. Under the first
nesting structure, we can see that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is
larger with land added to production, while land is a complement to physical capital. Under
the second nesting structure, capital and labor become complements though the elasticity
of substitution is still larger than in non-agriculture. The estimates for productivity growth
rate however seems less probable. In particular, land productivity declines at 4.1% per year,
which is significant at 10% level. The first technology seem to be a more reasonable choice.
I next repeat the numerical exercise using the new production technologies. Figure 3.9
presents the results on APG. Naturally, we see that the model with the first technology
produces even larger APG for developing countries. On the other hand, the explanatory
power of the model for APG is substantially reduced when we use the second technology.
Adding land to agricultural production thus delivers different results, depending on the
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Figure 3.9: APG with Land in Agricultural Production
Note: left panel is for the first technology (Eq. 3.12), and the right panel is for the
second technology (Eq. 3.13).
specification of technology. Under the more reasonable case capital-labor substitution is still
an important source of large APG in developing countries.
3.6.2 Factor-augmenting Productivity
I have omitted factor-augmenting productivity but only relied on Hicks-neutral productiv-
ity. This is partly due to data constraint. The literature has long recognized that factor-
augmenting productivity can be a key driving force behind changes in factor shares, which is
particularly a problem in production function estimation. I now discuss how the results will
be affected if we allow for factor-augmenting productivity. I first consider another extreme
case where only labor-augmenting productivity is allowed. This is the natural case to con-
sider as labor-augmenting productivity is consistent with balanced growth path in one-sector
models. I modify the production functions as follows,
Yn =
[
θnK
σn−1
σn
n + (1− θn)(ANn)
σn−1
σn
] σn
σn−1
, (3.14)
Ya =
[
θaK
σa−1
σa
a + (1− θa)(AκNa)
σa−1
σa
] σa
σa−1
. (3.15)
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The effect of labor-augmenting productivity is intuitive. If poor countries also have low
productivity, factor shares might change less as what matters is the ratio of capital to effective
labor.28 This potentially can help get the predictions on APG right, or even reverse the
results. A problem with this modification however is that the calibration strategy in Section
3.4 might not produce sensible results. Notice that there we need large TFP differences to
match labor productivity in poor countries. To match the same data in the new specification
can be unfeasible as it is possible that using capital alone is more than necessary to produce
the output a developing country can produce.29 Labor-augmenting productivity hence will
be negative if we require labor productivity in the model to match data.30 Indeed, this is a
serious problem in the sample of countries, the calibration is successful for only 16 out of 80
countries.31 I note that predicted APG is still negatively correlated with income levels, even
though now the correlation is less systematic than the baseline case.
We have seen in Section 3.5 that relative capital intensity in data is larger than model
prediction and the gap is larger for developing countries. For example, relative capital
intensity in U.S. is 0.74 in the model, while it is 1.13 in data. For a poor country like Morocco,
they are 4.34 and 46! This could be due to factor-augmenting productivity differences. But
will this overturn the results on APG? The answer is no. The reason is that no matter how
factor prices change, the changes in capital intensity due to factor-augmenting productivity
are going to increase the labor share of agriculture relative to that of non-agriculture if the
model is going to match data on sectoral capital intensity. On the other hand, changes in
factor prices might change the results. For that, I consider the following thought experiment.
Without re-calibrating the model, let’s assume that the model predicts a constant aggregate
28That is, capital intensity might increase less if increase in effective labor reduces the need of substituting
capital for labor.
29This is because neither capital or labor is necessary for producing output in CES production functions.
30At a deeper level, the problem is not concave if we have to change A and κ to match data on labor
productivity. For example, if we increase rental rate of capital, we can show that the demand for capital
might also increase due to corresponding shifts in production function.
31To solve the problem, I use a grid search over employment share in agriculture, given which all other
variables can be solved. The grids range from 0 to 1 with a grid size of 0.0001. An equilibrium exists if the
equilibrium conditions holds roughly.
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labor share of 0.67 for all countries and the allocation of capital and labor is the same as in
data.32 This pins down the wage-rental rate ratio, as33
w
r
=
ls
(1− ls)
K
Na +
Nn
1−ξ
,
where ls is the aggregate labor share. Given that the allocation of capital and labor is
exactly what we observe in data, what are the predictions for APG? To get that, I apply the
following formula to all the countries with comprehensive data,
APG =
Kn
Nn
r
w
+ 1
1−ξ
Ka
Na
r
w
+ 1
.
I find that predicted APG is still negatively correlated with income levels. In particular, it is
higher than 10 for 14 out of 27 countries, and it can be as large as 150! I find these numbers
implausibly large, indicating substantial errors in the capital measures.
The first experiment in this subsection shows that even labor-augmenting productivity
might play a role, it cannot account for the large international differences in labor productiv-
ity alone. The second experiment shows that a model calibrated to target capital allocation
in the data provided by Butzer et al. (2010) will still over-predict APG for poor countries,
indicating potentially large measurement errors in the capital measures. The conclusion is
that factor-augmenting productivity might get the predicted APG right. The data from
Butzer et al. (2010) however is not good enough for a quantitative study.
3.6.3 Investment
The model is static such that investment is not explicitly considered. With investment,
output will be different from consumption. The model thus implicitly requires the investment
rates in the two sectors follow a certain rule. To see that, notice the first order condition
32One property of a successful model would be a relative stable aggregate labor share (Gollin, 2002). The
baseline model shows the predictive power for labor allocation. Capital allocation can also be targeted if we
were to use that information.
33Notice the calibration of ξ will not be affected by adding factor-augmenting productivity.
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with investment changes to
ω
1− ω
((1− inva)Ya)−αa
((1− invn)Yn) −αn = p,
where invi is investment rate in sector i. Ignoring investment doesn’t affect model prediction
only if (1− inva)αa = (1− invn) αn , which implies invn > inva. As investment is commonly
believed to come from the manufacturing sector (Herrendorf et al., 2014), the bias due to ig-
noring investment might be small. In general, raising investment rate in the non-agricultural
sector increases the demand for the non-agricultural good, which further increases the rental
rate of capital, as non-agriculture is more capital intensive than agriculture in poor coun-
tries. The changes in factor prices will increase predicted APG as it further deviates the
wage-rental rate ratio from the U.S. benchmark. Adding investment hence will not overturn
the prediction for APG but reinforces it.
3.6.4 Trade and International Capital Flow
How does opening to international markets change my results? I next analyze two cases:
one with international trade and the other with international capital flow. I focus on what
will happen to developing countries.
What happens if a poor country opens to international trade? Given the low agricultural
productivity, relative price of the agricultural good is high in poor countries (Restuccia et al.,
2008; Lagakos and Waugh, 2013). This means poor countries will import food and export
industrial products.34 In my model, opening to international trade lowers the wage-rental
rate ratio, which tend to raise model predicted APG in poor countries. To see that, notice
that we can write the resource constraint for capital as
(
Kn
Nn
)
Nn +
(
Ka
Na
)
Na = K.
34In data poor countries don’t import as much food as they should, as trade costs are prohibitively high
in agriculture (Tombe, 2015). The fact that poor countries allocate a lot workers to agriculture is a reflection
of high trade costs.
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Given that the country will export non-agricultural good and import agricultural good, we
expect Nn to increase and Na to decrease. Since
Kn
Nn
> Ka
Na
in developing countries, we will
have both of them decrease, otherwise the resource constraint cannot be met.35 This leads
to a decrease in labor share in non-agriculture and an increase in agriculture, contributing
to a even larger APG. Opening to international trade thus only strengthens my results. The
fundamental reason behind this result is international trade benefits capital in capital-scarce
countries, which leads to a lower wage-rental rate ratio than under a closed economy. This
seemingly counter-intuitive result makes sense because the source of comparative advantage
mostly comes from TFP differences rather than factor endowment. In rich countries, the
opposite will happen. The dispersion in APG across countries will increase.
What about opening to the international capital market? The model predicts that capital
will move from rich to poor countries as returns are higher in poor countries. The wage-rental
rate ratio will increase in poor countries, which will reduce the APG. However, the difference
in relative factor price will not disappear because of capital flow alone. Factor prices will
not be equalized across countries because countries differ in TFP. Workers in rich countries
benefit from high TFP and receive higher wages. Efficient allocation of resources requires
both capital and labor move to rich countries instead of capital moving to poor countries.
Opening to international capital inflow however contributes to a decrease in the dispersion
of APG, which might help resolving the over-prediction of the model.
3.7 Summary
This chapter examines whether differential capital-labor substitution across sectors helps
explain some of the development facts regarding agriculture. I find that it helps explain
the negative relationship between the agricultural productivity gap and GDP per capita.
While Gollin et al. (2014) conclude that difference in sectoral labor shares cannot explain
the agricultural productivity gap, I find that the changes in sectoral labor shares might
35This relies on a shift of labor from agriculture to industry. This is necessary because if it’s not the case,
increased non-agricultural production require a larger increase in capital intensity in non-agriculture, which
leads to an even larger increase in agricultural labor share. The resource constraint again cannot be met.
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nevertheless help explain the cross-country pattern of APG. Since sectoral labor share data
covering a large set of countries are not readily available, we however cannot directly test this
model prediction. Fractional evidence in Fuglie (2010) supports the model. Quantitatively,
my baseline model even over-predicts the negative correlation, which can be attenuated by
adding more realistic features to the model. In terms of sectoral allocation of resources and
sectoral labor productivity, I find that the effect of capital-labor substitution is quantitatively
small, conforming the findings of Herrendorf et al. (2015).
The evidence presented in this chapter is hardly conclusive due to the lack of good data.
What’s clear is that relative capital intensity and labor share of income do change over time,
and the change is different across industries. This cautions using Cobb-Douglas production
functions in the study of agriculture and development. I show that it is in particular the
case when we try to attribute labor productivity differences across sectors to distortions.
3.8 Data Appendix
For the quantitative analysis, I construct a dataset countries for the year 1985. The dataset
includes each country’s agricultural and non-agricultural real GDP per capita, employment
and value-added shares of both sectors, relative prices, capital stock, and land endowment
per capita. Data on agricultural output come from Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations (FAO, Rao (1993)). Aggregate output data come from Penn World
Table 8.1 (Feenstra et al., 2015). While both the FAO and PWT provide real output,
they are not comparable because the international prices used are not comparable. I use the
procedure in Caselli (2005) to adjust the FAO data to make it comparable to PWT. The non-
agricultural output then is derived by subtracting agricultural output from aggregate output.
The employment data also come from FAO and PWT. Because FAO reports economically
active population while PWT only considers people who work, I use International Labor
Organization’s (ILO) data on economically active population to adjust the PWT data and
make economically active population as my measure of employment. The source of value-
added shares is the United Nations National Accounts, which I download from the online
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data appendix of Herrendorf et al. (2014). Relative prices are derived as the ratio of PPPs
for the two sectors. Finally, I use PWT’s capital stock measure. The land data also comes
from FAO. The dataset has 80 countries with non-missing values for all variables.
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CHAPTER 4
Value-added, Production Networks, and Misallocation
4.1 Introduction
Both the previous two chapters provide explanations for the agricultural productivity gap,
which has often been as an indicator of severe labor misallocation in developing countries
Gollin et al. (2014). While my study does not favor the misallocation explanation for the
productivity gap, a recent literature pioneered by Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh
and Klenow (2009) does argue forcefully and provide much evidence that resource misallo-
cation could be an important reason behind the staggering productivity differences between
developed and developing countries. In particular, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) develop an ac-
counting framework to estimate the efficiency loss resulted from misallocation across micro
production units such as firms, which is followed by later studies such as Oberfield (2013),
Hsieh and Klenow (2014), and Gopinath et al. (2017). While their approach relies on value-
added production functions and ignores intermediate input use in production, later studies
also have pointed out that the effect of given micro distortions can be magnified through the
linkages across sectors (Jones, 2011, 2013). Without taking firm productivity and distortions
as given, this chapter asks and answers a different question: will a model with production
networks produce larger efficiency loss than a model with value-added production functions
conditional on observing the same data?
To answer this question requires correct specification of both models. While we can
naturally view sectors as either categories of final expenditure or value-added that are con-
nected through complicated input-output linkages,1 Herrendorf et al. (2013) show that it
1An example given in Herrendorf et al. (2013) is a cotton shirt. While it is a product of the manufacturing
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is not easy to specify tractable models that can be easily transformed into the other form.
If the models are mis-specified, the question raised can not be properly answered because
we can not distinguish between model mis-specification and the use of different production
functions. The first contribution of this chapter is to show that the widely used model of
production networks with Cobb-Douglas production technologies at the sectoral level a la
Long and Plosser (1983) (the output model hereafter) is theoretically consistent with the
model of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) (the value-added model) when there are no distortions
in intermediate input use.2 This provides the basis for the comparison of these two models.
With the equivalence of the two models, I proceed to show that efficiency loss produced
in these two models are identical when there are no distortions in the intermediate input
use. Despite the magnification of distortions through the production network, the output
model doesn’t produce larger efficiency loss as firm productivity measured under an output
production function is substantially less dispersed that that measured under a value-added
production function, which lowers the effect of misallocation. This scaling effect has been
pointed out by Bruno (1978) in comparing the real value-added production and the output
production function. It has also recently been emphasized by Gandhi et al. (2013, 2017) as a
reason that the value-added framework might overstate the extent of misallocation in data,
though they do not consider production networks.
The scaling effect can be intuitively understood as follows. A rise in productivity will
induce the firm to employ more intermediate inputs and raise its output and value-added.
Value-added-based productivity will register a larger increase in productivity because it
doesn’t take into account the increase in intermediate input use, which is correctly accounted
for in the output-based productivity measures. It is essentially the magnification effect of
production networks, now implicitly reflected in measured firm productivity, while the same
effect is explicitly spelled out in the output model. It is another manifestation that the two
sector under the final expenditure view, it is a combination of raw cotton from agriculture, processing from
manufacturing, and retail services from the services sector under the value-added view.
2A minor modification is required: the elasticity of substitution between products of firms within a sector
should be different. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) assume a constant elasticity. I’ll come back to this point when
I discuss empirical implementation of the models.
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models are just different representations of the same production process.
When distortions in intermediate input use are introduced, the value-added model is no
longer a correct representation of data and will not produce the correct measure of efficiency
loss. I explore how the results might be biased in this scenario if the value-added model
is nevertheless specified. I go on to analyze a case where there is no misallocation across
sectors. This is the case considered by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and many others.3 It also
allows us to identify the production network and makes the implementation feasible. Sur-
prisingly, efficiency loss in the value-added model actually has the theoretically correct form
in terms of revenue and physical productivity of firms, despite a value-added representation
of the data does not exist. Though measured efficiency loss will be biased when the model
is implemented in data. The reason for the bias is that both revenue productivity and phys-
ical productivity are incorrectly measured in the value-added model. Since I assume that
intermediate inputs observed in the data are recorded in the same prices,4 one way to under-
stand this mismeasurement is to think of the commonly used value-added measure (output
minus intermediate input) as a real value-added measure constructed with constant prices
while the firms actually face different nominal prices due to the presence of distortions. As
argued by Bruno (1978), when prices are not constant, both marginal products and total
factor productivity measured using real value-added will be biased. The same logic underlies
the findings of Basu and Fernald (1995) that productivity spillover across manufacturing
industries exist in the value-added data but not in the output data. They consider imperfect
competition as a particular source of price distortion, while the distortions in this chapter
are generic and I apply the idea to misallocation accounting.
While efficiency loss is mismeasured in the value-added model with distortions in interme-
diate input use, the model does not predict a unambiguous direction for the bias. It depends
on how the distortions are distributed in data. I next empirically measure efficiency loss in
China under these two models using the Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial Production in
3In the contrary, Jones (2011) studies only misallocation across sectors.
4That is, the distortions considered in the chapter are implicit, or the data is net of taxes if the distortions
come from actual taxes.
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2005, which is also used by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) among others. When the value-added
model is calibrated in a way consistent with the theoretical discussion, I find that there are
biases in both directions across 4-digit industries of China. The biases however are relatively
small. The difference between the measures from the two models is less than 5 percentage
points for over 95% of the industries. This is because measured distortions in the interme-
diate input markets are substantially smaller than that in the capital and labor markets,
a finding that is consistent with Krishna and Tang (2018). The standard deviation of the
distortions in intermediate input market (in logs) is only 0.19, while that in the primary
input market is 0.85.
Existing literature however might have overstated the cost of misallocation due to mis-
specified parameter values. A key parameter for measuring efficiency loss is the elasticity
of substitution between varieties within a sector. This parameter is often assigned wrong
values in the literature in two ways: 1. it should be sector-specific, and 2. it is different in
the two models. While the bias coming from the first source is small, efficiency loss can be
substantially overstated when an output elasticity is assigned to a value-added model. In the
Chinese data, if I let the elasticity to be 3 in both models,5 measured efficiency loss is larger
in the value-added model in over 95% of the industries and the value-added measures are
on average 14 percentage points larger than the output measures. The reason behind this
overstatement is that the output elasticity is much smaller than the value-added elasticity.
The distinction between these two parameters is emphasized by Herrendorf et al. (2013) who
discuss the two views of sectors. It however has not be fully appreciated in the literature.
While the elasticity is often estimated for goods (Broda and Weinstein, 2006; Hendel and
Nevo, 2006), these estimates are often used in the value-added model without deliberation.
This chapter contributes to a burgeoning literature on misallocation, in particular those
studies using micro data to measure aggregate efficiency loss following Hsieh and Klenow
(2009).6 It is also closely related to a newer literature studying misallocation in production
5This is the baseline case in Hsieh and Klenow (2009). The overstatement still exists if other values are
assigned.
6It is part of the “indirect approach” under the taxonomy of Restuccia and Rogerson (2013). Studies
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networks.7,8 This chapter focuses on the measurement of efficiency loss under production
networks and compared it to the value-added model of Hsieh and Klenow (2009). It is
close to Krishna and Tang (2018), who also measure misallocation for China and India
using an output model similar to mine. They find that measured efficiency losses in the
two countries are not necessarily higher than those in Hsieh and Klenow (2009). This
chapter provides a theoretical underpinning for their findings. The comparison between
the use of output and value-added measures also echoes the early studies of Bruno (1978,
1984), and Basu and Fernald (1995). Different from them, this chapter explicitly considers
production networks and studies misallocation across firms.9 The two views of sectors are also
extensively discussed in Herrendorf et al. (2013) who try to disentangle different sources of
structural transformation. This chapter applies the idea to the measurement of misallocation
and explicitly models the input-output linkages.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section presents the output
model, which is followed by the value-added framework in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 shows
that the output model can be transformed into the value-added model and efficiency loss
measured in the two models are identical if there are no distortions in intermediate input
use. Section 4.5 discusses how the value-added model will produce biased results when those
distortions are present. Section 4.6 evaluates the two models empirically using Chinese data.
Section 4.7 concludes.
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4.2 The Output Model
This section presents the output model, which comes from adding a production network a la
Long and Plosser (1983) to the Hsieh and Klenow (2009) framework. I view this model as a
natural representation of production in an economy, as firms treat primary inputs and inter-
mediate inputs symmetrically in reality. From the point of view of the aggregate economy,
the concept of value-added however is more natural as the intermediate inputs cancel out
in the aggregation process. This makes sure that the comparison between the output model
present here and the value-added model in the next section is legitimate: both model takes
capital and labor to produce a final product (GDP) while one model considers endogenous
intermediate input use and the other model does not. The output model corresponds to the
“final consumption expenditure approach” of Herrendorf et al. (2013), while the value-added
model corresponds to the “consumption value-added approach”.10
The are S sectors in the economy. A final product is produced by competitive firms from
sectoral output,11
Y =
S∑
s=1
Cθss , with
S∑
s=1
θs = 1. (4.1)
Let the final output be the numeraire, the demand for sectoral output from final good
producers is given by PsYs = θsY . The sectoral output is used both for final consumption
and as intermediate inputs in production, with the market clearing condition,
Qs = Cs +Ms, (4.2)
where Ms is intermediate input demand from all sector, Ms =
∑S
q=1Msq, where Msq is the
demand of sector q for the output of sector s. The sectoral output is produced using different
10Note Herrendorf et al. (2013) only considers consumption as their purpose is to estimate utility functions
without considering which sector investment sources from. In this chapter both consumption and investment
are taken as part of total expenditure.
11I use C to denote consumption and will call it consumption, but it should be understood as expenditure
including both consumption and investment, see Footnote 10.
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intermediate varieties Qsi,
Qs =
(
Ns∑
i=1
Q
σs−1
σs
si
) σs
σs−1
, (4.3)
where Ns is the total number of varieties in sector s. I assume each variety is produced by
one firm such that firm and variety can used interchangeably. Note that the elasticity of
substitution between varieties is sector specific. This is not necessary for the output model
but I will later show that the elasticity cannot be constant in both models. The inverse
demand for a variety is given by Psi = PsQ
1
σs
s Q
− 1
σs
si , with the sectoral price index given as
Ps =
(∑S
i=1 P
1−σs
si
) 1
1−σs
.
The firms produce with two primary inputs, capital and labor, and intermediate inputs
from all sectors, according to a Cobb-Douglas technology
Qsi = Asi
(
Kαssi L
1−αs
si
)ηs ( S∏
q=1
M
λqs
qsi
)1−ηs
, (4.4)
with
∑S
q=1 λqs = 1. Different from Hsieh and Klenow (2009), I assume the firms take prices
as given instead of actively set prices.12 They face idiosyncratic distortions in the factor
markets, trying to maximize,
pisi = PsiQsi − (1 + τKsi)RKsi − (1 + τLsi)WLsi − (1 + τMsi)
S∑
q=1
PqMqsi.
The key to equivalence results presented below is there are no distortions in intermediate
input use, which I make explicit in the following assumption.
Assumption 2 τMsi = 0, ∀ s ∈ {1, 2, ...S} and i ∈ {1, 2, ...Ns}.
To prove the two models represent the same production structure, it is however not
necessary to introduce the distortions but adding them shows that the results are not affected
12One way to think about this is there are many firms with access to identical technology with tiny entry
costs. In equilibrium there will be only one firm operating but act like competitive producers. Otherwise, I
can assume there are many firms producing one variety and they all have the same technology and face the
same distortions. Assuming monopoly pricing does not change main conclusions in this chapter but only
alters the constant terms in the aggregate production derived below.
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by distortions in primary factor markets. It also facilitates the presentation of results below.
Following Hsieh and Klenow (2009), I assume that the payments to factors are recorded in
market prices net of the wedges. One way to think of this to view the wedges as the shadow
prices for the constraints the firms face in the factor markets, such as a collateral constraints
for renting capital. This however runs the risk of having firms with negative profits if they
face negative wedges. Giving the firms monopoly power can ease the problem but will not
solve it altogether. To assume the taxes and subsidies are rebated to the firms lump sum
however guarantees all firms receive zero profit. Either way, the allocation of production
factors is not affected. Finally, factor market clearing for capital and labor requires,
S∑
s=1
Ns∑
i=1
Ksi = K, and
S∑
s=1
Ns∑
i=1
Lsi = L. (4.5)
Within a sector, sectoral intermediate demand is the sum of demand from all variety pro-
ducers Mqs =
∑Ns
i=1Mqsi.
I next proceed to show that the model allows an aggregate production function with a
Cobb-Douglas form. Following Hsieh and Klenow (2009), I define marginal revenue products
as follows,
MRPKsi ≡ αsηsPsiQsi
Ksi
= (1 + τKsi)R, (4.6)
MRPLsi ≡ (1− αs)ηsPsiQsi
Lsi
= (1 + τLsi)W, (4.7)
MRPMqsi ≡ λqs(1− ηs)PsiQsi
Mqsi
= Pq, (4.8)
where the second equality simply comes from the first order conditions of the profit maxi-
mizing firms. With the wedges, the marginal revenue products are no longer the same across
firms, which is required for efficient resource allocation. I also define value productivity and
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physical productivity as follows,
TFPRsi ≡ PsiQsi(
Kαssi L
1−αs
si
)ηs (∏S
q=1M
λqs
qsi
)1−ηs , (4.9)
TFPQsi ≡ Qsi(
Kαssi L
1−αs
si
)ηs (∏S
q=1M
λqs
qsi
)1−ηs = Asi. (4.10)
Revenue productivity is simply a firm’s marginal cost of a production bundle such that we
can express price as Psi =
TFPRsi
Asi
.13 It also contains all the information on the wedges, each
of which weighted by the output elasticity of the corresponding production factor. Without
the wedges, revenue productivity is equalized across firms within a sector, which leads to the
efficient allocation of resources. Under efficient allocation, more productive firms employs
more inputs and produce more, which lowers the price of its product eventually to the point
of equal revenue productivity across firms.
For a sector as a whole, value productivity can be similarly defined as14
TFPRs ≡ PsQs
(Kαss L
1−αs
s )
ηs
(∏S
q=1 M
λqs
qs
)1−ηs , (4.11)
which allows us to express sectoral total factor productivity as,
TFPs ≡ Qs
(Kαss L
1−αs
s )
ηs
(∏S
q=1M
λqs
qs
)1−ηs = TFPRsPs .
13From the first order conditions, we have TFPRsi ∝
(
MRPKαssi MRPL
1−αs
si
)ηs (∏S
q=1MRPM
λqs
qsi
)1−ηs
.
14We have TFPRs ∝
(
MRPKαss MRPL
1−αs
s
)ηs (∏S
q=1MRPM
λqs
qsi
)1−ηs
, with
MRPKs ≡ αsηsPsQs
Ks
=
1∑Ns
i=1
1
MRPKsi
PsiQsi
PsQs
,
MRPLs ≡ (1− αs)ηsPsQs
Ls
=
1∑Ns
i=1
1
MRPLsi
PsiQsi
PsQs
,
MRPMqs ≡ λqs(1− ηs)PsQs
Mqsi
=
1∑Ns
i=1
1
MRPMqsi
PsiQsi
PsQs
.
The sectoral marginal revenue products hence are the weighted average of that of the firms.
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Plugging in Ps and using the prices of varieties, sectoral production takes a Cobb-Douglas
form as follows.
Qs = TFPs ·
(
Kαss L
1−αs
s
)ηs ( S∏
q=1
Mλqsqs
)1−ηs
, and TFPs =
[
Ns∑
i=1
(
Asi
TFPRs
TFPRsi
)σs−1] 1σs−1
(4.12)
I next study the allocation of resources across sectors and derive an aggregate production
function. For this purpose, it is useful to define the Domar weight vs =
PsQs
Y
, which is simply
the sales to GDP ratio. From the market clearing condition for sectoral output, we have15
V = θ +BV,
where V is the 1 by S vector of Domar weights vs, θ is the vector of sectoral shares in final
consumption θs, and the S by S matrix B is the input-output matrix with its sq
th element
bsq given by λsq(1− ηq). We can solve for the Domar weights as V = (I − B)−1θ. Without
distortions in intermediate input use, the Domar weights are determined by technology
parameters alone. We can then relate the intermediate input demand to sectoral output as,
Mqs = λqs(1− ηs)PsQs
Pq
= bqs
vs
vq
Qq.
The allocation of capital and labor across sectors is simply given by,
Ks
K
=
1
TKsαsηsvs∑S
q=1
1
TKqαqηqvq
≡ βKs,
Ls
L
=
1
TLs (1− αs)ηsvs∑S
q=1
1
TLq (1− αq)ηqvq
≡ βLs,
15Remember the market clearing condition for sectoral output is given by
PsQs = PsCs +
S∑
q=1
λsq(1− ηq)PqQq,
where I have plugged in the sectoral demand for intermediate inputs. Dividing the equation by Y and stack
it in a vector gives the result.
107
where TKs = MRPKsR and TLs = MRPLsW summarize the effect of distortions on sectoral factor
demand. Without distortions, TKs = 1 and TLs = 1.
Plugging the allocation of production factors described above into the sectoral production
function and taking logs, we have the log of sectoral production function in vector form16
q¯ = a¯+ ωq + δK logK + δL logL+B
′q¯,
where q¯ is a vector of logQs, δK a vector of αsηs, δL a vector of (1−αs)ηs, and ωq is a vector
of the allocation terms.17 The vector of log output is solved as
q¯ = (I −B′)−1(a¯+ ωq + δK logK + δL logL)
Notice that we can write Cs =
θsQs
vs
. Taking logs and stacking it into a vector, we have
c¯ = ωc + q¯,
where c¯ is the vector of logCs and ω a vector of log
θs
vs
. Using the final good production
function, we have,
log Y = θ′c¯ = θ′[ωc + (I −B′)−1(a¯+ ωq + δK logK + δL logL)]
which leads to the aggregate production function summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 The economy has an aggregate production function given by
Y = AKαL1−α, (4.13)
16The sectoral production function is given by
Qs = TFPs ·
(
(βKsK)
αs(βLsL)
1−αs)ηs [ S∏
q=1
(
bqs
vs
vq
Qq
)λqs]1−ηs
17The sth element of ωq is given by αsηs log βKs + (1− αs)ηs log βLs + (1− ηs)
∑S
q=1 λqs log
(
bqs
vs
vq
)
.
108
where total factor productivity is given by
A = γ (TFPs)
vs
S∏
s=1
[
(βKs)
αsηs (βLs)
(1−αs)ηs
]vs
, (4.14)
with γ being a constant given by
∏S
s=1
(
θs
vs
)θs∏S
s=1
[∏S
q=1
(
bqs
vs
vq
)1−ηs
λqs
]vs
and18
α = θ′(I −B′)−1δK . (4.15)
Notice that I have decomposed the aggregate total factor productivity into three terms.
The first is a constant. The second is the weighted average of sectorl TFP where the weights
are the Domar weights. This term gives the effect of distortions on within sector allocation.
The third reflects the allocation of capital and labor across sectors. If there is no misallocation
across sectors, the third term will also be constant in this Cobb-Douglas economy such that
the impact of an increase in sectoral TFP is given by its sales to GDP ratio, which is Hulten’s
theorem (Hulten, 1978).
Efficient allocation across all variety producers requires the marginal revenue products
to be equated across firms and sectors. Let Y E be the efficient output, the efficiency loss
from resource misallocation in the output model is given as
(
Y E
Y
)o
=
S∏
s=1
(
TFPEs
TFPs
)vs S∏
s=1
[(
βEKs
βKs
)αsηs (βELs
βLs
)(1−αs)ηs]vs
(4.16)
where
TFPEs =
[
Ns∑
i=1
Aσs−1si
] 1
σs−1
(4.17)
and
βEKs =
αsηsvs∑S
q=1 αqηqvq
, and βELs =
(1− αs)ηsvs∑S
q=1(1− αq)ηqvq
(4.18)
18To show that the production function has constant returns to scale, notice that the share of labor is
given by θ′(I−B)−1δL, returns to scale is then θ′(I−B′)−1(δK + δL). Since the value-added shares δK + δL
are given by (I −B′)1 where 1 is the vector of ones. It is easy to show that θ′(I −B′)−1(δK + δL) = 1.
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The two terms in the efficiency loss measure again reflect the role of within and across sector
allocation respectively.
4.3 The Value-added Model
I next present the value-added model, which comes straight from Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
with minor modifications. The model ignores sectoral linkages and assumes all firms work
with a value-added production. For the whole economy, there is still a single final product
that is the GDP of this economy. The final output is produced from sectoral value-added
with a Cobb-Douglas technology.
Y = Φ
S∑
s=1
Y θ̂ss , with
S∑
s=1
θ̂s = 1 (4.19)
where Φ is a normalizing constant and I have used a hat to indicate a variable that’s different
between the two models. Profit maximization leads to PY sYs = θ̂sY . Sectoral value-added
is an aggregate over the varieties,
Ys =
(
Ns∑
i=1
Y
σ̂s−1
σ̂s
si
) σ̂s
σ̂s−1
, (4.20)
where the elasticity of substitution σ̂s will be different from that in the output model. These
differences in parameters resemble the differences in utility functions under different views
of sectors as discussed in Herrendorf et al. (2013). For example, we can view the aggregate
production as a utility function without affecting the results of the model. Profit maximiza-
tion again leads to the inverse demand, PY si = PY sY
1
σ̂s
s Y
− 1
σ̂s
si with the price index of sectoral
value-added given by PY s =
(
P 1−σ̂sY si
) 1
1−σ̂s .
Production of the varieties uses only primary inputs,
Ysi = ÂsiK
αs
si L
1−αs
si , (4.21)
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where I have set the value-added shares of capital and labor to be identical in the two
models. The firms face idiosyncratic distortions in the factor markets. They take prices and
production technology as given and maximize,
pisi = PY siYsi − (1 + τKsi)RKsi − (1 + τLsi)WL,
where I have assumed that the size of the distortions are the same in the two models. Inferred
distortions using data however might be different in these two models, depending on whether
there are distortions in the intermediate input markets. I will discuss the inference later.
Factor market clearing conditions are defined the same as above.
Let’s proceed to define the marginal revenue products as above,
M̂RPKsi ≡ αsPY siYsi
Ksi
= (1 + τKsi)R, (4.22)
M̂RPLsi ≡ (1− αs)PY siYsi
Lsi
= (1 + τLsi)W. (4.23)
Similarly, value productivity and physical productivity are defined as,
T̂FPRsi ≡ PY siYsi
Kαssi L
1−αs
si
, (4.24)
T̂FPQsi ≡
Ysi
Kαssi L
1−αs
si
= Âsi, (4.25)
with price given by PY si =
T̂ FPRsi
Âsi
.19 Sectoral value productivity is defined as
T̂FPRs ≡ PY sYs
Kαss L
1−αs
s
. (4.26)
Making use of these definitions leads to the sectoral value-added production function
Ys = T̂FP s ·Kαss L1−αss , and T̂FP s =
 Ns∑
i=1
(
Âsi
T̂FPRs
T̂FPRsi
)σ̂s−1 1σ̂s−1 . (4.27)
19We again have T̂FPRsi ∝ M̂RPK
αs
si M̂RPL
1−αs
si .
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Given the sectoral production function, the allocation of capital and labor across sectors
is given by,
Ks
K
=
1
T̂Ksαsθ̂s∑S
q=1
1
T̂Kqαqθ̂q
≡ β̂Ks,
Ls
L
=
1
T̂Ls (1− αs)θ̂s∑S
q=1
1
T̂Lq (1− αq)θ̂q
≡ β̂Ls,
where T̂Ks = M̂RPKsR and T̂Ls = M̂RPLsW are defined as as above.20 Combining the factor
demand with the production function, the aggregate production function also has a Cobb-
Douglas form, which is introduced in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 The value-added model also admits an aggregate production function given
as
Y = ÂK α̂L1−α̂, (4.28)
where total factor productivity is given by
A = Φ
S∏
s=1
(
T̂FP s
)θ̂s S∏
s=1
[(
β̂Ks
)αs (
β̂Ls
)1−αs]θ̂s
, (4.29)
and the capital share is α̂ =
∑S
s=1 θ̂sαs.
21
Again TFP is decomposed into a within sector and a between sector component. The
exponents on sectoral TFP and the allocation terms are the sectoral shares in final ouptut
instead of the Domar weights in the output model. This difference reflects the fact that the
20The marginal revenue products are defined as
M̂RPKs ≡ αsPY sYs
Ks
=
1∑Ns
i=1
1
M̂RPKsi
PY siYsi
PY sYs
,
M̂RPLs ≡ (1− αs)PY sYs
Ls
=
1∑Ns
i=1
1
M̂RPLsi
PY siYsi
PY sYs
.
From the definition, we again have T̂FPRs ∝ M̂RPK
αs
s M̂RPL
1−αs
s .
21The share of labor is
∑S
s=1 θ̂s(1− αs). It is obvious that they sum to 1.
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shocks to productivity or resource allocation are magnified through the production network.
We can similarly decompose the efficiency loss from resource misallocation into two terms,
which is given by
(
Y E
Y
)v
=
S∏
s=1
(
T̂FP
E
s
T̂FP s
)θ̂s S∏
s=1
( β̂EKs
β̂Ks
)αs (
β̂ELs
β̂Ls
)1−αsθ̂s (4.30)
where
T̂FP
E
s =
[
Ns∑
i=1
Âσ̂s−1si
] 1
σ̂s−1
(4.31)
and
β̂EKs =
αsθ̂s∑S
q=1 αqθ̂q
, and β̂ELs =
(1− αs)θ̂s∑S
q=1(1− αq)θ̂q
(4.32)
Notice that Hsieh and Klenow (2009) focuses only on the within sector reallocation, efficiency
loss measured by them corresponds to the the first part of measured efficiency loss here.
4.4 The Equivalence of The Two Models
This section presents the equivalence results. I first show that we can transform the output
model to the value-added model with appropriate choice of parameters. I then show that
efficiency loss measured in these two models are identical for the case with no distortions in
the intermediate input markets.
4.4.1 The Proof
The proof builds the value-added model from firm value-added production and shows the
two models have the same resource allocation. I proceed in three steps. I first show that
given a value-added production function for the firms, there is an value-added production
function for the sectors. I then show that it is also the case for the whole economy. Lastly,
I prove that resource allocation in the constructed value-added model indeed conforms with
the output model.
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Step 1 I first show that sectoral output can be viewed as produced from sectoral value-
added and intermediate inputs, with sectoral value-added defined as a CES aggregator of
firm value-added while taking firm value-added production function as given. I will show in
step 3 that the two models have the same allocation of primary factors, such that the firm
value-added production function is properly defined.
Since the primary inputs and intermediate inputs are separated in output production, it
is easy to define a firm value-added production. Let’s rewrite the production function for
the variety as,
Qsi = Y
ηs
si
(
S∏
q=1
M
λqs
qsi
)1−ηs
, (4.33)
with Ysi = A
1
ηs
si K
αs
si L
1−αs
si as the firm’s value-added production function. For the moment, I
assume the firms take value-added as given and maximize profit by changing intermediate
input use only.22 Combining the transformed production function with the demand for
intermediate input of the firms, the allocation of intermediate inputs is given by
Mqsi
Mqs
=
Y
ηs(σs−1)
1+ηs(σs−1)
si∑Ns
j=1 Y
ηs(σs−1)
1+ηs(σs−1)
sj
Plugging the intermediate allocation rule back into the production functions, we can rewrite
the sectoral production function as produced from sectoral value-added and intermediate
inputs,
Qs = Y
ηs
s
(
S∏
q=1
Mλqsqs
)1−ηs
, with Ys =
(
Ns∑
i=1
Y
ηs(σs−1)
1+ηs(σs−1)
si
) 1+ηs(σs−1)
ηs(σs−1)
. (4.34)
If we set Âsi = A
1
ηs
si and σ̂s = 1 + ηs(σs − 1), we just have shown that there exists a sectoral
value-added production function which takes firm value-added as inputs.
Step 2 I next proceed to show that given the sectoral production function, final output is
given by a Cobb-Douglas aggregator of sectoral value-added.
22The result of this maximization problem is the restricted profit function.
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Plugging the demand for intermediate input Mqs =
(1−ηs)λqsPsQs
Pq
into the sectoral output
production function and taking logs, we have,
logQs = ηsQs+
S∑
q=1
(1−ηs)λqs log(1−ηs)λqs+(1−ηs)(logPs+logQs)−
S∑
q=1
(1−ηs)λqs logPq.
Solving for logQs and stacking it into a vector, we have,
q¯ = y¯ + [diag((1− η¯) η¯)− diag(η¯◦−11)B′]p¯,
where y¯ is the vector of log Ys, p¯ the vector of logPs, and ◦ the is the operator for the
element-wise Hadamard product, ◦−1 for Hadamard inverse,  for Hadamard division, and
diag transforms a vector into a diagonal matrix with its elements on the diagonal. This
equation gives the sectoral ouptu as a function of sectoral value-added and sectoral prices.
Next notice that the Domar weights links final output to sectoral price and output. Taking
logs of the Domar weight and stacking it into a vector, it reads
p¯+ q¯ = v¯ + 1 log Y,
where v¯ is the vector of log vs, and 1 is a vector of ones. Combining these two equations, we
can express p¯ as a function of log Y ,
p¯ = (I −B′)−1diag(η¯)[v¯ + 1 log Y − y¯]
Since I have used the final good as numeraire such that
∏S
s=1
(
Ps
θs
)θ
= 1. Taking logs and
combining it with the above equation, we have
θ′(I −B′)−1diag(η¯)[v¯ + 1 log Y − y¯]−
S∑
s=1
θs log θs = 0,
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which can be used to solve for final output as,
log Y = (η¯ ◦ v¯)y¯ − v¯′diagη¯v¯ −
S∑
s=1
θs log θs (4.35)
where I have made use of the fact that (η¯ ◦ v¯)1 = 1, which also implies that the production
function has constant returns to scale.23 Let θ̂s = ηsvs, I just proved that final output can
be viewed as produced from sectoral value-added with a Cobb-Douglas technology.24
Step 3 Finally, I show that the allocation of primary production factors are identical in the
two models given the same distortions in primary factor markets, which justifies the use of
firm value-added in the first step.
I start with the allocation of resources within a sector. For the output model, remember
that Psi =
TFPRsi
Asi
and PsQ
1
σs
s Q
− 1
σs
si = Psi. Combining these two equations, we have
PsiQsi ∝
(
TFPRsi
Asi
)1−σs
,
where I have made use of the definition of value productivity. Combining this equation with
firm’s factor demand, we have within sector factor allocation in the output model given as
Ksi
Ks
=
1
1+τKsi
(
TFPRsi
Asi
)1−σs
∑Ns
i=1
1
1+τKsi
(
TFPRsi
Asi
)1−σs ,
Lsi
Ls
=
1
1+τLsi
(
TFPRsi
Asi
)1−σs
∑Ns
i=1
1
1+τLsi
(
TFPRsi
Asi
)1−σs .
23From the definition of Domar weights, we have PY = (η¯ ◦ v¯)Y , where PY is the vector of nominal
value-added PY sYs. Since final output in this economy equals the sum of sectoral value-added, it is obvious
that (η¯ ◦ v¯)1 = 1.
24The normalizing constant Φ in the value-added model is given by exp
(
−
(
v¯′diagη¯v¯ +
∑S
s=1 θs log θs
))
.
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Similarly, for the value-added model, the same shares are given by
Ksi
Ks
=
1
1+τKsi
(
T̂ FPRsi
Âsi
)1−σ̂s
∑Ns
i=1
1
1+τKsi
(
T̂ FPRsi
Âsi
)1−σ̂s ,
Lsi
Ls
=
1
1+τLsi
(
T̂ FPRsi
Âsi
)1−σ̂s
∑Ns
i=1
1
1+τLsi
(
T̂ FPRsi
Âsi
)1−σ̂s .
From the definition of value productivity, we have TFPRsi = T̂FPR
1
ηs
si .
25 Combining this
information and the definition of Âsi in step 1. It is easy to see that within sector allocation
are the same in the two models. I next move to the between sector allocation. From the
discussion above, it is obvious that TKs = T̂Ks and TLs = T̂Ls. Also remember that θ̂s = ηsvs
from step 2. Across sector allocation again can be shown to be identical from comparing the
results in Section 4.2 and Section 4.3. This completes the proof. I summarize the results in
the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Let Âsi = A
1
ηs
si , σ̂s = 1 + ηs(σs − 1), and θ̂s = ηsvs, the two models are
equivalent.
The relationship between σs and σ̂s shows why it is necessary to specify the elasticity to
be sector specific. As long as the value-added shares are not identical across sectors, it is
not possible for both models to have identical elasticity of substitution across sectors. It also
says the elasticity of substitution should be different in the two models, a point emphasized
in Herrendorf et al. (2013). For practical considerations, since the elasticity is more likely
to be estimated for goods instead of value-added, the value-added studies are more likely
to have chosen wrong parameters. For example, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) cite Broda and
Weinstein (2006) and Hendel and Nevo (2006) for their choice of elasticity while both studies
estimate the parameter for goods instead of value-added. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) use 3
as a conservative measure of elasticity. If we take 3 as the elasticity for output, that for
25Remember TFPRsi ∝ (1 + τKsi)αsηs(1 + τLsi)(1−αs)ηs and T̂FPRsi ∝ (1 + τKsi)αs(1 + τLsi)(1−αs).
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value-added will be 2 if we assume ηs = 0.5 and only 1.56 if ηs = 0.28.
26 This will lower
measured efficiency loss as the larger the elasticity, the higher the cost of misallocation. The
next section shows that assigning incorrect values to the elasticity is the major reason why
the value-added model might have overstated the cost of resource misallocation.
The scaling up of productivity in the value-added model has been discussed by Bruno
(1978). It is just another manifestation of the magnification effect of sectoral linkages. To see
this clearly, consider the following one sector example. Final output is produced by labor and
intermediate input Q = ALαX1−α, which is used for consumption and intermediate inputs in
production, Q = C+X. GDP in this economy then is simply given by C = α(1−α) 1−αα A 1αX.
If we derive the aggregate production from the output production function, we realize that
the effect of a shock to productivity A is magnified through the input-output linkages. The
exponent 1
α
is the Domar weight for this economy. In the full model,the Domar weights can
be rewritten as vs =
θ̂s
ηs
such that it is clear to see the resemblance to the simple one-sector
model. On the other hand, if we are only given data on the value-added and primary inputs,
we will just scale up the size of the productivity shock. The value-added model hence is not
wrong, it just implicitly includes the magnification effect explicitly presented in the output
model.
4.4.2 Implementation
Even though the two models are theoretically equivalent in representing the underlying data,
measured efficiency loss could still be different if the wedges and productivity are incorrectly
estimated in one of the models. This subsection shows that this is not the case. Efficiency
loss measured in the two models are identical. For this exercise, assume we observe data
on output (PsiQsi), capital (Ksi), labor ( Lsi), and intermediate input use (
∑S
q=1 PqMqsi) at
260.5 is the rough value used in Jones (2011) and 0.28 is the average across industries found in the Chinese
manufacturing data used below. Note the share of intermediate inputs is higher in manufacturing, see for
example Donovan (2014).
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the firm level.27 Nominal value-added is defined as PY siYsi = PsiQsi−
∑S
q=1 PqMqsi.
28 I also
assume that we have assigned correct values to all the parameters.29
To refresh memory, I copy the efficiency loss measures from above. For the output model,
it is given by
(
Y E
Y
)o
=
S∏
s=1
(
TFPEs
TFPs
)vs S∏
s=1
[(
βEKs
βKs
)αsηs (βELs
βLs
)(1−αs)ηs]vs
For the value-added model, it is given by
(
Y E
Y
)o
=
S∏
s=1
(
T̂FP
E
s
T̂FP s
)θ̂s S∏
s=1
( β̂EKs
β̂Ks
)αs (
β̂ELs
β̂Ls
)1−αsθ̂s
Also remember the definition of sectoral TFP and the cross sector allocation rule, these
measures are operative if we have measures of firm productivity and wedges in factor markets.
I next discuss the identification of these objects in data.
For the output model, the wedges can be measured as
1 + τKsi =
αsηsPsiQsi
RKsi
,
1 + τLsi =
(1− αs)ηsPsiQsi
WLsi
27Note that I have assumed that we only observe total intermediate input in nominal values, which is
what most firm-level database can provide. Given our assumption of technology and the fact that there
is no distortions in the intermediate markets, we can attribute total expenditure on intermediate inputs to
different inputs, which can be further used to estimate the real quantity of intermediate inputs from different
sectors given appropriate price indexes for sectoral output. I will later show that this however is unnecessary
for the exercise here.
28Note that nominal value-added is measured net of wedges. See the discussion above.
29This might not be an easy job in particular for the elasticity of substitution. Previous studies have
mostly made the simplifying assumption that the parameter is the same for all sectors, for example see
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Oberfield (2013). See also the discussion in last subsection.
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For the value-added model, they are given by
1 + τKsi =
αsPY siYsi
RKsi
,
1 + τLsi =
(1− αs)PY siYsi
WLsi
Since we have PY siYsi = ηsPsiQsi, it is obvious the wedges are identical in these two models
if factor prices are assumed to be the same. We however need not to be worried about factor
prices as they cancel out when the wedges are plugged into the efficiency loss measures.
Identifying firm’s physical productivity is a bit more involved as there are no measures
of output prices or value-added prices at the firm level. Following Hsieh and Klenow (2009),
I calculate physical productivity in the output model as
Asi = P
σs
σs−1
s Q
1
σs−1
s
S∏
q=1
(
Pq
λqs
)λqs(1−ηs) (PsiQsi) σsσs−1(
Kαssi L
1−αs
si
)ηs (∑S
q=1 PqMqsi
)1−ηs ,
where I have used the allocation rule for intermediate inputs and the pricing function for the
variety. The term before the fraction can be viewed as a constant as it will be canceled out
in the process. Similarly, physical productivity measured in the value-added model is given
by,
Âsi = P
σ̂s
σ̂s−1
Y s Y
1
σ̂s−1
s
(PY siYsi)
σ̂s
σ̂s−1
Kαssi L
1−αs
si
.
To make a comparison between these two measures, notice that
∑S
q=1 PqMqsi = (1−ηs)PsiQsi
and PsiQsi =
1
ηs
PY siYsi. Plugging these into the output measure, we have
Asi = P
σs
σs−1
s Q
1
σs−1
s
S∏
q=1
(
Pq
λqs
)λqs(1−ηs) η ηsσ̂s1−σ̂ss
(1− ηs)1−ηs
(
(PY siYsi)
σ̂s
σ̂s−1
Kαssi L
1−αs
si
)ηs
Note that what matters for computing efficiency loss is the variation in physical productivity
but not the absolute level, we can thus set both of the constants to be 1, then it’s obvious
Âsi = A
1
ηs
si .
30 Given our discussion in step 3 of the equivalence proof, the relationship
30If instead we set the constants to be φ and φ̂, then we have Âsi = φ̂φ
− 1ηsA
1
ηs
si . Measured efficiency loss
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in measured wedges and firm productivity between the two models implies that measured
efficiency loss will be the same in the two models.
This result confirms that the value-added model is a correct representation of the under-
lying data generated from an output model. As discussed above, value-added productivity
observed in data implicitly includes the magnification effect of intersectoral linkages, which
is made explicit in the output model. The output model has magnification effect while mea-
sured productivity is less dispersed than in the value-added model. The two forces cancel
out each other, leaving the efficiency measure unaffected.
Identical measured efficiency loss also relies on the fact that marginal revenue products
and firm productivity can be correctly estimated in the value-added model. My definition
of value-added assumes the same intermediate prices for all firms, we thus can also view
them as a real value-added measure for the firms even though product prices are allowed to
change across firms.31 As shown by Bruno (1978), marginal revnue products and produc-
tivity for the real value-added production function can be correctly measured if the price of
intermediate inputs are constant. This condition is satisfied when there are no distortions
in the intermediate input markets. This assumption however is highly unrealistic. I proceed
to the discuss the more realistic case with intermediate input market distortions in the next
section.
4.5 Adding Intermediate Input Market Distortions
Having proved the equivalence results under the case with no distortions in intermediate
input markets, I next add these distortions and discuss the measurement of misallocation in
this more realistic case. There does not exist a correct value-added model with the newly
will still be the same in this case because the constants cancel out.
31This point becomes clearer when distortions in intermediate input use are introduced. Firms will then
face different effective prices in the intermediate input markets while value-added is defined using the same
market price.
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added distortions.32 I however continue to use the value-added model laid out in Section 4.2
as it is widely used in the literature.33 The purpose is to show how the value-added model
will bias the results. I first discuss the measurement of efficiency loss in the output model
in next section. I then discuss how the implementation is affected in Section 4.5.2.
4.5.1 Measuring Misallocation in the Output Model
I first describe how adding distortion to the intermediate inputs markets changes the mea-
surement of efficiency loss in the output model. The theoretical results in the value-added
model is not affected by this but the identification of wedges and firm productivity will be
affected, which I discuss in the next subsection.
Remember the firms try to maximize profit given distortions in factor markets from
Section 4.2,
pisi = PsiQsi − (1 + τKsi)RKsi − (1 + τLsi)WLsi − (1 + τMsi)
S∑
q=1
PqMqsi,
I now drop Assumption 2 and allow τMsi to be non-zero. Notice that I have assumed the
same wedge for all the intermediate inputs, as the data does not allow us to distinguish
distortions for inputs sourced from different sectors. This changes marginal revenue product
for intermediate inputs
MRPMqsi ≡ λqs(1− ηs)PsiQsi
Mqsi
= (1 + τMsi)Pq. (4.36)
Let TMs = MRPMqs/Pq be the distortion on sectoral intermediate input use. Market
clearing for sectoral output now reads as,
PsQs = PsCs +
S∑
q=1
1
TMqλsq(1− ηq)PqQq,
32This is because there is no value-added production function at the sector level. That is, step 1 of the
proof in Section 4.4.1 breaks down.
33See the review of literature in the Section 4.1.
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which is now also distorted given the presence of TMs. Let B˜ = B ◦ diag(T ◦−1M ) with TM
denoting the vector of TMs. The vector of Domar weights V˜ can then be solved from,
V˜ = θ + B˜V˜ .
Domar weights are now affected by market distortions, V˜ = (I − B˜)−1θ with its element
given by v˜s. Let the sq
th element of B˜ be b˜sq. We can then write the intermediate input
demand of sector s for sector q’s good as Mqs = b˜qs
vs
vq
Qq. This leads to the vector of log
sectoral output
q¯ = (I −B′)−1(a¯+ ω˜q + δK logK + δL logL),
where the vector ω˜q again summarizes the information on sectoral factor allocation.
34 This
further leads to an aggregate production function summarized as follows.
Proposition 8 The economy with intermediate input market distortions has a aggregate
production function given as
Y = A˜KαL1−α, (4.37)
with total factor productivity is given by
A˜ = γ˜
S∏
s=1
(TFPs)
v˜s
S∏
s=1
[
(βKs)
αsηsv˜s (βLs)
(1−αs)ηsv˜s
]
, (4.38)
where γ˜ =
∏S
s=1
(
θs
vs
)θs∏S
s=1
[∏S
q=1
(
b˜qs
vs
vq
)1−ηs
λqs
]v˜s
and α is defined as above.
Compared to Proposition 5, γ˜ is no longer a constant. The fact that the Domar weights
are no longer constant however makes the measurement of efficiency loss much more involved.
Notice that the aggregate output elasticity of capital and labor stays intact, such that the
effect of misallocation still manifests itself as a shock to TFP. To make it more comparable
to the existing literature, I go on to analyze the case with no misallocation across sectors by
making the following assumption,
34Its element is given by αsηs log βKs + (1− αs)ηs log βLs + (1− ηs)
∑S
q=1 λqs log
(
b˜qs
vs
vq
)
.
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Assumption 3 TJs = 1,∀J ∈ {K,L,M} and s ∈ {1, 2, ...S}.
This assumption directs attention to within sector allocation as in Hsieh and Klenow (2009).
It also allows us to identify the factor shares in the production function using sectoral
aggregates. Otherwise they can not be distinguished from the market distortions. With this
assumption, efficient loss from resource misallocation in the output model reduces to
(
Y E
Y
)o
=
S∏
s=1
(
TFPEs
TFPs
)vs
, (4.39)
while that in the value-added model is
(
Y E
Y
)v
=
S∏
s=1
(
T̂FP
E
s
T̂FP s
)θ̂s
. (4.40)
With Assumption 3, the efficiency loss measures are identical in the two models if we have
correct measures of revenue and physical productivity. This is surprising as the value-added
model does not actually exist. Measured efficiency loss however will be different in the two
models because marginal revenue products and firm productivity will be incorrectly inferred
in the value-added model while the output model still leads to correct measures. The next
subsection makes this point clear and discusses how the value-added model might measure
efficiency loss in data wrong.
4.5.2 Implementation
This subsection performs the same exercise in Section 4.4.2 with hypothetical data on firm
production and value-added computed as subtracting intermediate inputs from output. Im-
portantly, intermediate inputs are assumed to be measured with the same market prices in
the data, such that constructed value-added can be thought of a real value-added measure
as firms actually face different prices in the intermediate input markets due to the presence
of wedges.
Wedges and productivity in the output model will be correctly measured following the
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discussion in the previous section, but it is no longer the case for the value added model.
Using the first-order condition for intermediate input use, value-added is now solved as
PY siYsi =
(
1− 1− ηs
1 + τMsi
)
PsiQsi, (4.41)
which when plugged into the first order condition for the value-added model leads to
1 + τKsi =
αs
(
1− 1−ηs
1+τMsi
)
PsiQsi
RKsi
,
1 + τLsi =
(1− αs)
(
1− 1−ηs
1+τMsi
)
PsiQsi
WLsi
It is obvious the wedges are mismeasured by a factor of 1
ηs
− 1−ηs
ηs(1+τMsi)
as the share of
intermediate inputs in total output is distorted. Following the same steps in section 4.4.2,
firm productivity in the output model can be rewritten as
Asi = P
σs
σs−1
s Q
1
σs−1
s
S∏
q=1
(
Pq
λqs
)λqs(1−ηs) (1− 1−ηs
1+τMsi
) ηsσ̂s
1−σ̂s
(1 + τMsi)
1−ηs
(1− ηs)1−ηs
(
(PY siYsi)
σ̂s
σ̂s−1
Kαssi L
1−αs
si
)ηs
Assume the constant terms are 1 as before, we now have firm productivity in the value-added
model given by
Âsi =
(
1− 1− ηs
1 + τMsi
) σ̂s
σ̂s−1
(1 + τMsi)
ηs−1
ηs A
1
ηs
si
Measured physical productivity hence is also distorted by the presence of distortions in the
intermediate inputs markets.
I next proceed to express sectoral productivity in terms of inferred firm productivity and
wedges. For the output model, it is given by
TFPs =
(
Ns∑
i=1
(
Asi
[(1 + τKsi)αs(1 + τLsi)1−αs ]
ηs (1 + τMsi)1−ηs
)σs−1) 1σs−1
, (4.42)
while efficiency sectoral TFP in the output model is only determined by firm productivity
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as described above, TFPEs =
(∑Ns
i=1 A
σs−1
si
) 1
σs−1
. This equation breaks down revenue pro-
ductivity and allows us to see the effect of different distortions more clearly. In the case of
the value-added model, sectoral TFP is given by
T̂FP s =
 Ns∑
i=1
 Asi
(
1− 1−ηs
1+τMsi
) 1
σs−1
[(1 + τKsi)αs(1 + τLsi)1−αs ]
ηs (1 + τMsi)1−ηs

σs−1
1
ηs(σs−1)
. (4.43)
This result comes from mismeasured wedges in capital and labor use and physical productiv-
ity, and also reflects the fact that distortions in the intermediate input markets are not taken
into account in computing revenue productivity of firms. Given mismeasured firm physical
productivity, efficient sectoral TFP will also be mismeasured as
T̂FP
E
s =
 Ns∑
i=1
(
Asi
(
1− 1− ηs
1 + τMsi
) 1+ηs(σs−1)
σs−1
(1 + τMsi)
ηs−1
)σs−1 1ηs(σs−1) (4.44)
Measurement errors at the firm level thus build up, such that both actual and efficient
sectoral TFP will deviate from the true measures. These findings confirm the results of
Bruno (1978): the real value-added production function will leads to incorrect measures
of marginal products and productivity. Bruno (1984) has used this idea to explain the
productivity slowdown and Basu and Fernald (1995) find it useful in understanding why
productivity spillover across industries exists in value-added data but not in output data.
I show here that the mismeasurement builds up to the sector level and further leads to
mismeasured efficiency loss in the value-added model.
From the results above, it is not clear in which direction the value-added model will
bias measured efficiency loss. To see this more clearly, I next approximate the measures by
assuming Asi, 1 + τY si,
35 and (1 + τMsi) jointly follow a log-normal distribution, with the log
of the latter two having zero mean. I further assume ηs = 0.5 such that 1 − 1−ηs1+τMsi can be
351 + τY si is defined as (1 + τKsi)
αs(1 + τLsi)
1−αs , which summarizes the distortion in primary input use.
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approximated by 1
2
(1 + τMsi).
36 Efficiency loss for a single sector in these two models can be
approximated by37
log
(
TFPEs
TFPs
)vs
=
vs(1− σs)
2
(
σ2y
4
+
σ2m
4
− σay − σam + σym
2
)
,
where σ2x is the variance of variable x and σxz is the covariance between variables x and z.
Efficiency loss in the value-added model is approximated by
log
(
T̂FP
E
s
T̂FP s
)θ̂s
=
vs(1− σs)
2
[
σ2y
4
+
(
1
4
− 1
σs − 1
)
σ2m − σay − σam +
(
1
2
− 1
σs − 1
)
σym
]
Hence efficiency loss measured in these two model is differed by
log
(
TFPEs
TFPs
)vs
− log
(
T̂FP
E
s
T̂FP s
)θ̂s
= −vs
2
(σ2m + σym) (4.45)
From this comparison, efficiency loss in the value-added model can be biased from that in
the output model in either direction. The sign and the size of the bias depends on how the
wedges for intermediate inputs are distributed. I next go on to explore the bias empirically
using Chinese data.
4.6 An Application to Chinese Data
In this section I take the models to data and evaluate the bias in the value-added efficiency
loss measure quantitatively. The data I use is the Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial
Production in 2005. Since the survey is only for the the industrial sector, it is not sufficient
for measuring aggregate efficiency loss. Instead I will look at efficiency loss measures at
36The assumed value-added share in output is not so different from aggregate data. See Jones (2011) for
the evidence. The share might be different across sectors, as shown in the Chinese data in the next section.
37Notice the measure is raised by the Domar weights. This expression actually gives the contribution of
sector s to aggregate efficiency loss. It is the same case for the value-added model.
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4-digit industry level using both models.38 Despite that there are complicated input-output
linkages between the sectors, the discussion above shows that what we need is only the
sector’s Domar weight if we ignore cross sector misallocation. The purpose in this section
is to show how the use of the value-added model might distorts measured efficiency loss at
the industry level, as distortions in the intermediate input use enters our measure of firm
value-added.
The Survey of Industrial Production covers all non-state firms with more than 5 million
yuan in revenue plus all state-owned firms in the industrial sector, which includes mining,
manufacturing, utilities, and construction. I use the information on the firm’s industry
(at the four-digit level), wage payments,39 employment, output, value-added, capital stock,
and intermediate inputs. Capital stock is defined as the book value of fixed capital net of
depreciation. Labor compensation in the data is systematically under-reported such that
calculated industrial labor share is much smaller than those in the national accounts.40 To
correct for the under-reporting, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) raise the wage payments of all firms
to make aggregate labor share calculated from the survey consistent with national accounts
data. This however will create a labor share larger than 1 for some industries. To make the
industry labor shares bounded by 1, I raise wage payments by a factor of 2.75 for firms in the
industries with raw labor share less than 0.3 and by a factor of 1.26 for all other firms. This
assumes that the industries with smaller labor share surfer more from the under-reporting
of wage payments. Note that I only study misallocation within a sector, this adjustment
should not bias the results too much. The procedure produces an aggregate labor share of
0.5. Finally, to allow for differences in worker human capital across firms, I use wage bills as
my measurement of labor input instead of employment.
To measure efficiency loss, we need to assign values to parameters αs, ηs, σs, and vs.
38That is, log
(
TFPEs
TFPs
)vs
and log
(
T̂FP
E
s
T̂FP s
)θ̂s
as in last section.
39Wage payments include wages, retirement and unemployment insurance, health insurance, housing
benefits, and employee supplementary benefits.
40It can be clearly seen in the data. For example, 59% of all firms report zero unemployment insurance
payment, 38% of all firms report zero health insurance payment, while both of which are mandatory by the
law.
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of the Output Share of Intermediate Inputs
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Note: The distribution of 1− ηs at the industry level is plotted.
The output share parameters come from dividing factor payments by total output in an
industry, thanks to the assumption that there is no misallocation across sectors. Capital
income is derived by subtracting from total output the expenditure on intermediate input
and the adjusted payment to labor. To relieve the burden of assign different elasticity of
substitution for so many industries, I assume σs is 3 for all industries. This implies that
σ̂s = 1 + ηs(σs − 1) is different across industries for the value-added model if ηs is different
across industries. Figure 4.1 plots the distribution of the output share of intermediate inputs
(1 − ηs) for the 482 industries in the data. Most industries have relative high shares and
there is some variation across industries. The average across industries is 0.72. Finally, as
vs affects both measures to the same degree, I simply normalize it to 1.
Figure 4.2 compares measured efficiency loss in the two models. The measures are not so
different in the two models as most points center around the 45 degree line. The difference
between the two measures is less than 5 percentage points for over 95% of the industries.
There is no evidence that one model produces results substantially lower than the other, a
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Figure 4.2: Efficiency Loss in Different Models
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Note: What’s plotted is log
(
TFPEs
TFPs
)vs
and log
(
T̂ FP
E
s
T̂ FP s
)θ̂s
, both computed
by the author.
point my theoretical analysis emphasizes above. Despite the magnification effect of produc-
tion networks, the reason that the efficiency loss in the output model is not substantially
larger than that in the value-added model is lower dispersion of firm TFP measured in the
output model. This can be clearly seen from Figure 4.3, where the standard deviation of
log firm TFP in the output model is plotted against that in the value-added model. It is
also interesting to point out that the dispersion measured in the output model are quite
similar across industries, while it shows much more variation in the value-added model.41
This suggests that the differences in the dispersion of firm TFP across industries also come
from differences in intermediate input share across industries.
Efficiency loss measured in the value-added model will only deviate from that in the
output model if there are distortions in intermediate input use. The fact that the two
41The coefficient of variation across industries is 0.25 in the value-added model and 0.18 in the output
model.
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Figure 4.3: Dispersion of Firm Productivity in Different Models
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Note: Here dispersion is measured by standard deviation of log productivity.
measures stay close to each other suggest that distortions in intermediate input might be
mild. Figure 4.4 confirms this in the data, where I plot the density of the marginal revenue
product (in logs) of primary inputs and Intermediate inputs relative to their industry average
respectively.42 While the marginal revenue product of primary inputs has a very dispersed
distribution with a standard deviation of 0.85, that of intermediate inputs centers around
the industry average with a standard deviation of only 0.19. This confirms the finding of
Krishna and Tang (2018).
The elasticity of substitution in the value-added model is assumed to be different across
industries. If we instead use a constant elasticity by imposing the intermediate input share
for the whole industrial sector on σ̂s = 1 + ηs(σs − 1). The resulted efficiency loss will
not be so different. On the other hand, if we assume the elasticity is 3 as in Hsieh and
Klenow (2009), the value-added model will produce much larger efficiency loss than the
output model. This is because the true elasticity for the value-added model is only 1.56 on
42They are given by MRPKαssi MRPL
1−αs
si and
∏S
q=1MRPM
λqs
qsi .
131
Figure 4.4: Dispersion of Marginal Revenue Products
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λqs
qsi , both relative to the industry average.
average given the transformation from the output model to the value-added model. This
result is plotted in Figure 4.5. Measured efficiency loss is larger in the value-added model
for over 95% of the industries and the difference between the two models is 14 percentage
points on average. This finding suggests that the value-added model actually overstates
efficiency loss due to incorrectly assigned elasticity of substitution. Production networks will
not help in accounting for international income differences by raising measured efficiency loss
from resource misallocation but tends to lower the estimated cost of misallocation once the
differences between the output model and the value-added model are fully appreciated.
Finally, I examine how the approximation at the end of Section 4.5 compares to data.
Under the log normality assumption, the approximation of efficiency loss says that
(
TFPEs
TFPs
)vs
>
(
T̂FP
E
s
T̂FP s
)θ̂s
⇐⇒ σ2m + σym < 0.
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Figure 4.5: Efficiency Loss in Different Models with σs = σ̂s = 3
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Note: Here I have assigned 3 to σ̂s instead of using the theoretically correct
value.
Table 4.1 presents the frequency counts of these incidents. If the approximation is accurate,
we should observe larger numbers in the off diagonal cells. This is indeed the case in data.
If σ2m + σym < 0, the probability of observing
(
TFPEs
TFPs
)vs
>
(
T̂ FP
E
s
T̂ FP s
)θ̂s
is 0.70. On the other
hand, if σ2m + σym > 0, the probability of observing
(
TFPEs
TFPs
)vs
<
(
T̂FP
E
s
T̂ FP s
)θ̂s
is 0.61. On
average, the approximation will have the correct prediction on the relative size of efficiency
loss measured in the two models at a probability a little over 2/3. A t-test that the prediction
is random is rejected with a p-value less than 0.0001.
Table 4.1: Frequency Counts
σ2m + σym > 0 σ
2
m + σym < 0(
TFPEs
TFPs
)vs
>
(
T̂ FP
E
s
T̂ FP s
)θ̂s
28 286
(
TFPEs
TFPs
)vs
<
(
T̂ FP
E
s
T̂ FP s
)θ̂s
44 124
Data source: Authors’ own calculation.
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4.7 Summary
This chapter shows that the widely-used value-added framework of Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
does not necessarily understate the cost of resource misallocation. If there are no distortions
in the intermediate input markets, a model with a production network a la Long and Plosser
(1983) can be transformed into the value-added model and the two models produce the same
efficiency loss. If there are distortions in the intermediate input markets, the value-added
model produces biased results but the bias can go in either direction. The literature using
the value-added model, if anything, might have overstated the efficiency loss due to the use
of higher elasticity of substitution that is only suitable for the output model.
The findings in this chapter support the idea of Herrendorf et al. (2013) that we can
either view sectors as categories of final expenditure or value-added. Both models can be
correct representations of the same underlying data and they are connected through the
input-output linkages. The findings also suggest that the models can be easily mis-specified
if we don’t distinguish between the two perspectives explicitly, a point also emphasized in
Herrendorf et al. (2013). Given the recent surge in the study of production networks and
multi-sector models in general, we should pay more attention to the distinction between final
expenditure and value-added and how value-added models might be mis-specified.
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